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Contemporary virtue ethicists have largely followed Aristotle in accepting what Karen Stohr 
calls the harmony thesis. This thesis claims that a virtuous agent will not experience inner 
conflict or pain when acting. His reasons, desires, and actions will correspond and be in harmony 
with one another. A merely continent agent, on the other hand, is one who is said to perform the 
same action as the virtuous agent, but experiences inner conflict or pain in doing so. While the 
harmony thesis provides a useful criterion for demarcating virtue from continence, we can 
imagine cases where acting with conflict or pain is not only appropriate but necessary in the 
situation. In these cases the virtue/continence distinction cannot be easily drawn. This difficulty 
for the harmony thesis is better known as the problem of continence. In writing this dissertation I 
have three goals: show that the problem of continence poses a threat to the harmony thesis, offer 
a solution to the problem, and make that solution fit the needs of contemporary virtue ethics. 
 In bringing about the first goal, I begin by introducing the harmony thesis and show that, 
in the contemporary context, the virtue/continence distinction takes on a much more expanded 
scope than espoused by Aristotle. For example, McDowell applies it to courage; Foot to honesty, 
charity, and justice; and Hursthouse to nearly all the moral virtues. While useful for 
contemporary virtue ethicists, this more robust conception makes the harmony thesis susceptible 
to problematic cases that Aristotle did not have to face. Chapter 2 explores a problematic case 
offered by Stohr involving a company owner who needs to fire several of her employees in order 
to save the company from ruin. Because acting rightly in the case requires an agent experience 
inner conflict or pain, only the continent agent can deliver. This puts the status of the virtuous 
agent in a compromising position: either be deemed morally lacking (in some way) compared to 
the continent agent or deny that the standard of virtue is sharply distinct from continence. In 
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looking for a way out of the dilemma, Chapter 3 explores some attempts at a solution offered by 
Sarah Broadie, Susan Stark, David Carr, Geoffey Scarre, and Howard Curzer, concluding that 
none of the mentioned solutions adequately solve the problem of continence. 
 The second goal of the dissertation is reached in three steps. I first return to the traditional 
account of continence defended by Aristotle. In a neo-Aristotelian spin drawing on Terence 
Irwin and Ursula Coope, I argue in Chapter 4 that continence should be interpreted as a failure of 
rationality rather than one of feeling. By redefining continence in this way, the real problem in 
Stohr's counterexample can be homed in on: the company owner who fires her employees with 
ease feels less pain than she should. The second step sets out to make sense of what it means to 
feel an inappropriate amount of pain. In Chapter 5, I propose that we turn to Aristotle's virtue of 
endurance to make sense of the defect. The third step uses the virtue of endurance to show that 
the defect in the company owner that acts with ease is that he is subject to the vice of hardness– 
feeling less pain than he should–not that virtue is inferior to continence in the case.   
 Having accounted for Stohr's problem case, I address the other horn of the dilemma in 
Chapters 6 by offering an improved method for drawing the virtue/continence distinction. I do 
this by expanding and refining the concept of endurance. This culminates into a sophisticated 
account making use of temperance, continence, endurance, softness, and hardness. This meets 
my third goal by allowing the contemporary virtue ethicist to utilize continence and/or endurance 
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Chapter 1: The Harmony Thesis 
 
1. Introduction  
 The harmony thesis holds that a virtuous agent's reasons, actions, and desires will correspond 
and be in harmony with one another. The virtuous agent, accordingly, is taken to not experience 
inner conflict or pain when acting virtuously.1 The idea has ancient origins, extending at least as 
far back as Plato, and appearing in its most comprehensive form in Aristotle.2 In developing the 
thesis, Aristotle contrasts the preferable, harmonious state to two types of non-harmonious states: 
incontinence and continence.3 The incontinent agent, according to Aristotle, has the right reasons, 
but both his actions and desires fail to conform to right reason. The continent agent on the other 
hand, has the right reasons, and performs the right action, but has desires that conflict with right 
reason. The conflicting desires in question are then indicated by inner conflict or pain when 
acting. Under the harmony thesis, pointing to the expressed difficulty that a continent agent 
experiences when acting rightly allows us to claim that, while superior to the incontinent agent, 
he is still morally defective or lacking compared to the virtuous agent who does not have to 
struggle. Thus, the continent agent, while praiseworthy for his self-control, is judged to be 
morally inferior to the virtuous agent. By these standards, the harmony thesis gives rise to a 
                                                
1 Virtue ethicists commonly subscribe to the additional claim that a virtuous agent should also take pleasure in 
acting virtuously. But I believe this to be a separate issue, and see no reason why the harmony thesis needs to be 
committed to this requirement. In this dissertation, I will take the force of the harmony thesis to stand independent of 
the stronger pleasure requirement. 
2 In particular, see Plato's Republic. The Stoics also make use of the harmony thesis. See Annas (1993), esp. pp. 
159–179, for a good treatment of this subject.  
3 It might be argued that viciousness is a harmonious state. See Irwin (2001). I will return to this point in Chapter 4. 
For now, we can say that only a vicious agent's actions and desires correspond, not his reasons. This would be 
enough to discredit viciousness as a superior state according to the harmony thesis.  
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sharp division between virtue and continence based on the ease or difficulty with which virtuous 
actions are performed.  
 It must be acknowledged that Aristotle confined the harmony thesis exclusively to cases 
involving bodily pleasures, or the domain of temperance.4 This restricted scope provided the 
harmony thesis a relatively clear criterion for distinguishing a virtuous agent from a continent 
agent. If an agent performed the right action with ease and without pain in resisting some bodily 
pleasure judged contrary to reason, he was deemed temperate. If an agent performed the right 
action with difficulty and pain in resisting some bodily pleasure judged contrary to reason, he 
was deemed continent. In the modern context, however, the harmony thesis takes on a much 
more expanded scope. Prominent virtue ethicists like Philippa Foot, John McDowell, Rosalind 
Hursthouse, and Julia Annas have all extended the usage of the harmony thesis beyond the 
domain of temperance. I will call this expanded usage of the harmony thesis outside of the 
domain of temperance the robust conception of the harmony thesis.  
 The purpose of this chapter is to defend the crucial role that the robust conception of the 
harmony thesis plays in contemporary virtue ethics. In Section 2, I offer evidence that the 
acceptance of the harmony thesis is widespread, and give a number of examples of the harmony 
thesis being applied outside of the domain of temperance by contemporary virtue ethicists (being 
representative of the robust conception). From here, having established that the robust 
conception of the harmony thesis is utilized by contemporary virtue ethicists, I go on to make the 
stronger argument in Section 3 that the robust conception of the harmony thesis is a vital 
component of the contemporary debate and entrenched in the field of virtue ethics. Section 4 
gives support for the claim that the harmony thesis is useful for contemporary virtue ethics. 
                                                
4 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (hereafter NE), Book 7. 
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Finally, Section 5, drawing on what was previously claimed, argues that the robust conception of 
the harmony thesis made use of by contemporary virtue ethicists is worth maintaining, before 
concluding in Section 6.  
 
2. The Robust Conception of the Harmony Thesis   
The harmony thesis–more specifically the robust conception of the harmony thesis–has gained 
widespread acceptance in contemporary virtue ethics. In order to support this claim, I will do two 
things. First, I offer textual evidence from a number of notable virtue ethicists showing their 
endorsement of the harmony thesis. This endorsement, it should be noted, implies more than that 
the virtue/continence distinction can be drawn (or that virtue ethicists accept the 
virtue/continence distinction). The harmony thesis entails a specific way to draw the 
virtue/continence distinction. To be clear, the harmony thesis will both claim that there is a 
virtue/continence distinction, and that it is determined by the ease or difficulty with which 
virtuous actions are performed.5 My argument holds that the harmony thesis is widely accepted, 
not simply that the virtue/continence distinction is widely accepted. The second thing I do is 
provide evidence that the harmony thesis is applied outside of the domain of temperance. In 
doing so, I aim to establish that the contemporary virtue ethicists discussed endorse the robust 
conception of the harmony thesis.  
  One of the first virtue ethicists in the contemporary tradition to give the virtue/continence 
distinction a serious treatment was Philippa Foot. In the second section of her seminal paper, 
"Virtues and Vices," Foot sets out to make sense of the continent agent. There seems to be, as 
                                                
5 The harmony thesis will also want to claim that the virtuous agent is superior to the continent agent. But this 
assumption could be questioned. For example, Karen Stohr (2003) denies that acting with ease is necessarily 
superior to acting with difficulty in every circumstance. I address this important criticism in Chapter 2. At this stage, 
I hold that the harmony thesis can consistently be held without making reference to superiority.    
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Foot claims, something incredibly admirable about the person who, through sheer force of will, 
is able to resist temptation (1978: p. 6). She has in mind, not small temptations like avoiding a 
tasty treat, but rather those temptations that really test us. The continent agent succeeds where 
most people fail. The continent agent, then, is morally better than a regular person. He 
demonstrates a level of self-control that exceeds that of a normal person. And the more difficult 
the circumstances; the more the continent agent has to struggle to overcome conflicting desires; 
the stronger we take him to be, or the more self-control we attribute to him.  
 On the other hand, the fact that the continent agent has to struggle to do the right thing 
points to some defect in his character. It seems to indicate that he lacks virtue, or fails to 
appreciate what is important. The conflict that the continent agent experiences shows that he still 
possesses desires that he should not have, or has conflicting desires that are stronger than they 
should be. In this sense, we want to say that it would be better if the continent agent did not have 
these conflicting desires. It would be better if the continent agent did not have to struggle. Thus, 
while the continent agent's self-control is admirable, it falls short of virtue. Here we see the 
application of the harmony thesis. The continent agent is deemed morally inferior to the virtuous 
agent because he has to struggle to act virtuously. Textual evidence for this from Foot can be 
found in the following passage:  
For on the one hand great virtue is needed where it is particularly 
hard to act virtuously; yet on the other hand it could be argued that 
difficulty in acting virtuously shows that the agent is imperfect in 
virtue: according to Aristotle to take pleasure in virtuous action is a 
mark of true virtue, with the self-mastery of the one who finds 
virtue difficult only a second best. (1978: p. 6)  
 
What is important, and a point that Foot stresses, is that there is something special or unique 
about the virtue/continence distinction. It is not simply the case that continence is simpliciter 
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inferior to virtue. Continence is admirable in its own right, something to be praised above all 
other states, other than virtue.6  It really is, as Foot claims above, "second best." 
 So far, we have evidence that Foot endorsed the harmony thesis. But it can also be shown 
that she accepts the robust conception of the harmony thesis. Two examples of the harmony 
thesis being applied outside of the domain of temperance from the text are as follows:  
[1] We may suppose for instance that a man has the opportunity to 
steal, in circumstances where stealing is not morally permissible, 
but he refrains. And now let us ask our old question. For one man 
it is hard to refrain from stealing and for another it is not: which 
shows the greater virtue in acting as he should? (Foot 1978: p. 7)7  
 
[2] Some circumstances, as that great sacrifice is needed, or that 
the one to be helped is a rival, give an occasion on which a man's 
charity is severely tested. Yet in given circumstances of this kind it 
is the man who acts easily rather than the one who finds it hard 
who shows the most charity. Charity is a virtue of attachment, and 
the sympathy for others which makes it easier to help them is part 
of the virtue itself. (Foot 1978: p. 7) 
 
The first case given involves honesty8 and the second case involves charity. These cases clearly 
do not involve bodily pleasures. And it follows, in both cases, that the harmony thesis is being 
                                                
6 We might ask whether continence is superior to mere natural virtue. This is difficult question. I believe Aristotle, 
at least, would deny this. Mere natural virtue, unlike virtue proper or continence, does not involve reason. The 
naturally virtuous person, in a sense, is just lucky. His desires and actions happen to correspond to right reason, but 
it might be more appropriate to say, more in line with the harmony thesis, that the mere naturally virtuous person has 
no reason at all; lacking harmony in the more sophisticated sense. The clearest argument for why acting rightly by 
accident is an inferior state can be found in Aristotle's dismissal of the paradoxical vicious, incontinent agent who 
always performs the right action through an unintentional failure of the will (see NE 1146a20–30). While both the 
vicious, incontinent agent and continent agent perform the right action, only the continent agent is praised. Here, I 
believe it is appropriate to say continence is the superior state.       
7 Foot's comparison of the two agents (the poor man whose circumstances provide much temptation to steal and the 
rich man who has little temptation to steal) in this example has led to much confusion. At first blush, it seems that 
Foot sides with the poor man, attributing greater virtue to him, or leaves the question unanswered. But we should 
avoid interpreting the example this way. It would, as Foot would need to concede, follow that the rich man if he is 
truly virtuous, would still not be tempted to steal if circumstances changed, for instance he lost all his money. If this 
were not the case, virtue might be judged as fickle or variable, depending on the circumstances–a position we want 
to avoid. Some philosophers will want to deny this move. For example, see Doris (1998) and Harman (1999). In any 
case, the example that follows shortly after, involving charity, clearly expresses Foot's preferred view on the matter 
(where the honesty case, I believe, is intentionally set up as a foil to bring to light the intuitive appeal of continence). 
8 Justice is probably a more appropriate description here. But Foot takes the term honesty, in the expanded sense, to 
encompass the case in question.   
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applied to determine the virtue/continence distinction. I take this as reason to believe that Foot 
endorses the robust conception of the harmony thesis.  
 Another important figure in contemporary virtue ethics is John McDowell. In a series of 
papers McDowell argues that the virtuous agent possesses a special type of moral sensitivity.9 
This sensitivity has two aspects. The first aspect allows the virtuous agent to see the salient or 
morally important features of a situation (McDowell 1979: p. 332). It is a sort of perceptual 
capacity that reliably picks out what is morally required, or how to act in a particular situation.  
The second aspect silences, or blocks, non-moral or opposing considerations from being reasons 
for action in the situation. McDowell takes the continent agent to lack the virtuous agent's moral 
sensitivity (1979: p. 335). Because the continent agent has contrary desires or inclinations, it 
shows that he does not have the same perception of the situation as the virtuous person. He is 
morally defective in this sense. The agent who has to struggle to do the right thing "shows not 
virtue but (mere) continence" (McDowell 1979: p. 334). Hence, McDowell can be said to adhere 
to the harmony thesis in drawing the virtue/continence distinction.   
 McDowell also extends the virtue/continence distinction to courage: 
Virtues like temperance and courage involve steadfastness in face 
of characteristic sorts of temptation, and it can seem impossible to 
register that fact without regarding them as cases of continence. 
Insisting nevertheless on the distinction between virtue and 
continence yields a view of these virtues which has a certain 
sublimity. Their proper manifestation is a renunciation, without 
struggle, of something which in the abstract one would value 
highly (physical pleasure, security of life and limb). (1978: p. 27) 
 
This is an interesting passage. Looking at the case of courage, the courageous person, when 
facing death or harm, is taken by McDowell to possess a sort of tranquility that the continent 
agent lacks (1978: pp. 27–28). While both will toe the line, so to speak, the latter is taken to have 
                                                
9 See McDowell (1978), (1979), and (1980). 
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to resist the temptation to run away, escape, dodge responsibility, etc. This is not to say the 
virtuous agent is oblivious to danger, or does not value his own life. Rather, the concerns in 
question are silenced for the virtuous agent. Therefore, we can say, in the case of courage, the 
virtuous agent performs the courageous action without inner conflict or pain, and the continent 
agent experiences inner conflict and pain when performing the courageous action. I take this as 
evidence that McDowell accepts the robust conception of the harmony thesis. 
 Rosalind Hursthouse, in her influential book, On Virtue Ethics, takes herself to be 
presenting a comprehensive collection of the central ideas of contemporary virtue ethics.10 She 
takes the characteristic behavior of the virtuous agent to be the appropriate standard for right 
action. Part of this characteristic behavior is to perform the right action easily or without inner 
conflict. Hursthouse's endorsement of the harmony thesis can be seen in the following passage:   
Simply, the continent character is the one who, typically, knowing 
what she should do, does it, contrary to her desires, and the fully 
virtuous character is the one who, typically, knowing what she 
should do, does it, desiring to do it. Her desires are in complete 
harmony with her reason; hence, when she does what she should, 
she does what she desires to do, and reaps the reward of satisfied 
desire. (1999: p. 92) 
 
 It is also apparent that Hursthouse takes the above standard to be expansive, and not 
simply limited to the virtue of temperance. The clearest indication that Hursthouse intends the 
above standard to apply to all, or nearly all, the moral virtues, is expressed in her fourth 
requirement for acting virtuously:  
(4) The agent has the appropriate feeling(s) or attitude(s) when she 
acts. (1999: p. 125)11 
                                                
10 Hursthouse claims her book to capture the central ideas of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, in particular. I take her 
claims to apply more broadly, but if pressed will concede that my meaning here is neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics 
when I say contemporary virtue ethics.  
11 The other three requirements are: (1) [The agent performs a certain sort of action that is virtuous or good] (p. 
123); (2) The agent must know what she is doing... (p. 124); and (3) The agent acts for a reason, moreover, for the 




Because the continent agent experiences inner conflict or pain when acting virtuously, he fails to 
meet the fourth requirement, falling short of virtue. Hence, the virtue/continence distinction in 
this case is determined by the ease or difficulty with which virtuous actions are performed (in 
general).12 It would then be appropriate to say that Hursthouse is committed to the robust 
conception of the harmony thesis.   
 Julia Annas makes large use of the harmony thesis in her recent book, Intelligent Virtue. 
In her book, Annas defends a skill model of virtue. She takes virtue to be a type of moral 
expertise, and capable of being captured in developmental stages. One of the final steps in the 
process toward full virtue is performing virtuous actions effortlessly or with ease. Just as the 
expert pianist no longer needs to think about how to play the next chord or attempt the next scale, 
the virtuous agent does not need to mull the details, or struggle to perform a virtuous action 
(Annas 2011: p. 29).  The continent agent, according to Annas, has not yet reached this stage of 
development:   
Putting the difference in this way clearly expresses the idea that the 
encratic [continent person] is someone who has not yet matured or 
grown up; there is something still missing in his development... 
The encratic's actions are not in tune with her feelings, so although 
she may do the virtuous act, she does not do it as the virtuous 
person would do it; she can do the right thing, but is virtuous only 
in the way that the learner is, and so cannot yet properly be called 
virtuous. (2011: p. 67) 
 
Just like a novice in other skills, we can say the continent agent has certain deficiencies in his 
performance. While he can replicate the actions of the virtuous agent, he fails to do them as a 
virtuous agent would do them.  
                                                
12 Because the fourth requirement is a major standard for Hursthouse's definition of virtuous action it would be 
highly unusual if she implicitly meant for it to apply to only temperance, or a limited number of virtues. Additional 
evidence for my interpretation can be found in a footnote, were Hursthouse acknowledges that she is using 
continence in the general sense, rather than the limited sense made use of by Aristotle (see 1999: p. 92).   
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 Annas goes on to apply the virtue/continence distinction in the following example: 
The encratic [continent person], then, does what is tactful, brave, 
or beneficent, but does not have the right feelings about it, whereas 
the virtuous person does. (2011: p. 67)  
 
Again, we see the harmony thesis being applied outside of the domain of temperance. In terms of 
beneficence, for instance, the continent agent is said to be less morally developed than the 
virtuous agent because he still, for instance, hesitates, or weighs time and cost; or is pained when 
not receiving praise or reward when helping others. He is on the right track, as Annas would 
claim, but still lacks the effortless action or moral maturity expected of the virtuous agent. And 
because the continent agent must struggle to act rightly, this is ground to hold that he is less 
developed or morally inferior to the virtuous agent, giving support to the robust conception of the 
harmony thesis.  
 In the examples given, we see that the virtue/continence distinction is drawn from the 
ease or difficulty with which virtuous actions are performed. If an agent struggles in performing 
the right action, he is deemed continent, and if he performs the right action with ease, he is 
deemed virtuous. I take this to be evidence that the harmony thesis is accepted by the 
philosophers cited. There is also clear evidence that each of the philosophers discussed extend 
the harmony thesis outside of the domain of temperance. Thus, Foot, McDowell, Hursthouse, 
and Annas can be said to subscribe to the robust conception of the harmony thesis. To be fair, 
while I take the philosophers mentioned to be the best representatives of the field of 
contemporary virtue ethics, this list is not exhaustive.13 But, as I will show in the next section, 
the harmony thesis has become (whether explicitly or implicitly) inseparable from and ingrained 
in contemporary virtue ethics, as we know it.  While exceptions are possible, the vast majority of 
                                                
13 Some figures not mentioned might include Gregory Trianosky, Michael Slote, Thomas Hurka, Christine Swanton, 
and Daniel Russell.   
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contemporary virtue ethicists will need to accept to some version of the harmony thesis to 
maintain the characteristic features distinguishing virtue ethics from other ethical theories. 
 
3. The Harmony Thesis is Ingrained in Contemporary Theory  
The endorsement of the harmony thesis by contemporary virtue ethicists is not surprising. The 
idea that the virtuous agent must not only perform the right action, but also do so in a certain way, 
or have the appropriate emotions and desires when doing so, is ingrained in the contemporary 
debate. This giving of significance to the emotions is usually claimed to be a strength of virtue 
ethics over its rival theories of consequentialism and deontology. As Michael Stocker claims:  
To embody in one's motives the values of current ethical theories 
[e.g., consequentialism, deontology] is to treat people externally 
and to preclude love, friendship, affection, fellow feeling, and 
community–both with others and with oneself. To get these great 
goods while holding those current ethical theories requires a 
schizophrenia between reason and motive. (1976: p. 461) 
 
The schizophrenia that Stocker is referring to involves a disconnect between an agent's reasons 
and desires. An agent who struggles to perform the right action, or has contrary inclinations, but 
does the right thing nonetheless, out of a sense of duty, or to maximize the best consequences, 
for example, might be said to act in a way that is detached or fragmented from his inner self. 
There seems to be something unnerving about an agent who fails to desire, value, have positive 
feelings towards, etc., the (good) actions that he performs. The idea that the right action can 
trump all other considerations without making reference to, or independent of the agent's feelings, 
in some sense, comes off as very peculiar and alien.  
 The above point is illuminated by Stocker's often-cited example involving a visit from a 
friend during a hospital stay (see 1976: p. 462). In the case, we would normally say that being 
visited by a friend while recovering in the hospital, or after some traumatic event (especially 
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when bored or lonely, or in pain), is a good thing. We might even say that by visiting you the 
friend performs the right action. But imagine, as Stocker asks us to do, that after being 
bombarded with your praise, the friend in all seriousness assures you that the reason he is 
visiting you is not because you are his friend, but rather because it is his duty to visit you, or 
visiting you produces good consequences, etc. (1976: p. 462). This seemingly would cause alarm 
for anyone in the situation; and largely would cause us to question whether that person was in 
fact a true friend. Surely, we want to be visited by a friend in the hospital because he cares about 
us, or wants to be there, or simply because he is our friend.  While visiting or cheering up the 
friend is taking to be the right action in both cases, intuitively we want to say that the second 
case is better, or more representative of genuine friendship.   
 Of the mentioned ethical theories, virtue ethics is particularly well-equipped to make 
sense of Stocker's case, and the emotions in general. Virtue ethics can confidently claim, in 
concord with our commonsense intuitions, that the person who visits his friend in the hospital but 
goes reluctantly, or would prefer to do something else, or is pained at doing so, is morally 
defective. There is something lacking in him as a friend. This is where the harmony thesis comes 
into play. The agent who must struggle, or overcome conflicting desires, to visit a friend in the 
hospital in need of cheering up is merely continent rather than virtuous. Performing the right 
action because it is right is not enough. The harmony thesis gives us the resources to make sense 
of the case being discussed. While visiting your friend in the hospital is a good thing (or even the 
right action), and better than not visiting, only the person who also has the appropriate desires 
and emotions is virtuous.        
 The harmony thesis is also needed by virtue ethics to prevent virtue from breaking down 
into merely performing the right action (even if the action is determined by some standard 
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involving the virtuous agent). Without the harmony thesis, virtue ethics find itself in much the 
same predicament as act-based moral theories. If it is not the case that the emotions, desires, 
motive, of the agent is important, the emphasis on the agent becomes impoverished. We need not 
become virtuous agents, or strive toward becoming one; instead all we need to do is perform the 
action that a virtuous agent would (characteristically) perform.14 This might be one route, but I 
would hardly call it consistent with what we take a virtue ethical theory to be. Instead, 
performing the right action in a harmonious way, in which an agent's reasons and desires 
correspond, is taken by virtue ethicists to be the standard of virtue, and the ideal to strive toward. 
It is the focus on the agent that separates virtue ethics from other ethical theories. As Annas 
points out, "A distinction between the encratic and the virtuous is made by most theories that 
make virtue central... Indeed, it is hard to think of a theory of virtue making virtue a matter of 
disposition and character which could fail to note the distinction in some form" (2011: p. 67). 
We need some way to account for the fact that the agent (and his inner state) matters. The 
harmony thesis does just this by demarcating agents who perform the right action according to 
their desires. The virtuous agent acts rightly from corresponding desires and easily; whereas non-
virtuous agents, or continent agents, must struggle to act rightly, or act from contrary desires. In 
fact, without acknowledging the necessity of this harmony, virtue ethics finds itself liable to the 
much greater problem involving agents who happen to perform the same action as the virtuous 
agent, but do so from non-virtuous or base motives.15        
                                                
14 A loose reading of Hursthouse (1999) might take performing the same action that the virtuous agent would 
characteristically perform in the circumstances to be sufficient for acting virtuously, but this is incorrect. This is only 
a necessary condition for Hursthouse. An agent, in order to act virtuously, must also have knowledge of what he is 
doing, act for the right reason, and have the appropriate feelings or attitudes when he acts (see pp. 223–225). 
15 An example might be, an agent who jumps in the water to save a drowning child, but does so only to get a 
monetary reward, or praise. Without making reference to the motivation of this agent it would seem to follow that 
his action was virtuous. But clearly, we don't want to concede to this; and are even pressed to say the agent is 
continent. One way out would be to point out that the agent in question fails Hursthouse's third requirement for 
virtue: that the agent act for the right reason. This problematic case, I admit, might not be so easily dismissed. 
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 While any virtue ethical theory must take the agent's desires, emotions, and feelings, into 
consideration, there is a broader focus in the contemporary tradition on action-guidance than is 
found in Aristotle. Contemporary virtue ethics normally takes itself to be capable of also offering 
advice on what to do, in addition to what type of person to become. It is capable of being a 
normative theory. One example of this aspect in contemporary virtue ethics can be found in 
Hursthouse's v-rules. Hursthouse's v-rules are general moral prescriptions derived from virtue 
and vice terms capable of providing action-guidance (1999: p. 37). For example, the virtue of 
charity carries the prescription 'help others in need'. The virtue of honesty carries prescriptions 
like 'don't lie', 'keep your word' and so on. According to Hursthouse, these v-rules help us escape 
the criticism that virtue ethics can only tell us the type of person to be, rather than what to do. It 
is meant to apply more broadly to non-virtuous agents. Excluding certain problem cases (where 
actually being virtuous is required), Hursthouse is correct in this regard. The virtue of generosity 
tells me 'not to skimp on my turn to pay the bill'; the virtue of courage tells me 'not to run away'. 
I may still avoid picking up the bill or run away, but this is a problem in my motivation, not in 
the prescriptions the v-rules have to offer.  
 The acceptance of this more normative aspect is standard for many virtue ethicists, and 
an important contributing factor in virtue ethics status as one of the major ethical theories. This 
could be seen as an advancement over Aristotle, who is largely content with only telling us who 
to be, or more charitably, how we might imitate or strive to become a virtuous agent. 
Contemporary virtue ethics seems capable of giving us much more specific moral instruction. 
While this is the case, the prescriptions from the v-rules, for instance, find themselves thin. There 
is more to the virtue of charity than the prescription 'help others in need'. The harmony thesis is 
                                                                                                                                                       
However, in this dissertation, I am concerned with a different problem, roughly, the agent who performs the right 
action, knows what he is doing, acts for the right reason, but fails Hursthouse's fourth requirement: having the 
appropriate feelings or attitudes when he acts. 
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needed to make sense of these prescriptions. We want to also say that we should help others 
because we care about their well-being, or value human life, or can empathize with their 
suffering. We need these additional criteria to make sense of what it really means to be charitable. 
The person who blindly followed the prescription 'help others in need' but failed to have 
compassion or be concerned is missing something important. But if he follows the rule, and is 
properly motivated by that rule, it is hard to say why the agent in question does not actually act 
charitably. The harmony thesis allows us to go further (past compliance with right action) and 
show that not having the corresponding desires shows that the agent is defective. He is continent, 
rather than virtuous.  
 Above I argued that the harmony thesis gives substance to specific prescriptions offered 
by virtue ethics. We can also now say that the robust conception of the harmony thesis is needed 
to cover the broad scope of contemporary virtue ethics' normative project. It might be possible to 
limit the scope of your prescriptions to temperance, offering specific action-guidance like 'don't 
sleep with the neighbor's wife' or 'don't drink so much you impair your ability to drive' but this is 
not the scope of the normative project in contemporary virtue ethics. Contemporary virtue ethics 
wants to offer action-guidance to cover the entirety of our moral lives. The prescriptions offered 
are taken to cover courage, charity, honesty, friendliness, generosity, and so on; not just 
temperance. Virtue ethics would be at a serious disadvantage to consequentialism or deontology 
if it could only guide us a fraction of the time (e.g. only in cases involving temperance). A 
respectable normative theory, in other words, must be capable of informing our actions in at least 
most cases. I take this to be the goal of the contemporary tradition.16 This normative project 
                                                




might be abandoned of course, but one of the defining features of the contemporary tradition 
would go with it.  
 
4. The Harmony Thesis is Useful  
The appeal of the harmony thesis for contemporary virtue ethics extends further than broad 
consensus or theoretical necessity. It is also useful. The harmony thesis could play an important, 
if not essential role, in a number of theories on the horizon. One area in particular, offering much 
promise, involves the concept of the flow experience. The flow experience, originally put 
forward by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, entails a singular focus and commitment to a particular 
action or task.17 When an agent experiences 'flow' in his actions he is taken to perform the action 
effortlessly, lose sense of time, suspend all concerns, and get a deep sense of enjoyment from 
performing the action.18 A good example of an agent who might be said to experience flow in 
certain actions would be an elite athlete. The best soccer players when, for instance, attempting 
the winning kick in an important game, do not think about their problems at home, or the day 
before or after; they are immersed in the now.19 Nor do they hesitate, or struggle, or need to think 
through the steps; they just know and act. The virtuous agent, at least in his ideal or most 
developed form is taken to perform virtuous actions in a similar way.  
 Whether or not it is explicitly defended, intuitively we expect a virtuous agent to act with 
flow. The man who jumps in the water effortlessly and without hesitation to save a drowning 
child is what we imagine the virtuous agent to be. If that same man asked about the current, 
checked the depth of the water, and planned out what angle and stroke he would use in the rescue 
                                                
17 See Csikszentmihalyi (1990).  
18 A very clear and succinct description of the flow experience, and the conditions stated, can be found in 
Csikszentmihalyi, Abuhamdeh, and Nakamura (2005), pp. 598–608.  
19 A more colloquial description of the athlete might be that he is "in the zone." 
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he falls short of the ideal. But, we must acknowledge, it is quite possible the second man's 
reasons, desires, and actions could be in harmony. He just might be inexperienced in performing 
courageous actions. The man in question, we might say, will still, without a doubt jump in the 
water and save the child, and do so without inner conflict or struggle; but it takes him a little 
longer than the first man; his execution is sloppy; and he must meticulously plan the action out to 
guarantee he is successful. In this sense, flow is a stronger requirement than harmony. 
 The concept of flow has gained a lot of attention from philosophers as of late.20 The most 
notable defender of the flow experience in contemporary virtue ethics is Annas. In defending the 
concept she claims:   
This [the flow experience] aligns perfectly with the distinction, 
already seen, between virtue and continence or enkrateia. The 
merely continent person does the right thing, and is even guided to 
doing the right thing by developing virtue, but has other 
commitments and values that conflict with the exercise of virtue. 
Because of this, virtuous activity in her case has to be effortful and 
self-conscious. The mature honest person is aware of occasions for 
dishonesty, say, but it simply does not occur to her to take 
advantage of them... Honest actions will be experienced by the 
mature honest person in the 'flow' way; however complex and hard 
to navigate the circumstances are, there is no felt resistance to 
acting honestly, no interference with the direct having of honest 
responses. (2011: p. 75) 
 
What Annas has in mind involves the idea that disharmony impedes or interferes with the 
performance of virtuous action. An agent might still perform the virtuous action, but he will 
never, according to Annas, have flow in his actions as long as he has contrary values or desires 
(2011: p. 75). These contrary desires act as obstacles, requiring conscious effort to overcome, 
preventing the agent from performing the action in the flow way.  
                                                
20 For some very recent examples, see Stichter (2011), DeSouza (2013), and Peters (2015).  
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 Again, it must be pointed out that flow is stronger than harmony. The flow experience 
also has to do with performance. Virtuous performance entails hitting the mark: getting it right. 
This in many ways connects to the success component of virtue, which any virtue ethical theory 
should take seriously. There seems to be more to being virtuous than having the appropriate 
motivation, and feelings, and actually doing the right thing. We also take the delivery to matter. 
Annas claims: 
What of the point that activity is experienced satisfyingly as 'flow' 
when all the person's relevant goals are in harmony? In the case of 
skill, this is obviously a local matter; someone might be a skillful 
skater while having all kind of unresolved issues in other areas of 
her life. In the case of virtue, the person's global state is what is 
relevant to the performance of the action. An action won't be 
performed easily and enjoyably if there is interference from 
attachment to goals that are in tension with what the person is 
doing in the action. (2011: p. 74) 
 
Getting it right in the flow sense, for virtue, requires both practical expertise and internal 
harmony. An athlete, for instance, that makes a perfect kick will be praised regardless of what he 
was thinking at the time, or his motivation. But the same is not true of virtue. The performance 
of the action is only skilled in the sense that it comes from a virtuous character. An observer who 
witnesses an agent deliver kind remarks to his friends, but knows the agent has ulterior motives, 
will justifiably judge the action as morally lacking–according to the harmony aspect of the flow 
requirement. But at the same time, if that agent fails to impress, we will also be hesitant to hold 
him as virtuous in the other sense of the flow requirement–the practical sense. We might say the 
agent is not there yet: he needs to develop more skill in that virtue. The same would be the case 
with a charitable person that attempts to cheer up another person down on his luck but stumbles 
on his words, or hesitates, or pauses awkwardly while searching for the right joke or compliment. 
In fact, it could even have the opposite effect, upsetting the person even more. Flow helps us 
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explain why the otherwise harmonious person who performs the right action from the right 
motivation, emotions, and desires, could still manage to go wrong. Whether flow will be 
incorporated into the contemporary debate remains to be seen. Theoretically, virtue ethics can 
consistently be maintained without this stronger requirement. In any case, the point to be stressed 
is that harmony is required for flow, and the latter cannot be maintained without also endorsing 
the former. Thus, abandoning the harmony thesis closes an otherwise fruitful area of 
investigation. 
 
5. Reasons to Maintain the Robust Conception of the Harmony Thesis  
So far, I have argued that the robust conception of the harmony thesis is widespread, ingrained, 
and useful for contemporary virtue ethics. In this section, I look at the implications of these 
claims. To start, the first claim is rather straightforward. It is very clear, as I have shown, that 
many virtue ethicists accept the robust conception of the harmony thesis that I have described. 
What would it mean to contemporary virtue ethics in this regard if the harmony thesis were 
abandoned? Many theories would need to be drastically reworked. While burdensome, this is not 
an impossible feat. The fact that the harmony thesis is widespread, in itself, does not constitute 
grounds to maintain it at all cost. But it does count as a reason in favor of keeping the theory as 
long as doing so does not pose a contradiction or weakness to greater virtue ethics. This is 
especially true, considering the fact that it is unclear (in the current environment) how the gap 
might be filled by contemporary virtue ethicists.  
 The second claim is stronger. It holds that the robust conception of the harmony thesis is 
a defining feature of what we take a contemporary virtue ethical theory to be. I argued that the 
harmony thesis was entrenched in the contemporary debate in three major ways by: allowing  
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virtue ethics to give significance to and offer a better account of the emotions than deontology or 
consequentialism, demarcating and establishing virtue ethics as agent-focused rather than act-
focused in a consistent way, and bolstering the broad normative project contributing to virtue 
ethics' status as a major ethical theory. Abandoning the robust conception of the harmony thesis 
would have a significant impact on each of these three features. There is some overlap with the 
first two features. If it were not the case that the virtuous agent's emotional state mattered, in the 
sense that he could–in a consistent way–experience inner conflict and pain when acting 
virtuously, the focus on the agent is in many ways diminished. We want to understand why we 
take the agent who must struggle to perform the right action to be morally lacking. What is 
wrong with his inner state? It is not directly evident what other alternatives are available in the 
absence of the harmony thesis, and thus, we are forced to either leave the question open or say 
that the emotional state of the agent in not directly relevant to an act's moral status.21 The first 
option leaves a serious theoretical gap in our virtue ethical theories. The second option allows for 
the possibility that an agent can act with a great deal of inner conflict, or even from contrary 
motives, and still act virtuously as long as he performs the right action. In this sense, virtue ethics 
largely is reduced to the mere performance of the right action, a position we want to avoid 
holding.22  
                                                
21 There, it should be noted, could be other alternatives here. Chapter 2 explores one such alternative offered by 
Stohr (2003).   
22 One way out might be to say, that virtue ethics can still remain agent-focused rather than act-focused because the 
moral wisdom of the virtuous agent is needed to pick out or determine what the right action is. In this way, we could 
in theory consistently hold that as long as at least one virtuous agent existed, we could potentially ask for his advice 
or imitate his actions (independent of our own inner conflict or pain). Crudely, the virtuous agent's moral wisdom 
could be interpreted as a type of unique internal state (in the same way emotions are a type of internal state). So, 
because the virtuous agent's internal state determines the moral status of the action, virtue ethics remains agent-
focused. This view, though, is subject to its own difficulties. If we follow Aristotle, it proves to be difficult, if not 
impossible, to separate the moral wisdom of the virtuous agent from his emotional state (see NE 1144a8–10). We in 
a sense just pass the buck. If the harmony thesis fails, the implication is that the possibility of moral wisdom goes 
with it.       
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 The third feature definitive of the contemporary debate, virtue ethics' broad normative 
project, would also be impacted if we rejected the harmony thesis. The point of interest here 
involves the robustness component of the harmony thesis endorsed in this chapter. In the modern 
context, we take an agent that is conflicted, or has to struggle to return a wallet to be equally 
problematic as the agent who struggles to perform the temperate action. Contemporary virtue 
ethics' normative project aims to offer action-guidance in this more expanded sense. Because of 
this commitment, we also need the harmony thesis to apply in the broader sense as well. For each 
prescription we need the harmony thesis to give substance to it. Without the harmony thesis 
many or all of these prescriptions prove thin and liable to break down to mere compliance with 
specific rules. Whether we reject the harmony thesis in itself or the robust component, virtue 
ethics' normative project, and status as a major ethical theory, is compromised, or at the very 
least severely weakened.  
  I also argued that the robust conception of the harmony thesis is useful. I used the 
concept of the flow experience as an example to provide support for my claim. This claim, of 
course, and its implications does not cause a rift in or call the theoretical status of virtue ethics 
into question in the same way as the claims above. Only a small amount of virtue ethicists 
(mostly coming from the skill model camp of virtue ethics) endorse the flow requirement for 
virtue. I believe the concept of flow will play an important role in our future virtue ethical 
theories. But there is, of course, no guarantee. What is important though is the fact that the 
concept of the flow experience in virtue ethics is dependent on the harmony thesis to be viable. 
Thus, we have reason to maintain the harmony thesis, in this regard, if only to leave the 




6. Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have argued that the harmony thesis is widespread, entrenched in the 
contemporary debate, and useful for contemporary virtue ethics, and that there are important 
reasons counting in favor of maintaining the harmony thesis. To be clear in my terminology, 
when I say there are important reasons counting in favor of maintaining the harmony thesis, I 
mean there are important reasons counting in favor of maintaining the robust conception of the 
harmony thesis. As should be clear from this chapter, the two are taken together in the 
contemporary context. But as we will see in the next chapter, this more expansive version of the 

















Chapter 2: Stohr and the Problem of Continence 
 
1. Introduction 
In the extended moral landscape of contemporary virtue ethics there are hard cases where acting 
rightly with ease or without pain would offend our commonsense intuitions. We intuitively feel 
that in special cases involving a necessary harm or lesser evil we should be disturbed and pained 
by doing what needs to be done. This intuition, of course, comes into conflict with the harmony 
thesis, inverting the standards. Because the situation demands that an agent be pained in acting, 
only the continent agent can deliver. The status of the virtuous agent seems to be left in a 
compromising position: either be deemed as morally lacking in some way compared to the 
continent agent or deny that the standard of virtue is sharply distinct from continence. In order to 
resolve the dilemma, either our commonsense intuitions regarding problem cases or the harmony 
thesis as it is currently upheld must be discarded. This might be referred to as the problem of 
continence.  
 In this chapter, I start by looking at a problem case offered by Karen Stohr.23 Because 
contemporary virtue ethics takes its normative project to be expansive–that is it accepts the 
robust conception of the harmony thesis–it is subject to the problem of continence, and must be 
able to respond to Stohr's case to be consistent. Stohr, as I will show, takes the second route 
above to escape the dilemma, but does so at the expense of having to abandon the harmony thesis. 
Section 3 explores the ramifications of rejecting the harmony thesis for a number of notable 
virtue ethical theories. In particular, virtue ethicists find themselves unable to draw the 
virtue/continence distinction in the absence of the harmony thesis. Section 4 looks at an 
                                                
23 See Karen Stohr, "Moral Cacophony: When Continence is a Virtue" (2003). 
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alternative way to draw the virtue/continence distinction offered by Stohr based on the 
choiceworthiness of particular goods. She claims that a virtuous agent will respond with an 
intensity of feeling corresponding to her correct judgment of value, whereas a continent agent 
will miss the mark: he will feel too much or too little pain in response to his correct judgment of 
value. This solution, I argue in Section 5, is too strict because it entails something like a mean 
resembling a moral virtue or vice regarding pain, being inconsistent with our ordinary 
understanding of continence. Finally, I defend the need to find a solution to the problem of 
continence in Section 6.  
 
2. A Problem Case  
The problem of continence, roughly speaking, rests on the possibility of a counterexample. In 
order to appreciate the force of this claim it will prove useful to look closely at an illuminating 
case offered by Stohr:  
Imagine an agent who owns a small company. She has a number of 
employees, all of whom have worked for her for years and all of 
whom are capable and dependable. Since the company is small, 
she has gotten to know her employees relatively well and she has 
developed genuine affection and concern for them. Due to a recent 
downturn in the economy, demand for the company’s products has 
declined and the company is in financial trouble. After agonizing 
over the books, the owner of the company has decided that there is 
no alternative but to lay off several of her employees. She has 
already taken every other cost-cutting step possible and this is the 
last remaining option. If she does not perform any layoffs, the 
company will certainly go under and all her employees will lose 
their jobs. She knows that firing the employees is the right thing to 
do in these circumstances, and so she decides to go ahead with it. 
(2003: p. 342) 
 
The company owner in this case does what is right, and performs the action characteristically 
expected of someone who is virtuous. But we also intuitively believe that a virtuous agent should 
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have sympathy for the fired employees and be pained at causing them harm. If the company 
owner came in the day of the firing without any indication of inner conflict and handed out pink 
slips with ease, we would want to say that something was seriously wrong with her. We would 
think that she lacked the emotional depth and concern demanded by the situation.  
 This concern extends beyond the actual act itself, taking a toll on the virtuous agent both 
in the days leading up to the firing once the decision had been made as well as after the fact: 
We can imagine that she wakes up that morning with an anxious 
feeling in her stomach, perhaps unable to eat breakfast. She drives 
to work with a sense of dread and with the fanciful wish that the 
targeted employees will come in with the news that they have 
found other employment. She delivers the news as best she can, 
but she finds it extremely difficult. She is grieved at the sight of 
her employees’ stress, sadness, and anxiety in response to the news. 
After the fact, she worries about whether they will be able to find 
new jobs, pay their mortgages, and take care of their children. 
(Stohr 2003: p. 343) 
 
This type of behavior is expected of someone that is compassionate rather than callous. In 
Stohr’s example, the aspects of the company owner’s character like kindness, sympathy and 
responsiveness to the harm she is causing, the very traits that make it difficult to carry out the 
task, are the same traits that we would expect of someone with a virtuous character. An agent 
who slept soundly the night before and acted without pain or remorse in the situation is someone 
who we, by our commonsense intuitions, would find morally repulsive or lacking.  
 In order to meet the demands of the intuition, we must expect that the agent, if she is 
virtuous, be conflicted and pained when acting in the situation. For Stohr, the difficulty and pain 
that the agent experiences is not only necessary, but a mark of virtue. She elaborates:  
There are many actions that, though required, seem to be of a sort 
that good people should find difficult. People should find it 
difficult to deliver bad news to their friends. Parents should find it 
hard to punish their children. Teachers should find it hard to give 
low grades to students who are genuinely trying to do well. Lovers 
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should find it hard to break off relationships when doing so is 
likely to cause the other person to suffer. In each case, if an agent 
finds the action easy or painless, then she lacks virtue. (Stohr 2003: 
p. 344) 
 
Agents who performed the above actions without difficulty or pain, for Stohr, are in some sense 
lacking in some aspect of their characters. They are morally deficient. The problem, hence, 
involves the fact that in order for the harmony thesis to be true, a virtuous agent must possess 
this moral defect. In order to act appropriately, the virtuous agent must act as the continent agent 
would act in the situation. He must find it difficult and painful to act as he should.  
 The virtue/continence distinction finds itself flipped on account of accepting Stohr’s 
counterexample. The immunity from inner conflict and pain that the virtuous agent was claimed 
to possess now is a mark against his virtue, and the susceptibility to inner conflict and pain that 
deemed the continent agent inferior acts as his strength. For Stohr, the inner conflict in the 
company owner is representative of some virtue(s).24 If this is the case, it seems that an agent 
who acted without difficulty or pain in the company owner’s situation could not properly be 
called virtuous by Stohr’s standards. Conflicting desires or disharmony are in some sense 
necessary. Stohr claims:  
The point is not simply that it would be understandable for the 
company owner to find such an action difficult and painful. Rather, 
the point is that it seems to be a requirement of virtue that she finds 
it hard. If she does not, that is prima facie evidence that she lacks 
virtue. The person who can fire a deserving person without 
experiencing any difficulty or pain shows himself to be callous to 
the misfortune of others. (2003: p. 343) 
 
The problem at hand is more than the inversion of virtue and continence by the standards of the 
harmony thesis, but rather concerns the viability of the harmony thesis itself. If both the harmony 
                                                
24 See Stohr (2003: p. 344). Stohr describes the inner conflict of the company owner as entailing both the presence 




thesis and Stohr’s intuition about the company owner are true, the resultant conclusion is that it 
is possible for an agent to demonstrate a lack of virtue by acting as a virtuous agent should 
(without inner conflict or pain) in particular cases. 
 There are two ways that the preceding claim might be interpreted: (a) in some 
circumstances the virtuous agent shows himself to be subject to a moral defect, or, (b) acting 
with difficulty or pain in some situations is a mark of virtue. Regarding the first interpretation, it 
might be contended that, even if it is true that the virtuous agent is not inferior to the continent 
agent generally, he is still shown to be subject to a moral defect nonetheless, and should have his 
exemplary moral status questioned. We commonly take the virtuous agent to be morally perfect, 
or at least in possession of all the virtues. In the case of the company owner, the expressed inner 
conflict and concern for the fired employees points to morally desirable features of her character. 
It is clear that Stohr takes this expressed difficulty in acting to be reducible to some real virtue or 
virtues.25 The company owner “would be less virtuous if she lacked them” (Stohr 2003: p. 347). 
An agent in the company owner’s situation who did not express the same difficulty demonstrates 
a mar in his character. The problem, then, with the agent who acts without difficulty in the 
situation is more than the fact that he fails to be appropriately disturbed; his failure indicates that 
he is not in possession of all the virtues. His character is morally incomplete or imperfect.    
 Although Stohr’s counterexample points to some taint in the character of the agent who 
acts with ease or without pain in the situation, she is not positing a direct attack on the exemplary 
status of the virtuous agent. Stohr instead wants to claim that the virtuous agent will act with or 
without difficulty according to the demands of the situation: “It is true that sometimes harmony 
is preferable, but sometimes it is not” (2003: p. 342). The difficulty and pain that the company 
                                                
25 See Stohr (2003: p. 347). 
 
 27 
owner experiences in firing the employees is directly responsive to the harm she is causing to 
them, and is traceable to her kindness and compassion. There is no reason to believe that if the 
company’s product was in greater demand and times where better (promotions or raises needed 
to be handed out) the company owner would experience the same inner struggle. In fact, we 
should expect that she act with ease in distributing rewards if she is virtuous. Now, it need not be 
the case that the two examples be split into competing sets of virtues corresponding to the 
difficulty or ease of acting in the situation (i.e., kindness, compassion in the one case and 
generosity, fairness in the other). For Stohr, it does not directly follow that an agent fails to be 
virtuous because she experiences difficulty and pain in acting. Nor does it directly follow that an 
agent fails to be virtuous because he acts with ease. Rather, a virtuous agent, because he is 
completely virtuous, must be capable of demonstrating kindness, compassion, generosity, 
fairness, etc., in either situation. A virtuous agent could and should act with difficulty and pain in 
one situation and with ease in another because he possesses all the virtues.  
 While detractors of the counterexample will want to claim that a virtuous agent does not 
experience inner conflict or pain in acting, Stohr defends that in order for an agent to be virtuous 
to begin with he must be capable of experiencing inner conflict or pain in acting. This points to 
the second interpretation (b): acting with difficulty or pain in some situations is a mark of virtue. 
Again, acting with difficulty or pain is not preferable to acting with ease generally. Nor, is 
disharmony necessary or sufficient for virtue in itself. The claim is simply that in some cases the 
presence of inner conflict or pain is indicative of virtue (Stohr 2003: p. 346). Though less 
imposing than the previous interpretation, there is still enough force in it to call the harmony 
thesis into question. The very possibility of cases, or even a single case, posing a contradiction 
will “give us reason to doubt the general claim that virtuous agents always want to do what they 
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should do, or find it easy or pleasant, or feel no conflict” (Stohr 2003: p. 344). If we accept this 
interpretation, the harmony thesis as it is currently upheld is liable to produce inconsistent results.  
 Where does the viability of the harmony thesis stand? Stohr’s argument, if cogent, gives 
us serious grounds for doubt. The rejection of the harmony thesis, of course, also has 
ramifications for the virtue/continence distinction. In the absence of the inner conflict and pain 
characteristic of disharmony, continence finds itself unable to be adequately demarcated from 
virtue. In order to generate a distinction we might stipulate that the continent agent differs from 
the virtuous agent in the fact that he lacks the full set of virtues. But this proves to be an 
inadequate explanation because it fails to distinguish the continent agent from the incontinent or 
vicious agent. There are also arbitrary criteria we could force on the continent agent to negatively 
delimit him, but this would offend the praiseworthiness commonly attributed to the status. It is 
not entirely clear what criterion we should use, or how our current definition of continence can 
be maintained. Without the harmony thesis the virtue/continence distinction seems to fall apart. 
 
3. Ramifications for Contemporary Virtue Ethics  
The force of Stohr's argument impacts all of the major virtue ethical theories discussed. Because 
Foot, McDowell, Hursthouse, and Annas, as I have shown, are committed to the robust 
conception of the harmony thesis, the problem of continence needs to be responded to. This 
section addresses the problem from the vantage point of each of the philosophers mentioned.   
 To start, remember that Foot holds the continent agent to be praiseworthy, and superior to 
the vicious agent on account of desiring to do the right thing, and superior to the incontinent 
agent on account of actually doing the right thing. But the continent agent falls short of the 
virtuous agent in the fact that he has conflicting desires. Foot's theory seems most able, of the 
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theories mentioned, to capture Stohr's problem case. The fact, as Foot suggests, that the poor 
man has to overcome much pain or struggle to act rightly–in not stealing–seems to count in his 
favor (1978: p. 7). But if we look closely we will see that the cases are very different from one 
another. Because the poor man in Foot's case is tempted to steal, it is appropriate to attribute 
continence rather than virtue to him under the ordinary view. What makes the action admirable is 
dependent on the features of the situation: the poor man needs the money and so on, but resists 
anyway. We must be careful to note that what makes it hard for the poor man in the example is 
ultimately dependent on a lack of virtue or a mar in his character. The fact that he has the 
temptation to steal coupled with exceptional circumstances, such as hard times, and an 
abandoned purse in arm's reach, makes resisting that much more difficult. But, it still follows 
from Foot, that the fact that he even has the temptation to steal shows that the agent in question is 
morally defective, and not truly virtuous–independent of the circumstances.26 
 In the case of the company owner something else is at issue. What makes the company 
owner pained or conflicted comes from the fact that she is virtuous or possesses certain virtuous 
character traits. The source of the conflict comes from within the agent herself rather than the 
circumstances. Whereas the poor man might become less pained or conflicted in acting honestly 
if his external situation were improved, i.e. he were made wealthier, the company owner can 
only become less conflicted by being less compassionate, caring, sympathetic, etc. The cases go 
in the opposite direction. It is the fact that the company owner is virtuous that makes it hard for 
her to act. Thus, Foot cannot account for Stohr's counterexample. This is further complicated by 
the fact that Foot must also hold that a rich man, if he were made poor, would still not have the 
temptation to steal in the circumstances if he is virtuous. Her explication of the virtue of charity 
                                                
26 This of course excludes cases where the agent needs to steal to survive, or feed his family, etc.  
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captures this point: "It is the man who acts easily rather than the one who finds it hard that shows 
the most charity" (Foot 1978: p. 7). We might press the issue and say that certain virtues are best 
exemplified by having to overcome difficult circumstance or a struggle, and certain other virtues 
are exemplified by a lack of struggle or acting easily in the situation. But there is no indication 
that Foot takes this position.27 Her held view is that virtue entails not having the inclination to act 
otherwise and performing the right action easily (Foot 1978: p. 8).  
 McDowell holds the virtuous agent to possess a special type of moral sensitivity that 
allows him to see the morally salient features of a situation and silence competing considerations. 
His theory is very reliant on the harmony thesis. Part of what it means to be virtuous for 
McDowell is to not have conflicting desires, experience conflict, etc. The whole point of 
silencing points to this dependence on harmony (McDowell 1979: pp. 334–335). Thus, for 
McDowell, the company owner should not experience pain and inner conflict in firing the 
employees if she is virtuous. Of course, this runs counter to our commonsense intuitions about 
the case. We want to say that the concern that the agent has for the employees should not be 
silenced. That is the point at issue. It is worth reiterating that McDowell's theory has two 
components. Remember, besides silencing competing considerations the virtuous agent also has 
a special moral sensitivity capable of picking out the morally salient features of particular 
circumstances. While silencing is not an option in responding to Stohr's counterexample it is 
conceivable that McDowell's theory could hold one component without the other; it could hold 
                                                
27 Considering that Foot (1978) is in a large way responding to Kant, it would not make sense for her to fracture 
virtue in this way (i.e., in cases of honesty the man who overcomes much struggle is superior, but in cases of charity 
the man who acts easily is superior). Besides not being very helpful in responding to Stohr's counterexample, 
adopting a fractured view of virtue would undermine an important goal of Foot's theory.  
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onto the virtuous agent's unique perceptual capacity while allowing competing considerations to 
surface–that is we could keep moral sensitivity while rejecting silencing.28  
 Although the above move could allow McDowell to respond to Stohr's counterexample 
(the same moral sensitivity that picks out saving the company also picks out the needs of the 
employees to be fired) it opens him up to a different problem. McDowell, without silencing, 
finds himself unable to draw the virtue/continence distinction. If all that matters is picking out 
the right action, or locating the morally salient features of circumstances, there is nothing 
(deriving simply from this capacity) to distinguish continence from virtue. Both the continent 
agent and virtuous agent simply respond to the moral demands of particular circumstances.29 Of 
course we could go on to claim that agents who lacked the perceptual capacity in question would 
fail to act in the right way, or miss the mark. But there is nothing in McDowell, or implied by 
Stohr's case, that would suggest that the continent agent would be lacking in this capacity.30  
 Hursthouse holds having the appropriate feelings and attitude when acting to be a 
necessary component of virtue. When taken with an understanding and commitment to acting 
rightly, this according to Hursthouse, can be represented by moral prescriptions she calls v-
rules.31 Hursthouse might respond to Stohr's problem case as a conflict between v-rules. We 
might say that in the case there are competing concerns capable of pulling the virtuous agent in 
more than one direction. For instance, charity might demand that the employees to be fired not 
                                                
28 It might be argued that for McDowell the two components mentioned are one and the same or are unable to be 
split from one another. If this is the case, then without much argument, it will need to be conceded that McDowell's 
theory cannot adequately account for Stohr's counterexample. My aim here is not to take a position on whether the 
move is possible or not in McDowell's theory, but rather simply to speculate whether the move, if allowed, could 
solve the problem.   
29 We might point out that saving the company and the employees' welfare both seem to be morally salient. Should 
competing considerations counting in favor of saving the employees' jobs–the non-right action in the case–be 
silenced under McDowell's view? This is an interesting question that I will return to in Chapter 6.   
30 The continent agent for McDowell, of course, would not silence competing considerations giving us a way to 
demarcate him from the virtuous agent. But in the case discussed we are dismissing the silencing aspect of 
McDowell's theory. 
31 See Chapter 1, Section 3.  
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suffer or be harmed, and justice or general benevolence might demand that the company be 
saved. While this is an interesting move, it does not get us out of the problem. Part of the issue 
with this move is that Hursthouse's conception of the virtuous agent entails that the virtuous 
agent is able to resolve conflicts between v-rules (1999: pp. 80–81). So, for Hursthouse, it would 
likely still follow that firing the employees is the right thing to do. The virtuous agent could be 
said to simply weigh the competing concerns, deciding that the needs of justice or general 
benevolence is more salient. It also should be acknowledged that in the way Stohr sets up the 
case, both the company owner who fires the employees easily and the company owner who must 
struggle both know that saving the company is the right thing to do, and that they will cause 
harm by firing the employees (see 2003: p. 343). Thus, there presumably would not be a conflict 
concerning which v-rule had greater precedence.   
 Annas holds the virtuous agent to be a type of moral expert. Annas' theory without much 
argument needs to make a serious concession to even to attempt to respond to Stohr's problem 
case. The concept of the flow experience must be abandoned in the general sense. For the 
company owner to act with flow when firing the employees seems to be even more intuitively 
repulsive than the original example. But it is conceivable that Annas' theory can be sustained 
without the stronger flow requirement. While this is the case, the skill model of virtue proves not 
to be very helpful. For Annas, an agent becomes better at acting virtuously through practice 
(2011: p. 79). As he performs more and more virtuous actions he becomes more proficient at 
performing such actions. At each developmental stage performing the right action becomes 
easier. Hence, for Annas, the continent agent who must struggle is taken to be at the level of 
learner and the virtuous agent who acts easily is taken to be more akin to a moral expert. The 
problem with this view, for our purposes, concerns the fact that it is unclear where to place 
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Stohr's company owner on the paradigm. If she struggles to perform the right action the company 
owner will fall on the learner side of Annas' model. But, the intuition that we are defending is 
that the company owner should be pained and conflicted when acting; and that this is a mark of 
virtue.  
 I am not sure how Annas can respond, or draw the virtue/continence distinction in a 
consistent way in light of the case. She would have to allow that an agent on the skill model in 
some cases becomes more and more pained and conflicted as he becomes more proficient at 
acting rightly. At each developmental stage it becomes harder for the agent to act rightly, and 
this is a mark of virtue. But clearly this is absurd. Even if we used Stohr's case as a constant in 
the model, the move is implausible. For instance, imagine that the company owner is instead a 
consultant in charge of advising numerous companies on how to maintain solvency. In the given 
case, the agent in question must decide which employees to fire on a regular basis. Take the 
variable to be roughly the same as in Stohr's case: if no one is fired each company will go under 
and so on. For Annas' theory to effectively respond to Stohr's counterexample it would have to 
follow that the consultant in question as a learner starts by firing the employees very easily, and 
later through practice finds it harder and harder to do so with each new company; ultimately 
culminating in the level of pain and inner conflict expected in the original case. While not 
impossible, this is a very strange conclusion to accept. For we intuitively believe that the 
development of skill or expertise works the other way: we become less and less pained and 
frustrated as we become more proficient.  
 It is clear that a number of notable virtue ethical theories are unable to respond to the 
problem of continence. In each case, either the problem case of the company owner cannot be 
accounted for in an adequate way or the virtue/continence distinction cannot be drawn. This, in 
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many ways, can be traced to a reliance on the harmony thesis as traditionally upheld. But, as was 
previously claimed, the harmony thesis only entails a particular way to draw the 
virtue/continence distinction not necessarily the distinction itself.32 So, while contemporary 
virtue ethical theories can be said to be reliant on the virtue/continence distinction, it is at least 
possible that it can consistently do without the harmony thesis if some other method is available 
to draw the distinction. Thus, such a move is worth exploring if we want to escape the problem 
of continence. The next section will show one way we might try drawing the virtue/continence 
distinction without appealing to the harmony thesis.     
  
4. Stohr's Solution  
Although Stohr ultimately rejects the harmony thesis, she wants to hold onto the 
virtue/continence distinction in some form. In order to salvage the distinction she appeals to the 
choiceworthiness of particular goods (Stohr 2003: p. 348). The status of a particular good as 
choiceworthy is largely determined by the extent to which it is responsive to reason. For example, 
goods like knowledge, honor, and aesthetic appreciation could be categorized as choiceworthy, 
whereas goods concerning bodily pleasures would fall in the category of the non-choiceworthy 
or base.33 Following Aristotle, a choiceworthy good is an object to be valued, and elicits a 
response in the agent who pursues or desires it.34 In the case of the company owner, the 
appropriateness of being conflicted or pained is derived from the loss of something valuable. The 
                                                
32 See Chapter 1.  
33 Stohr uses the terms noble and shameful interchangeably with choiceworthiness and baseness. But there are 
notable difficulties regarding the noble and the base in Aristotle. For example, murder, adultery, and theft are base 
in a different way than bodily pleasures. The latter might be better categorized as ignoble. I restrict myself to the 
terms choiceworthy and non-choiceworthy to avoid some of these interpretive difficulties.  
34 See NE 1099a10–25. 
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well-being and livelihood of the fired employees is a choiceworthy good worth preserving and 
should cause a negative response in its loss.  
 For the virtuous, objects of value will elicit a positive response like pleasure in those who 
promote it and a negative response like pain or disturbance at the loss of the choiceworthy 
object.35 The inner conflict that the company owner experiences in firing the employees is 
representative of virtue, essentially, because it is expressive of how choiceworthy goods are to be 
responded to. This gives Stohr what she needs to capture the intuition underlying her 
counterexample. The fault of the agent who acts with ease in the situation lies in the fact that he 
fails to appreciate the loss of something valuable (Stohr 2003: p. 356). While the current move 
provides Stohr with an independent criterion (to replace the harmony thesis) for establishing the 
conditions for virtue, it is only one side of the solution. More still needs to be said on how we are 
to distinguish continence from virtue under the new criterion.  
 In order to flesh out the distinction Stohr turns to the practical wisdom of the virtuous 
agent: 
The phronimos [practically wise person] has a correct 
understanding of the goods of human life and hence knows what is 
worth giving up and at what price. She also knows what is to be 
held dear and how much to grieve its loss. She values things in 
correspondence to their actual value in human flourishing, and her 
feelings reflect those correct judgments of value. (2003: p. 362) 
 
There are at least two implications to be drawn from this path of argumentation. The first is that 
a virtuous agent (because he possesses practical wisdom) will recognize choiceworthy goods as 
valuable, and non-choiceworthy goods as lacking value or being less valuable. Though an 
important (perhaps necessary) feature, the mere recognition of objects as choiceworthy or non-
choiceworthy is not enough to generate a distinctive moral defect in the continent agent. For it 
                                                
35 See NE 1104b1–15. 
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does not directly follow that a continent agent will misapprehend choiceworthy objects. Instead, 
the problem lies in the intensity in which his feelings correspond to his correct judgment (Stohr 
2003: p. 362). 
 To illustrate this point Stohr gives an example:  
She [the continent agent] knows that when her friend calls for help 
with a broken-down car, she ought to go help her, despite the fact 
that one of her favorite television programs is on. She does in fact 
go to help her friend, but she does not really want to go. She wants 
to stay at home and watch television, and she is annoyed that she 
has to go out. Because she knows that her friend’s needs are more 
important than her television program, she berates herself for being 
annoyed. But she is annoyed all the same, and her annoyance, 
while perhaps understandable, is a moral failing in her. (2003: p. 
362) 
 
The agent above, for Stohr, is morally defective because her frustration shows that she values 
watching the television program more than she should. If she were fully virtuous her feelings 
would proportionally correspond to her correct judgment concerning the worth of the good. The 
force behind the claim has to do with the requisite pull of the competing objects. A friend’s 
welfare is more choiceworthy than the enjoyment of a television program. The agent is morally 
defective who is disturbed at having to miss a television program in order to help her friend 
because it (the television program) elicits a response that does not correspond to the value of the 
object. She is pained or annoyed when she should not be. This is different from the case of the 
company owner. The company owner, like the agent who wants to watch her favorite television 
program, also has a desire to value the less choiceworthy good. She really does not want to fire 
the employees (Stohr 2003: p. 361). The difference, though, concerns the fact that the pain, 
agony, annoyance, etc., the company owner experiences in the loss of the lesser good 
corresponds to its worth, whereas, the same level of disturbance in missing a television program 
does not.  
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 The revised virtue/continence distinction, then, seems to avoid a direct confrontation with 
our commonsense intuitions. We can now understand why an agent in the company owner’s 
situation should experience inner conflict. This is not a mark against her, but an appropriate 
response to an object of value. We can also see that acting with ease is not generally 
representative of a moral defect in an agent. When a non-choiceworthy good is passed over in 
pursuit of an object of greater worth, an agent is completely justified in assigning the lesser good 
little or no weight. For Stohr, the moral defect in the continent agent, then, does not involve the 
mere presence or lack of pain in a particular situation. If it is a response correctly corresponding 
to the value of the object it is appropriate. Rather, the fault in the continent agent lies in the fact 
that his feelings fail to track his correct judgment of what is valuable; he feels more or less pain 
than he should.   
 
5. Problems with Stohr's Solution   
While promising, Stohr’s solution does not prove to be particularly helpful. Part of the difficulty 
lies in the fact that the worth in pursuing choiceworthy objects seems not to be strictly reliant on 
a set level of intensity. For instance, take Stohr's example of the reluctant television enthusiast 
again (see Stohr 2003: p. 362). Accounting for intensity, the example seems to imply that the 
worth of helping the friend is something like 5, and the value of watching the television program 
is something like 1; But, the friend feels an intensity of pain as if the worth of watching the 
television program is 4, and this is continence: in the sense of Stohr's feeling more pain than is 
appropriate. Following this line of thought, we could contrarily go on to claim in response that 
saving the company has a worth of, say 10, and not firing the employees has a worth of 9; And 
the company owner correspondingly experiences an intensity of pain of 9, and this is continence 
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for the most part, as traditionally understood–but Stohr calls this virtue. What if there were two 
competing goods where one had a worth of 10 and the other 9.9? For example, the agent 
performed the right action (bringing about 10) and felt an intensity of pain corresponding to say 
9.8–keep in mind that Stohr would claim the agent experienced too little pain here: and also 
characterize it as continence. But it seems not to matter whether the agent experiences an 
intensity of pain of 9.8, 9.7, 5, 4, 1; the agent is simply continent by Stohr's standards–and the 
traditional standard as well. In order to see this, it might prove useful to look at an unloaded case, 
where the consequences in performing one action over the other are not necessarily unsavory or 
repulsive. In a case involving two choiceworthy actions A and B, where A is the rationally 
prescribed, or right action to perform according to the agent’s knowledge:36 
  (1) Virtue – Agent knows A is right, prefers A, and performs A. 
  (2) Continence – Agent knows A is right, prefers B, and performs A. 
  
Imagine A to represent writing a novel and B to represent joining the Peace Corps (for the sake 
of argument, having a worth of 10 for writing a novel and 9.9 for joining the Peace Corps, 
respectively). An agent who desired A excessively, or more than he should (say 11, or even 20), 
would not normally be referred to as continent. Nor will an agent who desires B less than he 
should (say he values writing the novel at 10 and now values joining the Peace Corps at 9.8 
instead of 9.9–technically he is now less conflicted) be referred to as less continent. Unless he 
should not be pained at all at the lost opportunity of not joining the Peace Corps.37 He may 
simply defend that, B, while choiceworthy, is not what he values (or prefers) in the situation. To 
demand that he have some corresponding anguish to match the lost worth of volunteering is 
                                                
36 In the situation presented, it is stipulated that the agent cannot perform both A and B, but is required to perform 
one or the other, where the performance of one excludes the performance of the other. It is also the case that the 
situation is not dilemmatic; A is clearly the better choice over B (continue to increase the value of A and decrease 
the value of B if needed to arrive at this conclusion). 
37 The traditional harmony thesis does imply this. But it seems a little strange. Chapter 5 offers an explanation to the 
puzzle, and shows that the virtuous agent, if he is fully virtuous, will be pained at this prospect.  
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unnecessarily rigid. Unlike the case of the company owner, the agent who wrote his novel with 
ease is not intuitively repulsive.38  
 Only in cases where an agent has a stronger desire for B can we confidently attribute 
inner conflict. If an agent prefers B, but performs A, for example, (i.e., B has a value of 10.1 and 
A now has a value of 9.9) he will by necessity be ascribed as being disturbed in some way. An 
agent who prefers to join the Peace Corps but writes a novel instead is by definition conflicted. 
According to the harmony thesis, pain or difficulty in acting provides evidence for the presence 
of this disturbance. Stohr at the basic level accepts (1). Even though the company owner does not 
want to fire the employees and values their well-being, she values saving her company even 
more (i.e., she prefers saving the company). Her preference corresponds to the rationally 
prescribed action. Where Stohr diverges from the harmony thesis is in directly deriving 
continence from (1) instead of (2). She takes the virtue/continence distinction to be dependent on 
the correct appraisal of B as well as A.  
 To see the contrast we can formulate the distinctions as follows: 
(1a) Virtue 1 – Agent knows A is right, prefers A, performs A, and 
acknowledges B as a competing good but is not pained by not 
performing B (harmony thesis). 
(1b) Virtue 2 – Agent knows A is right, prefers A, performs A, and 
both acknowledges B as a competing good and is pained by not 
performing B (Stohr).39  
 
                                                
38 The argument here is that, the real issue that Stohr is bringing to the surface by the company owner example is 
our intuitive repulsion to the agent not being pained in firing the employees. She is tapping and affirming our 
commonsense intuitions about the case. A charitable interpretation of Stohr might hold her to mean there is some 
threshold capable of being capture by "more" or "less" pain than is appropriate at the loss of B. But I take the strict 
intensity requirement not to follow intuitively from the affirmation of that same commonsense intuition.     
39 Using this formulation, the other side of the demarcation would be: (2a) Continence 1 – Agent knows A is right, 
prefers A, performs A, and both acknowledges B as a competing good and is pained by not performing B. Stohr's 
demarcation is more complicated: (2b) Continence 2 – Agent knows A is right, prefers A, performs A, and 
acknowledges B as a competing good but is not pained by not performing B; (3b) Continence 3 – Agent knows A is 
right, prefers A, performs A, and both acknowledges B as a competing good and is pained too little by not 
performing B; (4b) Continence 4 – Agent knows A is right, prefers A, performs A, and both acknowledges B as a 
competing good and is pained too much by not performing B. 
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Notice that (1a) would fall under what Stohr takes to be continence rather than virtue (because 
presumably, the amount of pain in response to the loss of B is seemingly 0 according to the 
harmony thesis). The agent who is not disturbed by the loss of B demonstrates a failure to 
appreciate its worth as a choiceworthy object by feeling less pain than he should–where 0 here is 
less. But, of course, this is not the only example that Stohr uses to represent continence. In the 
case of the reluctant television enthusiast the agent is more pained than she should be. But I 
should point out that, for Stohr's theory, it would not matter whether this agent was pained by an 
intensity of 2 or 4. In fact, if it were the case that the friend was in serious danger, and helping 
had a worth of 100, the agent would be continent, or lacking, by Stohr's standard if she valued 
the television program, or even helping the friend, anywhere between 1.1–99.9; or 101. That is, 
anything other than feeling exactly a 1 or 100 intensity of pain falls short of virtue. I take this 
standard to be far too strict. Even if we, out of charity, assume Stohr to be entailing not falling 
short of virtue to occur within some general threshold of neither too much nor too little pain 
(plus or minus 10, for instance), it still follows that Stohr is trying to get something like a moral 
mean, similar to the other moral virtues, for how much pain an agent should feel. But continence, 
we take it, is not a moral virtue, and in nearly every meaning of the word is taking to be, even if 
praiseworthy, second to or less praiseworthy than moral virtue. We could treat it as a moral 
virtue concerning pain; but it should be clear that it is too high a standard for continence, as 
normally understood.40 
 Furthermore, when we talk about continence as such, there are, we must admit, certain 
conceptual distinctions that are difficult if not impossible to dismiss or ignore. For example, 
Stohr's positive claim is that in some cases (where the agent performs the right action) what we 
                                                
40 An important clarification is in order. I am not claiming that a mean or moral virtue regarding pain is impossible 
or incoherent, but rather that a discussion of continence is unable to do the work or properly capture this mean or 
moral virtue.  
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take as continence is indicative of virtue (2003: pp. 345–346). But according to our traditional 
understanding, continence is never indicative of virtue. That is the whole point of continence. It 
falls short of virtue. There is also, we normally take it, an important relation between continence, 
temperance, and pleasure. But Stohr is positing that same relation toward pain; something very 
different. And it is not entirely clear what worth or value Stohr would attribute to bodily 
pleasures, except to say it is 0. But if that is the case then we really need not talk about an 
intensity requirement; for even the slightest overvaluing (0.1?) of pleasure would result in a 
defect. Stohr could stipulate that it is only inner conflict if pain is felt in the presence of some 
countervailing good having value; but this is simply temperance as treated by the harmony thesis. 
She also, I take it from her theory, will have no need for, or a distorted view of the associated 
moral vices of intemperance and insensibility. The insensible person, who cares very little for 
pleasure, does not adequately capture what we mean be continence. But Stohr will need to claim, 
if her theory is to hold–e.g., virtue as feelings correctly tracking judgment of value, and 
continence as not–that the insensible person is continent. Or even worse, if the value of bodily 
pleasure is 0, and the insensible person really cares nothing for bodily pleasures, that he is 
virtuous. Stohr could counter by claiming that continence, as she is using it, only applies to 
choiceworthy goods; but then we have, it seems, no way to account for temperance.41 It is my 
suspicion that Stohr is in fact after some undelineated moral virtue, other than temperance, 
concerning pain, and using the word "continence" to replace it. But continence has important 
connotations that do not cross over, and close relations to a number of other virtue ethical 
concepts. Its traditional connections to temperance, moral virtue, and moral vice run deep. Thus, 
                                                
41 Charitably, Stohr could be claiming that temperance is caring about pleasure more than one should, or feeling 
excessive feeling toward non-choiceworthy goods. But this would seem, by her standards, to imply that temperance 
is a type of continence; which I take to be even stranger than the above claim; unless to simply beg the question that 
what Stohr means by virtue is really a special type of temperance.  
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it would be a disservice to contemporary virtue ethics to dismiss the temperance/continence 
(moral virtue/continence) distinction readily.            
 That being said, I will admit that Stohr would be justified in pointing out that her usage of 
the word continence is non-traditional, or detached from any of its ancient connotations.42 This 
makes much of my criticism moot. And it is true that her problem remains; verbal disputes aside. 
But the point I want to stress is that something much more important is at stake. I take the 
harmony thesis to be connected to virtue ethics in an intimate way. Part of what makes the 
virtuous agent appealing lies in the fact that he does the right thing so easily. Being able to draw 
a virtue/continence distinction, in itself, is not enough. We want to be able to draw it in a way 
that respects its traditional connotations. Thus, we should not reject the harmony thesis so 
willingly. And even if it is true that Stohr can escape the problem of continence by rejecting the 
harmony thesis there is something important lost.  
  
6. An Impasse?  
Remember, the problem brought to light by Stohr's counterexample involved the failure of the 
robust conception of the virtue/continence distinction to account for hard cases involving 
competing choiceworthy goods. Stohr takes this as reason to reject the harmony thesis outright 
and replace it with an intensity requirement (corresponding to an agent's correct judgment). I 
have argued that Stohr's attempt to derive the virtue/continence distinction fails–in demarcating 
continence–because it is only able to show that the continent agent falls short of or lacks the full 
set of virtues. To call this continence would be in name only. It should now be clear that the 
latter implication is more important than initially thought. The underlying problem cannot be 
                                                
42 This seems to be Stohr's ultimate position. Though her heavy usage of Aristotle makes it less clear than it 
otherwise should be.   
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addressed by appealing to continence. Instead, the real difficulty rests on the fact that Stohr's 
counterexample points to a missing virtue that we cannot delineate. Stohr in a way recognizes 
this problem, but attempts to bridge the gap by treating continence as a virtue.43 Unless we 
accept a radical reinterpretation of continence as a moral virtue concerning pain, this proves 
unsatisfactory.  
 While Stohr's solution fails her problem still remains. We do intuitively feel that an agent 
in the company owner's situation should be pained and experience inner conflict when firing the 
employees. How are we to account for the problem of continence in a consistent way? In order to 
find an adequate solution three things need to be accomplished. First, our ordinary understanding 
of continence needs to remain fixed.44 We cannot simply call whatever defect the company 
owner has continence.45 This leaves an unacceptable theoretical gap in virtue ethical theories, 
and distorts what me mean by continence in non-problem cases. Because we also want 
robustness, Stohr's counterexample (as well as any other problem case) needs to be accounted for. 
To fail to offer an explanation for such cases would put contemporary virtue ethics at a serious 
disadvantage to deontology and consequentialism. We must also be able to draw the 
virtue/continence distinction. This, as was argued, is an indispensable feature of the 
contemporary debate. Stohr's argument showed that our understanding of the harmony thesis is 
incompatible with robustness, hence we cannot draw the virtue/continence distinction in the 
ordinary way. But this does not mean that the harmony thesis cannot be revised, or that there are 
                                                
43 I should acknowledge that my disagreement with Stohr, to her credit, could be viewed as a disagreement over 
which terminology to use. Stohr argues that continence best captures the problem case. I argue that some 
unidentified moral virtue or vice concerning pain is at issue. But we both arrive at very similar conclusions: mainly 
that an agent who fails to feel the appropriate amount of pain in the case is morally defective. 
44 Aristotle, it should be noted, does consider the possibility that continence could be a mean, looking at excessive 
and deficient forms (see NE 1151b24–32). But ultimately, as Aristotle is clear to point out, this is a distortion of 
what continence is supposed to be or represent. Continence is different than moral virtue or vice (NE 1145a35–
1145b3). This is part of what makes the concept special or interesting.    
45 That is the company owner who fires his employees easily or without inner conflict or pain in the case. 
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not other ways to draw the virtue/continence distinction that are compatible with robustness. The 
























Chapter 3: Some Alternative Solutions to the Problem of Continence 
 
1. Introduction   
With the failure of Stohr's solution in the previous chapter, the problem of continence remains as 
a threat to contemporary virtue ethics–the threat, if you will remember, being that if we accept 
Stohr's intuition about the problem case (that on some occasions virtue requires that we feel pain 
in doing the right thing) then it seems that we must reject the harmony thesis or hold the virtuous 
agent to be morally lacking in some way compared to the continent agent. This chapter looks to 
several other philosophers in hopes of finding a solution to the problem. It should be pointed out 
that the authors in question are not explicitly responding to the problem of continence as such. 
This is to be expected considering the novelty of the topic treated in the dissertation. But, as I 
will show, it is not too difficult to adapt certain aspects of these philosophers' theories in service 
of our goal. The bulk of this chapter pursues this strategy, before concluding with a summary of 
the major features of the arguments discussed in Chapters 1-3 and a sketch of the solution that I 
will pursue in the chapters to follow.  
 
2. Broadie and Attitudinal Pleasure  
A promising first solution to the problem of continence comes from Sarah Broadie. In her book, 
Ethics with Aristotle, Broadie holds the view that a virtuous agent will take a special type of 
satisfaction in performing virtuous actions, independent of the sensory pleasures or pains 
involved. She claims: 
[T]he pleasure with which the virtuous agent acts must be 
distinguished from his enjoying or finding enjoyable what he does. 
Doing it with pleasure must be doing it freely, unreluctantly, 
ungrudgingly, hence in this sense gladly. It may also be taking 
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satisfaction in doing it. All this is consistent with its being an 
unpleasant or painful thing to do. (Broadie 1991: p. 91) 
 
The type of pleasure that Broadie is referring to is in many ways representative of what is now 
referred to as propositional or attitudinal pleasure.46 There are indications that Aristotle took such 
a view (at least in some cases).47 For example, in certain circumstances, it does seem completely 
appropriate to allow, or expect, that an agent experience pain. As Broadie contends, "How can it 
realistically be held that fighting until one is cut to pieces is pleasant or ... not painful?" (1991: p. 
91). To say that getting cut to pieces would not be painful would be very bizarre. But, this is not 
to say that an agent who sacrifices himself for something worthwhile cannot be glad that he did it, 
or take satisfaction in the act.  
 Broadie goes on to claim, 
So, when Aristotle says that the temperate person delights or takes 
pleasure in temperate actions, meaning that they are engaged in 
gladly and with satisfaction, he is referring to an attitude 
consequential upon seeing the action as good or proper and as it 
would be noble to do or shameful not to do; whereas pleasures that 
can clash with the noble are felt to be pleasures independently of 
the rightness of pursuing them. (1991: p. 93) 
 
What Broadie is saying is that a virtuous agent, when acting virtuously, will take attitudinal 
pleasure in the action itself, or a particular state of affairs. A courageous agent, for instance, may 
be wounded or suffer severe pain during a battle, but this does not count against him having 
satisfaction regarding his action when evaluating the situation. Even though he experiences 
sensory pain (which includes emotional or psychological distress) while performing the right 
action, he nonetheless takes attitudinal pleasure in its performance. The point is, that 
                                                
46 See Feldman (1988) and (2004), in particular.   
47 The clearest example can be found in Aristotle's discussion of the courageous agent. See NE 1117b8–18.  
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experiencing sensory pain is not necessarily incompatible with taking attitudinal pleasure in 
bringing about a certain state of affairs.        
 The focus of the attitudinal pleasure that the virtuous agent is said to take in acting 
virtuously can be directly attributed to the fact that it is noble or right. The sensory aspects of the 
action, or means to achieving the end, are according to Broadie, irrelevant in an important sense: 
"[A]cting for pleasure that is excluded by acting for the sake of the noble has to do with logically 
antecedent pleasure. Someone who does A simply because he feels like it or feels he would 
enjoy it (these are not the same, but Aristotle tends to merge them) is not doing A for the sake of 
the noble" (1991: p. 93). For Broadie, something like the presence of sensory pleasure or pain, 
while an unavoidable feature of certain actions, are to be seen as merely derivative. While it 
might indeed be the case that acting virtuously could produce something like sensory pleasure 
indirectly, it is only accidental; and the virtuous agent is taken to be one who would gladly 
perform the virtuous action in the absence of any resultant sensory aspects. This type of gladness 
or satisfaction is to be found in the performance of the action itself; for itself. And in the same 
way that the presence or promise of sensory pleasure is non-decisive as to whether or not an 
agent will take attitudinal pleasure in an action's performance, sensory pain is also an irrelevant 
factor for deciding against performing a virtuous action; or whether a virtuous agent will take 
attitudinal pleasure in its performance.  
 In applying this interpretation to Stohr's problem case, we might claim that the virtuous 
agent merely experiences sensory pain when firing the employees. Thus, the company owner can 
be ascribed as taking pleasure, as attitudinal pleasure, in performing the right action while still 
being pained in its performance. This could allow us to keep our commonsense intuitions about 
Stohr's case while holding the harmony thesis at the same time. The company owner who fires 
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the employees, thus, can now be said to experience and be physically pained, conflicted, hurt, 
sad, anxious, depressed, nervous, distraught, etc., during the firing. She acts in the way we 
expect any caring or kind person to act. But, while the company owner is not deemed insensitive 
or callous (e.g., she does not offend out commonsense intuitions) it can still be said that she takes 
satisfaction in doing what is right in the fact that the company has been saved.    
 While an interesting move, Broadie's solution is problematic. One reason the move is 
problematic involves the fact that a continent agent presumably also takes attitudinal pleasure in 
performing the right action. Even if he has to struggle, or is pained, he can be said to be satisfied 
with what he has done. There is nothing in Stohr or Aristotle to suggest that the continent agent 
is not pleased in bringing about the state of affairs deemed to be right by his action. In fact, this 
in many ways is needed to account for why the continent agent performs the right action at all. 
Stohr in her discussion of the problem even goes on to suggests that a continent agent, when 
performing the right action, might take even more attitudinal pleasure than the virtuous agent on 
account of how hard it is for him to perform the action (2003: p. 353). Therefore, Broadie's 
solution fails to solve the problem because we are still unable to draw the virtue/continence 
distinction from her account.  
 
3. Stark and Motivational Unity  
Susan Stark, in her paper "Virtue and Emotion," is concerned with the virtuous agent's 
motivating reasons for action. For Stark, a virtuous agent is motivationally unified whereas a 
continent agent is not. She claims: 
As we have seen, this view holds that for the virtuous person, there 
simply are no countervailing considerations. Though I do not argue 
for this in depth, I believe that this idea of unity is a crucial one for 
virtue theorists. First, it allows the virtue theorist to maintain 
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Aristotle's clear distinction between virtue and continence. The 
virtuous person is motivationally unified, while the continent 
person is not. Second, and more important, without this notion of 
unity, it is difficult to explain why virtue represents a higher level 
of moral goodness than mere continence. (Stark 2001: p. 446) 
 
What Stark is claiming is that a virtuous agent will not be motivated to perform a non-virtuous 
action, even in the presence of other reasons (like loss, emotions, pain, etc.). She takes it that 
reasons to feel a certain way are (or can be) separated from motivating reasons for action (Stark 
2001: p. 452). For example, during a battle, the suffering that the courageous agent experiences 
can (or will), according to Stark, generate motivating reasons to have negative emotions or feel 
pain, but it will never generate a motivating reason to act non-virtuously. The continent agent, on 
the other hand, will not only possess motivating reasons to have negative emotions or feel pain, 
but also will have a motivating reason to act otherwise. He will have a motivating reason to run 
away. Essentially, Stark is claiming that the virtuous agent and continent agent can be 
demarcated by the fact that the virtuous agent, when performing the right action, will never be 
tempted to act otherwise, whereas the continent agent will. 
 We might also look at the above in the following way. Stark can be said to commit to two 
central claims. The first is that the virtuous agent's motivating reasons and normative reasons–
counting in favor of performing the action, as the right thing to do–line up. What the virtuous 
agent evaluates to be right corresponds with his desire to perform the action. Whereas in the case 
of the continent agent, while his normative reasons pick out the right action his motivating 
reasons push in the other direction. Stark claims:  
For the virtuous person, the normative reasons and the motivating 
reasons coincide. And this is one way of expressing the virtuous 
person's very important unity. But this unity is lacking in the 
continent person. For the continent person, although he may 
perceive the moral situation accurately, he has an anti-virtue desire. 
So although he does the right action, he has a desire and thus a 
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motivating anti-virtue reason. For him, the normative pro-virtue 
reason is not the only motivating reason there is. His motivations 
are in this sense, then, not unified. (2001: p. 444) 
 
The first claim expressed above is not very controversial. Essentially it is saying that the virtuous 
agent's reasons and desire are in harmony with one another, whereas the continent agent's are not. 
But the second claim held by Stark proves to be much more interesting.    
 Stark holds that an agent can recognize or appreciate some consideration as a reason 
without it generating a motivating reason for action; and that it can take the form of an emotion 
instead.48 Thus the desire in such cases does not act as a reason for action but rather as a 
motivating reason to have some emotion. As Stark claims, "A consideration can be evaluative 
without having any say whatsoever in action: its evaluative-ness can be fully expressed in the 
emotional state of the agent" (2001: p. 452). This allows a virtuous agent to express a certain 
level of mixed feelings or reluctance without attributing a real case of conflict, or allows us to 
"admit conflicting values into virtue without the worry of indecision in action" (Stark 2001: p. 
453). As far as our purposes in finding a solution to the problem of continence, Stark's move 
could allow us to separate the negative emotions or pain that an agent experiences from the inner 
conflict itself.  
 In applying this interpretation to the problem case, we might claim that the company 
owner's pain, grief, etc., is appropriate according to motivating reasons concerning her emotions, 
but she does not have a motivating reason for action to do otherwise; she will not be tempted to 
not fire the employees, whereas the continent agent will. This allows us to say that the virtuous 
agent can appropriately experience pain in firing the employees while at the same time remain 
unified in his actions, reasons, and desires. Thus we might try to save the harmony thesis by 
                                                
48 I am taking Stark to be rejecting reasons internalism here.  
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claiming something like: both the virtuous agent and continent agent are indeed (appropriately) 
pained when acting in Stohr's problem case, but such pain is largely inconsequential to whether 
or not an agent's actions line up with his desires or are representative of inner conflict; thus the 
virtuous agent acts in a unified way and the continent agent acts in a non-unified way. Such a 
move, I take it, allows for a demarcation of harmony and disharmony while also accommodating 
the commonsense intuition that the company owner should experience pain in the case.  
 The above solution is problematic in a number of ways. The first concerns the fact that 
we intuitively believe that the virtuous agent should be tempted not to fire the employees. If 
saving the employees' jobs was never an option for the company owner, the soul searching and 
grief that we expect her to go through before making the decision seems insincere. The company 
owner in this case simply goes through the motions. So, it seems there is more at issue in acting 
virtuously than just the presence of some negative emotion or mere pain. Our commonsense 
intuitions point to or expect something more serious and troubling in the virtuous agent: a real 
case of inner conflict; not simply a fleeting sense of loss or regret. So while it is indeed possible 
that reasons to feel a certain way can be separated from the agent's motivating reasons for action, 
it seems limited to cases where the countervailing pull is toward something non-virtuous. But in 
the case of the company owner both saving the company and not firing the employees are, I take 
it, to be deemed pro-virtue reasons by Stark's standards. Or more simply, in the case of the 
company owner the pain that the company owner is expected to experience cannot be neatly 
separated from the underlying inner conflict generating that pain. 
 A second, related, problem concerns an assumption on Stark's part that the continent 
agent will have a motivating reason for action that corresponds to acting non-virtuously. This 
may or may not be true. The continent agent can presumably be ascribed as strong enough to 
 
 52 
always perform the right action in the presence of other countervailing motivating reasons. Stark 
is taking it that the continent agent will occasionally slip up and perform the wrong action (2001: 
p. 446). But again, this is unwarranted, and can only, at least by necessity, be ascribed to the 
incontinent agent. Furthermore, by Stark's own standards, there is nothing to prevent the 
continent agent from being motivationally unified. She is allowing that a virtuous agent can act 
virtuously even while pained or distressed as long as there is no motivating reason to act 
otherwise. In this view, the virtuous agent sounds a lot like the continent agent previously put 
under evaluation.49 Therefore, Stark's solution fails to solve the problem because we are unable 
to draw the virtue/continence distinction in an adequate way from her account.  
 
4. Carr and Moral Ambivalence  
David Carr, in his paper "Virtue, Mixed Emotions, and Moral Ambivalence," argues that the 
continent agent and virtuous agent differ in the fact that the former will experience moral 
ambivalence whereas the latter will not. He claims:  
On the other hand, though there may be squalid or dishonorable 
courses of human action to which they are no longer drawn, the 
virtuous are no less prey than the rest of us to the emotional 
conflicts and moral dilemmas to which human flesh is heir, so that 
the absence of emotional or moral uncertainty or conflict would 
not in and of itself distinguish the virtuous from the continent. But, 
more strongly, the standard Aristotelian story might lead us to 
expect that the virtuous are those who have the wisdom, 
imagination, and ability to address such conflicts in ways that are 
not available to the merely continent. (Carr 2009: p. 44) 
 
                                                
49 Not only does the virtuous agent appear similar to the continent agent under Stark's view, it exacerbates the 
difficulties found in Stohr's problem case: intuitively, we might now claim that, not only do we expect the virtuous 
agent to be pained in the case, we also expect him to have a motivating reason not to fire the employees–making him 
exhibit an even stronger type of continence (where mere pain was all that was originally required). Thus, Stark's 
move not only fails to solve the problem of continence; it makes it worse.   
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In the above passage, Carr is following Stark in allowing that both the virtuous and continent 
agent are capable of experiencing pain, distress, negative emotions, etc., when performing the 
right action. But instead of drawing the virtue/continence from motivational unity, Carr relies on 
the agent's particular understanding or appreciation of acting rightly. The continent agent, for 
Carr, regrets or resents having done the right thing; he wishes he could have done otherwise 
(2009: p. 43). The virtuous agent, while reflecting on his action, by contrast, has no such desire. 
The continent agent, unlike the virtuous agent, is also taken to not understand his inner conflict 
or emotions. He is unable to analyze or adjust his evaluation of himself to encompass the conflict. 
Nor is he able to adjust his actions or moral evaluations in response to new evidence. The 
continent agent, for Carr, is only able to act in a rigid or single-minded way (2009: p. 45). 
 The fact that the continent agent fails to properly understand or appreciate the relation 
that his desires bare to the moral actions he performs is grounds for attributing him a moral 
defect. Carr gives an example:  
To be sure, continent agents–or at least some of them–may actually 
view heroically resisted opportunities for adultery with some 
regret: they may even wish (albeit unconsciously) that they were 
not cursed with the strong moral conscience (the product, perhaps, 
of a strict puritan upbringing) that has denied them the 
opportunities for pleasure available to the less scrupulous. The 
virtuous, on the other hand, are said to be incapable of such 
ambivalence. (2009: p. 40) 
 
The continent agent for Carr, fails to recognize that the reason he should not commit adultery has 
to do with the fact that people could get hurt, trusts will be broken, and so on. The continent 
agent instead simply sees the moral action as something that he should not do. This points to a 
very narrow and limited understanding of what is at issue: like a young child who stares at a 
cookie jar wishing he was not forbidden to reach in; rather than appreciating that his health is the 
thing at stake. The continent agent acts, unquestionably, according to what he believes to be right, 
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but has no understanding of why the action is right. Thusly, as a result, he is inflexible and ill-
equipped to respond to diverse or changing circumstances.  
 Not only does the continent agent act in a rigid and uncompromising way, his ambivalent 
emotions are in a way alien to him.  Carr, for instance, claims that "merely self-controlled agents 
are incapable of coming to mature terms with the prospect of such inevitably ungratified desire" 
(2009: p. 45). The continent agent in a sense both wants and does not want to do the right thing. 
When reflecting on what was lost, he wishes he was less upright, and when reflecting on his 
contrary to right inclinations he wishes the base desire would disappear. Rather than coming to 
terms with the fact that certain things are more valuable or important than those things that he 
resents himself for wanting, the continent agent sees his contrary inclinations as a threat needed 
to be fought, vanquished, or locked away in the subconscious. This is different from the virtuous 
agent, who, in Carr's view, experiences the same pull toward base desires, but sees these desires 
as being of lesser importance; appropriately delegating them to their proper place (2009: p. 45).   
 In applying Carr's interpretation to the company owner, we might say that both the 
virtuous agent and continent agent in this case act appropriately by being pained or conflicted, 
but the continent agent regrets his decision after the fact, whereas the virtuous agent does not. 
Furthermore, it presumably would follow from Carr's argument, that if the fired employees 
gained (or could gain) employment shortly after being fired, the virtuous agent would adjust her 
evaluation of herself to be pleased at the outcome (or she will no longer have pain, negative 
emotions, etc.), whereas the continent agent will continue to have regret or be conflicted by his 
decision. Thus, the virtuous agent can be distinguished from the continent agent by the fact that 
her emotional conflict is temporary, whereas the continent agent's is longer lasting or permanent.  
Besides the fact that the above, intuitively, makes the continent agent out to be more concerned 
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or affected by the employees' plight–which Carr would hold to be a failure to appreciate the 
situation rather than a merit–the demarcation poses some serious difficulties. First, Carr is 
imposing a very strict or uncompromising attitude on the continent agent. The continent agent 
seems to be caught in a type of inescapable momentum after making up his mind. Why would 
the continent company owner not be able to re-evaluate his decision; especially if everything 
worked out for the best? The continent agent must remain stuck with the mixed emotions present 
at the time of making the decision in the case. This does not necessarily follow, and is 
unwarranted. I think Carr is relying on a very specific type of continence here, which Aristotle 
refers to as strong-headedness (see NE 1151b1–15).50 This is not the notion of continence we 
have been working with.  
 Second, Carr's interpretation of the continent agent as not understanding or appreciating 
right action seems questionable. Why would the continent agent not be able to understand his 
own mind, actions, or emotions? Could he not hold that he is completely aware or appreciate, for 
example, that his strong desire to smoke is in conflict with staying healthy, and correctly see it as 
problematic for that reason? It would be strange to hold that the smoker above only resists 
smoking because it is the wrong action under the description 'smoking is wrong'. And even if the 
agent in question did hold the narrow view that he should not smoke because it is wrong, this 
would not be incompatible with him also holding the view that smoking is unhealthy. Nor does it 
necessarily follow that he will resent himself for smoking or not smoking.  
 Furthermore, why would a continent agent not be able to adjust his evaluation of himself 
or change his behavior in light of new evidence? For example, if recent studies were able to 
show that something the continent agent desired like red meat, for example, was healthy rather 
                                                




than unhealthy, it seems perfectly reasonable that the continent agent can (or will) start eating red 
meat without regret. To demand that he resent himself for having the desire or continue to avoid 
red meat in spite of the evidence is severe. But Carr would require that the continent agent 
continue to be subject to self-loathing:  
For while Aristotle's concept of continence might be considered a 
morally required developmental stage on the way to virtue–through 
which perfectly decent human beings may have to pass to genuine 
love of the good for its own sake–it may also be the psychological 
source and cause of some of the worst human excesses and vices of 
self-delusion, hypocrisy, and fanaticism... Indeed, the idea that 
much excessive moral zeal is often fuelled by projected self-hatred 
was clearly recognized long before psychoanalysis. (Carr 2009: p. 
44)  
 
The preceding passage suggests that the continent agent in the scenario given above will after 
living with the repressed desire for so long, now need, in at least some sense, to resent himself 
for previously having the (non-right) desire not to eat red meat–that is if he is continent. He 
regrets not acting well in the past. Otherwise it would simply be the case that the red-meat-
desiring continent agent is virtuous, or non-continent, in light of the new evidence. But Carr 
would deny this of the continent agent. In this sense, the continent agent is taken to suffer 
permanent psychologically damage from the experience–where the moral ambivalence remains 
as residue. I am not sure that Carr's distinction can work without assigning the continent agent 
some type of neurosis. 51  This, of course, would pose serious problems regarding the 
praiseworthiness commonly attributed to continence. Thus, Carr's solution proves to be 
unsatisfactory. 
 
                                                
51 Carr (2009) seems to suggest that the continent agent is neurotic on p. 46: "Thus seen, the trouble with neurotic 
agents–or the more seriously repressed continent–is that they lack the wisdom or self-knowledge needed for both 
honest recognition of what they cannot change and the courage to bear the ungratified desire that is the inevitable 
consequence of such recognition." 
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5. Scarre on Blurring the Virtue/Continence Distinction  
A fourth solution to the problem of continence might involve denying that a clear distinction 
between continence and virtue can be drawn. In his paper, "The Continence of Virtue," Geoffrey 
Scarre argues that the distinction between virtue and continence should be seen as one of degree 
rather than kind, where virtue is seen as continence matured and perfected by practice. For 
Scarre, the path to becoming virtuous is not direct or unbroken, but must make reference to an 
agent's struggle in getting there:  
Virtuous people accomplish with ease what is taxing to the 
"merely continent" subject. This answer may still fail to satisfy if it 
makes virtuous behavior seem simply effortless to the virtuous. 
But it begins to look more promising if it places emphasis on the 
development of virtuous dispositions by the subject... The virtuous 
agent has arrived at where he or she now is on the basis of a 
sustained and laborious programme of character development. 
(2013: p. 6) 
 
What Scarre is saying is that the division commonly drawn between the virtuous agent and 
continent agent is largely artificial. He claims, "On this account, the virtuous agent acts swiftly 
and unhesitatingly while his continent counterpart succeeds only after a struggle and some 
mental pain. But this account is too neat..." (Scarre 2013: p. 17). Not only is a neat division not 
possible, Scare goes on to say that maintaining one's character, and overcoming temptation is an 
ongoing process, even for agents that are morally mature: "Hence, even people whose moral 
development is well advanced will never be wholly beyond the reach of temptation" (2013: p. 
15). Acting rightly will never be completely effortless, "continence will always be required in the 
practice of virtue" (2013: p. 15). Thus, according to Scarre, an agent can never completely 
transcend from continence to virtue: continence will always remain a live option, and a necessary 
moral feature of the agent's character. 
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 While the above is the case, Scarre holds that an agent that is engaged and committed to 
moral improvement will struggle less and less over time until he performs the right action more 
and more easily. Scarre claims: 
It is unrealistic to suppose there to be a determinate threshold at 
which agents pass from being merely continent to being genuinely 
virtuous. While those who exhibit a high state of self-development 
are more fittingly labeled 'virtuous', the difference between them 
and less-advanced agents is a matter of degree rather than kind. 
The further on that a person is in her character development, the 
easier she should find it to act rightly in situations that provide 
temptations to deviate from right reason. But the relative ease with 
which she now copes with temptation should not be allowed to 
mask the hardness of the task she has performed to arrive at that 
point. (2013: p. 12) 
 
For Scarre, there are a large number of developmental stages in between mere continence and 
matured continence that he refers to as proto-virtue (2013: p. 8). In becoming proto-virtuous, an 
agent through practice, and effort, starts to appreciate the value of performing the right action. 
This appreciation, in some ways, stems from the struggle that must be undertaken to get there. 
Scarre claims, "The former [matured continence] is aspirational in a way that the other [mere 
continence] is not. While the latter is prepared to put in what might be termed the 'occasional 
labor' to combat specific bad temptations, the former, more far-sighted, is engaged in an 
enterprise that requires effort of a different kind" (2013: p. 8). This different kind of effort 
involves a more refined understanding of what is at stake, and the difficulties involved. In 
becoming proto-virtuous, the agent performs the right action in a more systematic and effortless 
way; though, again, the nature of the proto-virtuous agent's proficiency is traceable to a gradual 
series of steps building to this point. So, while an agent can become more morally proficient with 
practice, and moral gradations are distinguishable, there is never a clear or full transition to what 
might be called virtue, in the strict sense. Ultimately, Scarre is able to get around the need to 
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draw the virtue/continence distinction by holding that such a move is neither possible nor 
necessary.52  
 Scarre's solution is interesting. I take it that the merely continent agent always has to 
struggle to perform the right action and the matured continent agent or "proto-virtuous" agent as 
Scarre calls him, struggles say half the time or only some of the time when performing the right 
action. I also presume Scarre holds (or would allow) that certain agents will come very close to 
virtue, and be able to act well most of the time, but not all of the time. The problem though 
involves the fact that it is still the case that the virtuous agent will act well in all cases, and the 
matured continent agent, or proto-virtuous agent, will not. This has a very similar structure to the 
harmony thesis. We could of course deny that virtuous agents exist. But this would prove to be 
very problematic for virtue ethics. Furthermore, it would still follow in evaluating particular 
cases regarding the proto-virtuous agent that he can act virtuously in one case (he experiences no 
inner conflict) or that he can act continently in another case (he experiences inner conflict). I 
don't see how this is a significant departure from our ordinary understanding of the harmony 
thesis.  
 Another problem with Scarre's solution concerns the fact that it does not necessarily 
follow that continence needs to be a developmental stage in becoming virtuous. For example, 
Gregory Trianosky, in his paper "Rightly Ordered Appetites: How to Live Morally and Live 
Well" points out that there is more than one way to reach virtue. He gives the example of an 
agent trying to achieve temperance in overcoming alcohol:  
There are two distinct possible strategies for coping with 
alcoholism. On the one hand, one might rely on aversion therapy, 
together with efforts to develop alternative interests and pleasures. 
                                                
52 While this move mimics Annas (2011) in some ways it differs in the fact that it denies that there can be a 
virtue/continence distinction at all. Annas on the other hand holds there to be some clear demarcation that takes 
place at a certain stage of moral development that can be linked to the flow experience. See Chapter 1, Section 4.    
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If such therapy is successful, then ultimately one's desire for 
alcohol will extinguish entirely. On the other hand, one might rely 
on the supportiveness and morally uplifting effects of membership 
in a group like Alcoholics Anonymous, to develop the self-control 
or strength of will necessary to combat unruly passions. (Trianosky 
1988: p. 3) 
 
Scarre is going to require that an agent have to go through a series of stages requiring struggle 
and inner conflict before he can reach proto-virtue or virtue. This seems to be unnecessary or 
avoidable in certain cases. For example, take the case of an agent that is naturally generous. It 
does follow that he will need to refine his character in order to move the natural virtue in 
question to full virtue. But this need not involve some type of internal struggle in the process. 
This fine-tuning will involve learning to give to the right people, at the right time, in the right 
amount, etc., not exercising the will. Contrary to Scarre, an agent that takes this alternative path 
will be praised just as much as an agent who had to struggle in order to get there. Thus, Scarre, in 
addition to this concern, and the previous argument, cannot adequately make sense of Stohr's 
problem case.53   
 
6. Curzer and Idealization  
Finally, the notion that the virtuous agent is morally perfect might be attacked to escape the 
problem of continence. This move is made by Howard Curzer in his paper "How Good People 
Do Bad Things: Aristotle on the Misdeeds of the Virtuous." Curzer argues that it is unwarranted 
to hold that the virtuous agent need always acts virtuously. For instance, as Curzer points out, if a 
generous agent happens to give more or less money than he should due to epistemic limitations, 
misinformation, or even accidently, he will not cease to be generous afterward (2005: p. 237). 
Virtue, at least if we follow Aristotle, is taken to be a very durable thing. Because the virtuous 
                                                
53 That is, even if he outright rejected the harmony thesis. 
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agent is not omniscient, we must accept that out of character acts like the one above are at least 
possible and not necessarily character-destroying. As Curzer claims:  
Indeed, it would be uncharitable to attribute to Aristotle the view 
that merely performing a few vicious acts disqualifies a person 
from being virtuous. Surely a person who performs thousands and 
thousands of just acts plus a tiny number of peccadilloes over the 
course of a lifetime is a just person. Similarly for the other virtues. 
Even the virtuous occasionally act out of character, i.e., wrongly. 
Even the virtuous occasionally have bad days. (2005: p. 240)  
 
The above passage makes a good point. It would seem very counterintuitive to withdraw the 
status of being virtuous from an agent who slipped up on occasion, especially if the slip up was 
independent of his character. To be clear, the virtuous agent is not perfect with a capital P; he is 
not superhuman. Rather the virtuous agent is morally perfect. And sometimes being morally 
perfect will entail making the best of a bad situation.  
 There are two more things that can be said about the above passage. If we accept Curzer's 
intuition, and agree with the view he is putting forward, it will follow that a virtuous agent is an 
agent who usually acts rightly. But we should be mindful that as a normative standard we should 
not follow or imitate the virtuous agent in the sense that he slips up; but rather only allow or 
make exceptions for occasional, out of character acts. And if this is the case, as Curzer agrees, 
the standard is not the virtuous agent but rather the virtuous agent in so far as he acts rightly 
(2005: p. 235). This is an important point that I will come back to.        
 There is also another sense in which Curzer takes a virtuous agent to be capable of being 
imperfect yet virtuous. Sometimes on account of the very virtues he possesses an agent will be 
expected to act wrongly in a reliable way. Curzer refers to this defect as being virtuous-to-a-fault 
(2005: p. 242). Curzer gives the following example: 
Greg recognizes that when it comes to helping others, he can do 
more good by giving to charities than by giving to needy people 
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directly... Greg frequently makes large donations to charities, but 
sometimes encounters beggars face to face. He knows that giving 
money directly to beggars is a mistake ... but because Greg is 
liberal, the plight of the beggar affects him deeply and he ends up 
giving them cash. (2005: p. 245) 
 
This is an interesting case. Greg knows the right thing to do is not to give money to the beggars 
when he encounters them; but he does so anyway. But, we would not say that Greg is less 
virtuous or generous because of this. In fact, we are tempted to say the opposite. Furthermore, 
assuming we knew Greg, such actions would not be surprising or unexpected. But he acts 
wrongly nonetheless, and his "vicious acts arise from his virtues rather than despite them" 
(Curzer 2005: p. 245).  
 Intuitively we think Greg acts generously, or at least does not cease to be a generous 
person on account of committing what he takes to be a wrong act: giving money to the beggars 
rather than charity. In order to be generous it seems he must act other than he ought. The case of 
Greg, it should be pointed out, is very similar to the case of the company owner. But it is in 
reverse. It would be as if the company owner decided not to fire the employees after all and let 
the company go under. And surprisingly, following the same line of intuition we might say that 
this company owner acts virtuously. But we must be careful. When we start to separate virtue 
from right action like this it can get us into a lot of theoretical trouble. So I suggest in applying 
Curzer's theory to Stohr's counterexample we take a step back and simply consider whether or 
not holding the virtuous agent to be less than perfect is able to escape the problem case in a way 
that is consistent with the harmony thesis.  
 To get at a solution, we might first draw the virtue/continence distinction in the usual way 
and hold that the virtuous agent performs the right action easily and without inner conflict and 
the continent agent performs the right action painfully or with inner conflict. And to get 
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robustness we can say that this demarcation extends to every case. Applying Curzer's theory we 
might go on to now say that the virtuous agent always acts easily and without inner conflict but 
occasionally on account of this fails to act as he should; and the continent agent always acts 
painfully and with inner conflict but occasionally on account of this succeeds in acting as he 
should. Thus, the virtuous agent usually acts as he should but occasionally slips up and the 
continent agent usually acts other than he should but occasionally gets it right. And I take it that 
it would not be unreasonable to say the virtuous agent is morally better than the continent agent 
on account of getting it right most of the time.   
 Notice the tension between 'acting rightly' and 'acting as one should'. The tension, I think, 
comes from the original underlying intuition regarding the problem case. Our commonsense 
intuitions tell us that the company owner should be conflicted and that Greg should give the 
money to the beggar. But we also have to be aware that doing as one should comes into conflict 
with our standard of virtuous action in the first case and acting rightly in the second. Putting this 
tension aside, we could claim that acting easily and without inner conflict is the best means to 
being virtuous and works in most cases; while still allowing that in certain problem cases the 
virtuous agent will come up short, or fail. This solution, I take it, could allow us to hold onto the 
robust conception of the harmony these without forcing us to hold that the virtuous agent is 
inferior to the continent agent.  
 While I take Curzer's solution to be very promising, it is subject to some difficulties. The 
first, and most problematic, is that Curzer's solution seems to pass the buck on Stohr's 
counterexample. Roughly, if we follow Curzer: the problem of continence is not really a problem 
at all, or one we should be concerned with. It is simply a case where the virtuous agent cannot 
act as he should. This proves unsatisfying. We do, I take it, want to understand why the virtuous 
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agent cannot act as he should in Stohr's problem case. The counterexample, for instance, does 
not involve acting in a way that is self-defeating or the agent being in what Hursthouse refers to 
as a tragic dilemma: where performing the act strips the virtuous agent of his virtue.54 By 
Curzer's own standards the virtuous agent can occasionally act viciously and still retain his status 
as a virtuous agent. Thus, Stohr's counterexample still needs explaining. Simply holding it as a 
problem case best avoided is not satisfactory.  
 The second difficulty with Curzer's solution is that it weakens the virtuous agent's 
normative status. If the virtuous agent is taken to occasionally not act as he should, in what sense 
can he function as the standard of right action in a reliable way? We might again claim that the 
virtuous agent is our normative standard only in so far as he acts virtuously, but how are we to 
know when the virtuous agent is acting virtuously? Stohr's counterexample is almost certainly 
not the only problem case there is, and it will be a huge disadvantage to virtue ethics if in certain 
cases it tells us something like, "you're on your own." This might have some justification behind 
it if the case is a genuine moral dilemma or epistemically there is no clear best solution. But in 
the case of the company owner saving the company is clearly the right action and the company 
owner's life or virtue–drawing on another set of intuitions–will not be destroyed. So, virtue ethics, 
to be a robust normative theory, needs to be able to account for the case. And Curzer's solution 
comes up short at offering an explanation, and thus, is unable to adequately account for Stohr's 
problem case.  
 
7. Conclusion  
                                                
54 See Hursthouse (1999), Chapter 3.  
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None of the philosophers treated are able to provide an adequate solution to the problem of 
continence. Where do we go from here? At this point, a quick recap is in order. It was argued 
that because contemporary virtue ethics is taken to be expansive it cannot simply escape the 
problem of continence by ignoring or dismissing Stohr's problem case. And, because we accept 
the intuition that the company owner should be conflicted or pained in the situation, there is 
reason to reject the harmony thesis.55 But without the harmony thesis the virtue/continence 
distinction cannot be drawn. With some implicit premises added the argument might be 
formulated in the following way: 
1. If we accept our commonsense intuitions about Stohr's problem 
case, then we must reject the harmony thesis or hold the virtuous 
agent to be morally lacking in some way compared to the continent 
agent.56  
2. We accept our commonsense intuitions about Stohr's problem 
case. 
3. Therefore, we must reject the harmony thesis or hold the 
virtuous agent to be morally lacking in some way compared to the 
continent agent.  
4. If we reject the harmony thesis, then the virtue/continence 
distinction cannot be drawn.    
5. If we hold the virtuous agent to be morally lacking in some way 
compared to the continent agent, then contemporary virtue ethics is 
not a robust normative theory.  
6. Therefore, the virtue/continence distinction cannot be drawn or 
contemporary virtue ethics is not a robust normative theory.  
 
 The authors discussed thus far, I argued, have largely been unsuccessful at defeating the 
above argument. In each case they have either failed to account for Stohr's counterexample or 
were unable to adequately draw the virtue/continence distinction. In the upcoming chapters, I 
                                                
55 One unexamined solution to the problem of continence, of course, might simply be to reject our commonsense 
intuitions regarding Stohr's problem case, however strange such a move might seem. While this could work, it seems 
to be an undesirable move for contemporary virtue ethicists to make, especially in light of the widespread emphasis 
and attention paid to terms like compassion and callousness in recent years. While it is hard to track down the source 
of this particular enthusiasm, Foot (1977) and Hursthouse (1991) are likely contributors to the current popularity of 
such and like virtue ethical terms.     
56 We might also think of the problem of continence as stemming from three plausible claims that are conjointly 
inconsistent: (a) our commonsense intuitions about Stohr's problem case are correct, (b) the harmony thesis is true, 
and (c) the virtuous agent is not morally defective.  
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will solve the problem of continence by addressing both sides. In the process, I hope to show that 
the harmony thesis should be limited in scope, as well as propose an independent explanation 
capable of accounting for Stohr's problem case–while doing so in a way that is consistent with 
the commitments of contemporary virtue ethics.57 Getting here will take some time. So, while 
tedious, it is best to start at the beginning. The next chapter will examine Aristotle's motivation 
for limiting the scope of the harmony thesis to temperance, and argue that he was justified in 
















                                                
57 If helpful to the reader, a rough sketch and foreshadow of my intended path of argumentation goes as follows: 
The virtue/continence distinction can be drawn but must be limited in scope to be viable, and contemporary virtue 
ethics is a robust normative theory but must rely on Aristotle's virtue of endurance in order to be so.  
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Chapter 4: Continence and Reason 
 
1. Introduction  
The problem brought to light by Stohr's counterexample and explored in Chapters 2 and 3, had to 
do with the failure of the virtuous agent–under the harmony thesis–to be appropriately disturbed 
at having to fire the employees. This in an important way had to do with the fact that we take the 
employees' well-being to matter in the case: saving their jobs is choiceworthy. But what do we 
mean by choiceworthiness? Section 2 looks to Aristotle in order to find an answer to this 
question and its relation to continence. We might also ask why the traditional view of continence 
must limit itself to bodily pleasures? Section 3 makes the case that this limitation is a necessary 
feature of what continence entails. What does continence entail? What is wrong with the 
continent agent? Sections 4 and 5 argue that it is not simply that the continent agent feels pain 
when he should not; but rather that he is subject to a genuine rational defect. Finally, Section 6 
defends that continence cannot make sense of cases involving competing choiceworthy goods 
and must instead relegate itself to cases involving at least one non-choiceworthy good, before 
concluding in Section 7 that for the problem of continence, the virtue/continence distinction is 
not at issue, but something else. 
 
2. Choiceworthiness and Continence  
What does it mean for a good to be choiceworthy? We might at first be tempted to simply equate 
choiceworthiness with the noble (the fine, to kalon). But I think this move is unjustified within 
the context of how we have been using the term choiceworthy. For, while even if it is true that all 
noble goods, actions, etc., are choiceworthy, the reverse does not necessarily follow. For instance, 
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while Aristotle would agree that paying respect to one's parents is choiceworthy, it seems very 
unlikely that performing basic familial duties is noble in itself, or at least not representative of 
'the noble'. Furthermore, in order to be able to represent degrees of choiceworthiness–that is, 
certain goods are more or less choiceworthy than others–we must be able to point to some 
evaluative standard. If something is barely choiceworthy, for instance, we are hard-pressed to say 
that thing is noble. This of course might be a consequence of nobleness normally being ascribed 
to goods, actions, etc., that are ends in themselves or done for their own sake. But this gets us 
into a lot of trouble. How do you compare two things, each of which is to be pursued in and for 
its own sake? What do we say about the employees' mortgages in Stohr's case, which seem to 
have moral value but not intrinsic value?58   
 To avoid the above difficulties, I propose adopting an alternative standard for 
choiceworthiness. To determine if a good is choiceworthy, and its degree of choiceworthiness, 
we should look to its relation and responsiveness to reason. By responsiveness to reason, I am 
referring to the Aristotelian understanding of rationality, or Reason, as having the ability to 
command or exhort the nonrational part of the soul toward certain actions or objects. To be 
responsive to reason is to listen to what the rational part of the soul prescribes. Aristotle provides 
some evidence for this interpretation when he claims:  
Or perhaps pleasures differ in species. For those from fine [noble] 
sources are different from those from shameful sources; and we 
cannot have the just person's pleasure without being just, any more 
than we can have the musician's without being musicians, and 
similarly in the other cases. (NE 1173b29–32) 
 
                                                
58 We might follow Jennifer Whiting (2002) and hold choiceworthiness to correspond with instrumentally bringing 
about eudaimonia, or flourishing. But in the case of the company owner this would mean that her eudaimonia is 
realized outside of herself: in the employees. This possibility is controversial, and best steered clear of in this 
dissertation.   
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Aristotle here is pointing to the fact that certain pleasures and the source of those pleasures differ 
in kind from others. Not only this, Aristotle claims that these types of pleasures are responsive to 
the objects of a thing's proper activity, and that objects in the best relation to this proper activity 
are best (NE 1174b15–21). For our purposes, I think it is best to focus on what objects (and 
pleasures) specifically engage us as human beings. I will hold that an object to be pursued, a 
good, becomes more or less valuable to the extent that it engages the source of a human being's 
proper activity: reason.  
 Aristotle, more generally, is referring to the capacity of human beings to take a certain 
kind of pleasure that animals do not: "Each kind of animal seems to have its own proper pleasure, 
just as it has its own proper function; for the proper pleasure will be the one that corresponds to 
its activity" (NE 1176a3–5). If we take the proper function of a human being to be the exercise of 
his rational faculty, it seems that our evaluation of goods as valuable will need to make reference 
to reason in some way.59 We could of course value things that are detached from or opposed to 
reason, but Aristotle would point out that we are simply in error: those things we value in fact are 
not valuable (NE 1176a20–24). And this extends beyond virtue in the strict sense. It is 
completely appropriate to respect one's parents, or seek honor from others; and hold doing so to 
be choiceworthy (see NE 1148a30–1148b17). At the same time, we could claim that the 
mentioned goods are in fact more choiceworthy than bodily pleasures, though less choiceworthy 
than moral virtue, and so on. We can say this is the case because moral virtue is more connected 
and responsive to the rational faculty than honor, and honor is more connected and responsive to 
the rational faculty than bodily pleasures; that is, moral virtue listens better to reason than honor, 
                                                
59 The same would be the case with evaluations of character. For instance, Aristotle claims: "However, this [part] as 
well [as the rational part] appears, as we said, to share in reason. At any rate, in the continent person it obeys reason; 
and in the temperate and the brave person it presumably listens still better to reason, since there it agrees with reason 
in everything" (NE 1102b27–30).  
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which listens better to reason than bodily pleasures–mainly, we now have an evaluative standard 
to point to. While this interpretation is far from perfect, it does help make sense of intermediate 
goods like honor, power, wealth, social status, and physical beauty: those goods that are not 
necessary (nor virtue) but praiseworthy60; as well as the worth of contemplation at the other 
extreme.61 
 If we accept the proposed interpretation it also becomes relatively clear why Aristotle 
would hold things like food and sex as non-choiceworthy–that is having absolutely no worth in 
itself. Eating and reproducing are something we do in so far as we are animals. What makes 
something have worth has to do with it being distinctly human: that is, being representative of 
our rational nature in one way or another. And this includes respecting our parents, paying a 
mortgage, and presumably keeping a steady job. With this in mind, let us turn our attention back 
to continence.   
 Aristotle places excessive pursuit of choiceworthy objects like wealth, profit, victory, and 
honor in a qualified category of continence/incontinence because their objects are inherently 
rational:  
There is no vice here [i.e., concerning wealth, profit, victory, and 
honor], for the reason we have given, since each of these things is 
naturally choiceworthy for itself, though excess about them is bad 
and to be avoided. Similarly, there is no incontinence here either, 
since incontinence is not merely to be avoided, but also 
blameworthy [and these conditions are not]. But because this way 
of being affected is similar to incontinence, people call it 
incontinence, adding the qualification that it is incontinence about 
this or that. Just so they call someone a bad doctor or a bad actor, 
though they would never call him simply bad, since each of these 
                                                
60 Some examples of intermediate goods given by Aristotle would include: wealth, profit, victory, and honor. See 
NE 1147b25–31; 1148a23–28.   
61 In this dissertation, I think it is best to avoid getting caught up in the inclusivist/exclusivist debate concerning 




conditions is not vice, but only similar to it by analogy. (NE 
1148b3–11) 
 
In the cases mentioned, the objects themselves are not criticized for being pursued. Nor are 
agents blamed "for feeling an appetite and love for them” (NE 1148a27). Instead, the problem 
lies in the particular way choiceworthy objects are pursued by the agent (in this case excessively). 
For example, the agent who overvalues or undervalues honor is normally characterized to be 
vicious: an honor-lover in the first case and indifferent to honor in the second case.62 But this is 
not the criterion for continence/incontinence that Aristotle is after. For Aristotle, 
continence/incontinence is taken to be different from moral virtue and vice (NE 1145a35–
1145b3). Though a mismatch in feelings may resemble excessive/deficient forms of a particular 
moral virtue, continence/incontinence is regarded as failing in a different way. The demarcation 
of continence as an intensity of feeling involving too much or too little pleasure or pain 
corresponding to the value of an object is unable to account for cases involving choiceworthiness. 
It is not that a good is more or less choiceworthy, but rather that it is choiceworthy at all. The 
connection of choiceworthy objects to the rational faculty prevents it from generating continence 
in the unqualified sense that Aristotle is looking for.  
 The same is the case with the emotions. While objects of emotion are far more removed 
from rational prescription than choiceworthy objects like honor or victory, they are still 
connected to reason. For example, Aristotle describes incontinence in respect to anger to be like 
an overly eager servant that mishears his instructions before setting about his task (NE 1149a25–
31). Even though it (anger) fails in its purpose, it is still said to listen to reason to an extent (NE 
1149a26–27). While an agent in this case may get too angry or angry at the wrong person, he 
acts according to reason and rightly in the sense that he has appropriate grounds to be angry in 
                                                
62 See NE 1125b7–13. 
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the situation. Again, Stohr would be justified in pointing out that an agent who felt too much 
anger at a small insult is defective in his excessive reaction. But this is simply to say that the 
agent in question is subject to the moral vice of irascibility.63 This is not what Aristotle is after in 
trying to establish the conditions of continence/incontinence. The intensity of the emotion is less 
relevant than the source: “For if someone is incontinent about spirit, [specifically referring to 
anger in the context] he is overcome by reason in a way" (NE 1149b2–3). Even if an agent grows 
excessively angry at the smallest slight, there seems for Aristotle some rational prescription, 
however small, justifying the reaction. Aristotle therefore seems committed to cases that are 
completely detached from reason in order to ascribe unqualified continence/incontinence.64 
 In order to get a purely irrational defect Aristotle must turn to the appetitive desires. The 
appetitive desires are concerned with necessary bodily needs, and are not held by Aristotle to be 
choiceworthy in themselves (NE 1147b25–31). This is not to say that all bodily desires are bad, 
but rather that it is possible for bodily desires to issue commands that conflict with reason. These 
desires are normally taken to involve objects of sense like sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch, 
though Aristotle is careful to restrict continence/incontinence exclusively to taste and touch. The 
move, while seemingly required, is unilluminating. If it is indeed the case, as I have claimed, that 
Aristotle wants unqualified continence/incontinence to be completely disconnected from reason, 
it does follow that it must involve non-choiceworthy objects, of which the bodily pleasures are 
an example. But this does not explain why continence/incontinence should be limited to such 
                                                
63 See NE 1125b25–31.  
64 It should be noted that Aristotle holds all spirited desire to be cases of qualified rather than unqualified 
continence/incontinence. For example, right after referencing the pursuit of intermediate goods like honor and gain 
as qualified cases of continence/incontinence Aristotle claims: "We speak of incontinence about spirit because of the 
similarity [to simple incontinence], and hence add the qualification that someone is incontinent about spirit, as we do 
in cases of honor or gain" (NE 1148b14–17).   
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cases. It only informs us that it is possible and consistent with Aristotle’s commitments that 
continence/incontinence can be derived from the bodily pleasures. 
 It is important to try to understand why Aristotle decides to limit unqualified 
continence/incontinence to bodily pleasures, particularly taste and touch, rather than something 
else. What is his motivation? The answer to this question is not readily apparent. Besides a 
discussion concerning the necessity of bodily pleasures and their status as non-choiceworthy, 
much of the support is commonly just taken to be stipulated. The primary quote in question 
reads:  
It is clear, then, that incontinence and continence apply only within 
the range of intemperance and temperance, and that for other 
things there is another form of incontinence, so called by 
transference of the name, and not simply. (NE 1149a20–25) 
 
The above passage is clear evidence that Aristotle intended the virtue/continence distinction to 
be limited in scope. But simply accepting the stipulation and using it to block derivations of the 
virtue/continence distinction outside of cases of temperance proves to be unsatisfying. I believe 
Aristotle must have had some reason for doing what he did. In order to try to provide an 
explanation for Aristotle’s tactic I suggest we move outside the confines of NE Book 7. 
 
3. The Uniqueness of Taste and Touch  
What is unique about taste and touch? It cannot simply lie in the fact that the two are necessary, 
non-choiceworthy, or appetitive.65 The other bodily pleasures of sight, hearing, and smell share 
in these features. It is also not the case that taste and touch are unique in being excessively 
                                                
65 Aristotle ultimately reduces the pleasures of taste to touch, making it one sense rather than two. See NE 1118a25–
1118b2. For convenience, I am treating taste and touch as two distinct senses, with their objects being food, drink, 
and sex, respectively. 
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pursued, or admitting of degrees. Aristotle readily acknowledges that objects of sight, hearing, 
and smell admit of excessive, deficient, or appropriate degrees. He claims,  
For those who find enjoyment in objects of sight, such as colors, 
shapes, a painting, are called neither temperate nor intemperate, 
even though it would also seem possible to enjoy these things 
rightly or excessively and deficiently. The same is true for hearing; 
no one is ever called intemperate for excessive enjoyment of songs 
or playacting, or temperate for the right enjoyment of them. Nor is 
this said about someone enjoying smells, except coincidentally. 
(NE 1118a4–11) 
 
This seems right. In terms of continence or temperance, we do not praise someone for his effort 
in resisting some smell. In fact, there is no need for self-control at all in such cases. The same 
would be the case with someone who decided to listen to music excessively. There is no defect 
here. So, the fact that taste and touch can be excessively pursued is not enough to demarcate it 
from sight, hearing, and smell.  
 Perhaps taste and touch are unique in being the most bestial of the bodily pleasures. For 
example, Aristotle claims, "The pleasures that concern temperance and intemperance are those 
that are shared with the other animals, and so appear slavish and bestial. These pleasures are 
touch and taste" (NE 1118a25–27). He goes onto to claim, "And so the sense that concerns 
intemperance is the most widely shared, and seems justifiably open to reproach, since we have it 
insofar as we are animals, not insofar as we are human beings" (1118b2–5). The argument here 
is that taste and touch are senses that belong to a larger class of animals than sight, hearing, and 
smell; and that this is ground to hold these senses as more primitive than the others. This, I take 
it, will necessarily follow from Aristotle's commitments in De Anima,66 but the distinction is 
somewhat trivial, or at least not very helpful for our purposes. Many animals, like lions and 
                                                
66 See De Anima 413b5–7, where Aristotle claims: "The primary form of sense is touch, which belongs to all 
animals. Just as the power of self-nutrition can be separated from touch and sensation generally, so touch can be 
separated from all other forms of sense." 
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wolves, for example, share in the sense of sight, hearing, and smell in similar if not more 
sophisticated ways than humans.67 The fact that they also possess the more basic necessary 
senses does little to show why continence/incontinence needs to be limited to temperance. Rather, 
it seems to amount to the claim that the most primitive senses are simply inferior to the less 
primitive. 
 We might expand the above argument to claim that touch–and taste: to be consistent–
cannot share in thought in the same way as sight, hearing, and smell. But this claim seems to 
come into conflict with Aristotle's acknowledgment in NE Book 3 that the connoisseur is capable 
of differentiating complicated flavors in tasting wine and fine food (1118a28–31) and that the 
rubbing and warming of massage allows for fine discrimination of touch (1118b5–8). It is hard to 
deny that appreciating fine wine, for instance, has some intellectual component to it. Enjoying a 
massage is less convincing, but when we think about advanced feats of dexterity it seems to 
counter the claim that touch is incapable of sharing in thought, in the strict sense.68 We might 
then say that taste and touch share in thought less than seeing, hearing, and smell. This is 
probably true, but Aristotle is not pointing to taste and touch in itself to make his claim, but more 
of a bestial version of these senses. For example, he excludes the example of the connoisseur 
above from intemperance. The same is the case with more sophisticated aspects of touch: "For 
indeed the most civilized of the pleasures coming through touch, such as those produced by 
rubbing and warming in gymnasia, are excluded from intemperance..." (NE 1118b5–7). So, in 
                                                
67 I should note that Aristotle would likely deny this. Though his claim in De Anima 421a20–22 might call my 
intuition into question: "While in respect of all the other senses we fall below many species of animals, in respect of 
touch we far excel all other species in exactness of discrimination." 
68 For example, see Parts of Animals 687a16–21 where Aristotle praises the hands: "Seeing then that such is the 
better course, and seeing also that of what is possible nature invariably brings about the best, we must conclude that 
man does not owe his superior intelligence to his hands, but his hands to his superior intelligence. For the most 
intelligent of animals is the one who would put the most organs to good use; and the hand is not to be looked on as 
one organ but as many; for it is, as it were, and instrument for further instruments." Also see De Anima 421a20–22. 
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order to get intemperance we must appeal to a less sophisticated form of taste and touch that 
does not share in thought, or is completely disconnected from the rational faculty.    
 The problem with the above move is the fact that each of the five senses admits of basic 
and more sophisticated forms. Seeing and hearing, for instance, can be elevated to appreciating 
art or listening to music. The horse for example can hear the same music as humans, but we want 
to say that for the horse it is not music but just a series of sounds. It is not clear why this is not 
the same scenario, or similar to that of the connoisseur of taste and touch above. The issue at 
hand is that the given argument does not tell us how taste and touch are different from seeing, 
hearing, and smell in itself. Rather, it seems to be the case that we are now drawing a new 
distinction between intellectually attuned perception and the five senses.69 That is, instead of 
trying to differentiate taste and touch from the other senses we are now, it seems, trying to 
differentiate a special quality of human perception from animal perception. But this does not tell 
us why taste and touch are unique in themselves; only that intemperance will need to apply to a 
less sophisticated or non-intellectual version of it. But without simply begging the question, there 
is no reason why the same demarcation should not apply to seeing, hearing, and smell as well.     
 That being said, there are some odd claims that Aristotle makes that would allow us to 
get more out of the above argument. First, Aristotle privileges sight in humans above the other 
senses. For example, he claims in Metaphysics 980a24–26 that humans prefer sight above all the 
other senses: "For not only with a view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, 
we prefer sight to almost everything else." Notice, that the claim is not simply stating that sight is 
better, less bestial, etc., but rather that we prefer seeing above the other senses.70 Aristotle also 
                                                
69 A discussion of Aristotle's account of phantasia or an analysis of his notion of "appearances" would prove helpful 
here. But phantasia is a notoriously difficult concept and beyond the scope of this dissertation.   
70 This is made more clear when Aristotle says in Metaphysics 980a22–27: "All men desire to know. An indication 
of this is the delight we take in our senses; for apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above 
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makes the strange claim that animals, unlike humans, are pained by seeing and hearing (NE 
1154b7–10). In fact, Aristotle claims that animals are constantly in pain: "For an animal is 
always suffering, as the natural scientists also testify, since they maintain that seeing and hearing 
are painful" (NE 1154b7–8). But from the phenomena, it seems pretty clear that humans at least 
are not constantly pained. As Aristotle contests, "However, we [humans] are used [to seeing and 
hearing] by now, so they say, [and so feel no intense pain]" (NE 1154b8–10). So from this, we 
might distinguish at least one distinct feature of human perception, in the basic sense, from 
animal perception: In humans, seeing and hearing are generally not painful activities. As far as 
the project in this section goes, we might go on to claim that seeing and hearing–and taking some 
philosophical liberties, smell–are not capable of causing humans pain, in itself. And by 
elimination, we might then say it is left open (or at least not excluded) that taste and touch are 
capable of causing humans pain, in itself.    
 While interesting, the above discussions have yet to provide an answer to the question of 
why taste and touch, in itself, is distinct from the other senses? In finding an answer to our 
question, I suggest that the distinctive mark of taste and touch is the fact that it is possible for 
these pleasures to cause pain in their absence or in the desiring of them. An excessive desire for 
pleasure is less to be faulted than the pain that results: “Pain disturbs and ruins the nature of the 
sufferer, while pleasure does nothing of the sort" (NE 1119a23–24). It is the potential destructive 
power of the pain generated by the pursuit of objects of taste and touch that separate these 
desires from sight, hearing, and smell. A desire for images, sounds, or smells does not produce 
pain in the same way. For instance, walking past blooming flowers without smelling them, we 
take it, will not require any serious struggle. This is not to say that pursuing objects of sight, 
                                                                                                                                                       
all others the sense of sight... The reason is that this, [sight] most of all the senses, makes us know and brings to light 
many differences between things." 
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hearing, or smell cannot result in bad consequences; like failing to fulfill one's social 
responsibilities on account of staring too long at a mountain range. But the point is that the pain 
resulting from taste and touch are internal to the desire itself, not the consequences. Unlike sight, 
hearing, or smell, the desire for objects of taste and touch are capable of generating pain simply 
in the fact that they are desired.  
 The continent agent and intemperate agent are similar in the fact that they are both pained 
by not receiving objects of taste and touch: “Rather, someone is intemperate because he feels 
more pain than is right at failing to get pleasant things; and even this pain is produced by the 
pleasure [he takes in them]" (NE 1118b31–33). In searching for the defect of the continent agent, 
the above considerations become important. The mere presence of a desire (however strong) for 
a bodily pleasure is not enough to show that the continent agent is subject to a distinctive defect. 
In fact, Aristotle holds desires of this sort to be necessary and appropriate to an extent (NE 
1154a10–20). What is not necessary is the presence of pain. In the case of bodily pleasures, 
Aristotle does not simply hold that some pain or a certain amount of pain is unnecessary, but 
rather no pain is necessary.71 He further claims that, “It would seem absurd, however, to suffer 
pain because of pleasure” (NE 1119a5–6). By “absurd,” I take Aristotle to mean contradictory or 
self-defeating. To be pained by the loss or absence of a hypothetical bodily pleasure is of course 
irrational in this sense. In this condition, the more an agent desired a pleasure of this sort, the 
more pained he would become. The continent agent’s situation is most dire, in the sense that he, 
unlike the intemperate or incontinent agent, will never satisfy the conflicting desire in action. It 
                                                
71 Aristotle provides support for this claim when he says, “Now the bodily goods allow excess. The base person is 
base because he pursues the excess, but not because he pursues the necessary pleasures; for all enjoy delicacies and 
wine and sexual relations in some way, though not all in the right way. The contrary is true with pain. For the base 
person avoids pain in general, not [only] an excess of it. For not [all] pain is contrary to excess [of pleasure], except 
to someone who pursues the excess [of pleasure]" (NE 1154a16–22). 
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will perpetually remain hypothetical, creating all the more reason that he should not desire the 
pleasure or be pained by its absence.  
 But, while it is true that not receiving objects of taste and touch can cause the continent 
agent to be pained in acting rightly, when by his own standards he should not be, this does not 
tell us very much about his distinctive defect. More is required to demarcate continence. Why is 
the continent agent pained at the loss of bodily pleasures like the intemperate agent when the 
virtuous agent is not? What is the source of the continent agent's irrational pain? The next two 
sections try to answer these questions. 
       
4. The Vicious Agent's Defect and Continence  
Before answering the question about the continent agent's defect, it will be useful to first look at 
the vicious agent's defect in the general sense. By seeing what's wrong with the vicious agent, I 
believe we can better understand the source of the continent agent's inner conflict. In making 
sense of the vicious agent's defect Terence Irwin's paper "Vice and Reason" proves incredibly 
helpful. Irwin argues that the standard view of the vicious agent as one who brings about the 
wrong ends in a harmonious way, or without inner conflict–neatly separating him from the 
incontinent agent–needs to be reevaluated. He instead claims that the vicious agent, in the 
extended view, is subject to inner conflict and regret. In making his argument, Irwin starts by 
pointing to the vicious agent's unstable source of evaluation:  
The virtuous person attaches value to acting on a non-strategic 
conviction about what is best, apart from its usefulness in fulfilling 
his inclinations; and so he will not regret having acted on that 
conviction. On the contrary, he will be satisfied with himself, since 
he has done what he rationally cares most about doing. The vicious 
person lacks this reason for self-satisfaction; for he does not care 
about acting on any non-strategic conviction. The fact that he has 
acted on such a conviction is not a source of satisfaction; hence he 
 
 80 
has no retrospective satisfaction opposing his dissatisfaction at 
how things turned out. The frustration of his inclinations is an 
undefeated reason for regret about his past actions. (Irwin 2001: p. 
91) 
 
Unlike the virtuous agent, the vicious agent acts according to his inclinations rather than an 
objective standard. This standard of personal inclination, while potentially unproblematic at the 
moment of acting, is subject to change over time. The fleeting nature of appetites makes the 
vicious agent liable to no longer value the past action or develop new inclinations that conflict 
with his original inclinations. Under such a view, the vicious agent's harmony is always 
threatened by his own sporadic desires. 
 The preceding claim might also be represented as a conflict between the vicious agent's 
current and future self:  
The vicious person conceives himself as nothing more than a 
sequence of appetites and satisfactions; he takes his good to 
depend on what he happens to want at a particular time. While he 
exercises practical reason to the extent of taking measures to 
secure his future satisfaction, his reason for this is not the virtuous 
person's reason. His concern for his future depends on the 
persistence of the same desires and appetites; and since he does not 
adopt these for a reason, but just treats them as desires that he 
happens to have, he has no particular reason to be concerned about 
a future self that (for all he knows) may have changed quite 
significantly. (Irwin 2001: p. 91) 
 
The source of inner conflict in the passage is the volatile nature of appetites. Because the vicious 
agent bases his conception of the good on his current inclinations, he can act against his own 
self-interest–even by his own standard of what is good. This is the source of his inner conflict. 
When his inclinations change he will then regret having done what he did. This is not to say that 
the vicious agent necessarily lacks a self, but rather that he has no reason to be concerned with 




 The above is further complicated by the fact that the vicious agent need not necessarily 
bring about the wrong ends. Because he is taken to act with decision and is capable of forming a 
rational plan to bring about what he holds to be valuable, the possibility of pursuing fine72 action 
is not excluded to him. As Irwin claims,  
This difference between virtuous and vicious people still allows 
the vicious person to have a conception of virtues and fine action. 
He can see, for instance, that it is good for him, given his 
inclinations, to cultivate some aspects of bravery and temperance 
(as Aristotle understands them) so that he can execute his longer-
term aims. He can also regard some actions and traits of 
personality as fine, because they are admirable in their own right 
apart from any belief about their effects; perhaps, for instance, he 
takes this view of someone who displays his power and wealth in 
magnificent actions (as the vicious person conceives them). (2001: 
p. 86) 
 
This is an interesting passage. It seems to be the case (without simply begging the question) that 
there is nothing to prevent the vicious person from performing fine actions, or even desiring to 
perform these types of actions. As was stated, the vicious agent simply values whatever 
inclination he has at the time. And when we think about intermediate choiceworthy goods like 
honor or power it becomes even more apparent that vicious agents will often desire and pursue 
these goods, sometimes at the expense of other gratifications. Furthermore, by the given view of 
viciousness, it is at least possible that a vicious agent could form a desire to develop some virtue 
in himself like honesty, for instance. Perhaps the agent in question is attracted to all the attention 
and praises honest people receive, and sees actually becoming honest to be the best strategy in 
securing this end.   
 If we accept the above possibility, there are problematic results. The first is that the agent 
discussed, who now has the desire to be honest, will according to the view given resent his past 
                                                
72 Irwin (2001) primarily uses fine to mean 'choiceworthy' in the sense of 'the noble' as I have defined it in Section 2, 
but he also uses fine to mean 'choiceworthy' in the more general sense to mean 'something that is valuable'. In this 
section, I simply stick to the term fine instead of choiceworthy to avoid ambiguity or misinterpreting Irwin.  
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self for telling so many lies: it makes it harder to accomplish his current ends, and so on. He 
regrets being so bad. But if this is the case, he sounds a lot like the virtuous agent. That is, the 
agent's present desires support, or are in harmony, with bringing about the right action. The 
reverse would also be the case if honesty no longer appealed to him in the future. He would 
regret being so good, and so on. This issue at hand is that merely performing the wrong action or 
having the wrong desires is not enough to demarcate the vicious agent. It is at least possible that 
all that could change the next day, and he could perform the right action and have the right 
desires, if his inclinations steered him in that direction. But, I take it, we want to say that in the 
second case the agent is still vicious: there is something wrong with him; even if he happens to 
imitate the virtuous agent.   
 To make sense of the vicious agent we need to look beyond the fact that he performs the 
wrong action.73 We need to look to the source of his inner conflict. The problem, according to 
Irwin, is that vicious agents, even when they pursue the fine, do not pursue it for itself, but rather 
for some other reason. They fail to appreciate the value of the action in itself:  
These features of vicious people result from their refusing to form 
their rational decisions by consideration of what is fine; hence, 
Aristotle is entitled to treat them as essential to vice. He need not 
rely on the assumption (true or false) that vicious people always 
have some residual respect for morality that is the source of their 
disapproval of themselves. On the contrary, the less their respect 
for the outlook guided by considerations of the fine, the more 
liable they are to self-hatred. (Irwin 2001: p. 94) 
 
The vicious agent's defect is that he is unable to see the fine as valuable in itself (even when he 
desires it). Rather, the vicious agent would pursue something like honesty because it is 
advantageous, gives him pleasure, etc. He holds his inclinations as the standard for what is right 
rather than a rational principle. Because of this, the vicious agent is unable to form a coherent 
                                                
73 In the case, the vicious agent is taken to perform the wrong action easily or without inner conflict at a specific 
point in time to separate him from the incontinent agent.  
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life plan or basis for self-evaluation (Irwin 2001: p. 91). For Irwin, this points to a malfunction of 
his reasoning and the source of his inner conflict.74  
 I hold that something similar is going on with the continent agent. The continent agent 
lacks the resources to be able to appreciate fine action in itself. While he knows that health is 
more valuable than bodily pleasure, he cannot rationally determine how valuable health actually 
is. He only knows that bodily pleasure, as a non-choiceworthy good, has no value whatsoever 
and health has more value than that. And that is his sole basis for preferring the latter. Thus, 
while he can distinguish that temperance is preferable to intemperance, he cannot gauge the 
actual value of a temperate act over another. He lacks the capacity to determine the worth of an 
object outside of a right/wrong dichotomy.  
 Because the continent agent is unable to gauge the value of fine actions or choiceworthy 
goods it fails to move him in the same way that it would a virtuous agent. His inclinations 
continue to play a decisive role in a similar way that they do in the vicious agent pushing him in 
more than one direction.  Thus, he fails to take the appropriate pleasure in acting rightly while at 
the same time experiencing pain in having to forego something that he wanted. And because he 
holds his decision as right–even though he cannot gauge the worth of either good–he will regret 
experiencing pain for something he actively avoided. In this way, the continent agent remains 
conflicted on account of his failure to be appropriately moved by the rational principle he set for 
himself. The next section looks at why a failure to be moved by the fine represents a defect in the 
rational faculty. 
                                                
74 To be clear, the important feature of argument is that it is at least possible for the vicious agent to act as the 
virtuous agent would act in a harmonious way; and thus we cannot use harmoniously performing vicious actions as 
the sole standard for demarcating the vicious agent. Irwin suggests instead we look to the vicious agent's inner 
conflict over time to demarcate him. This works. But I will acknowledge that it is conceivable for some vicious 
agent to be truly committed to evil, and consistently form his life plan in a way to bring it about. This new problem 
of viciousness, or whether or not genuine viciousness can or needs to be demarcated from incontinent viciousness or 




5. The Continent Agent's Defect and Pleasure  
The continent agent is subject to the conflicted state of being both pained at the loss of a bodily 
pleasure while at the same time anticipates the future prospect of some good: for instance, health. 
So, in this way, we could hold him to care about his future self unlike the vicious agent.75 But the 
continent agent is pained when he should not be unlike the virtuous agent. Why does acting 
rightly cause the continent agent to be pained? Ursula Coope makes headway in answering this 
question in her paper "Why does Aristotle Think that Ethical Virtue is Required for Practical 
Wisdom?" Coope agrees that the continent agent is unable to grasp the fine but takes the 
argument further in claiming that a failure to take the appropriate pleasure in fine action is 
representative of a rational defect. In regard to the pleasure the continent agent takes in health, 
for example, she claims, "The pleasure [in acting continently] comes from the anticipation of 
some benefit that the action is expected to produce: the benefit of good health. It is not said to 
come from the awareness that, in acting that way, one is acting finely (or at least, as finely as 
possible, given the presence of bad appetites)" (Coope 2012: p. 153). The pleasure in question is 
pursued by the continent agent for a reason other than that it is fine; it is advantageous, 
preventative of pain later on, etc. And because future benefit like this is remote it fails to be 
properly felt in the presence of the countervailing pain of foregoing the appetite at hand. 
 The point at issue is that the continent agent, on account of his appetites, remains drawn 
to objects contrary to what is right. For instance, if gluttony were not detrimental to health the 
continent agent would pursue it. Coope makes this point when she claims:  
This brings out the strength of the self-controlled [continent] 
person's bad appetites. The point, I take it, is not simply that the 
                                                
75 Or at least we would hold him to care about maintaining some constant principle over time, like acting in a way 
to preserve health.  
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self-controlled person has an appetite for some pleasure that reason 
forbids him to pursue. The point is, rather, that the self-controlled 
person's appetitive desire is so strong that he would enjoy acting on 
it, even though he was aware that this was not the right thing to do. 
(2012: p. 154) 
 
The fact that the continent agent would take pleasure in actions contrary to what reason 
prescribes is an indication that he does not appreciate fine action for itself. To take pleasure from 
shameful or base objects is something the virtuous agent would not do. Not only is this the case, 
we take it that the virtuous agent would be pained by such actions (Coope: 2012: p. 154; NE 
1119a12–15). Thus, both not taking appropriate pleasure in the fine and taking pleasure in what 
is shameful would represent some failure in the continent agent. Coope reinforces this point:  
Taken together, these remarks suggest that the self-controlled 
person is not sufficiently pained by the shamefulness of bad action: 
he would enjoy it, in spite of its shamefulness... Nor is he 
sufficiently pleased by the fineness of good action: he finds good 
action painful, in spite of his awareness that it is the right action ... 
and any pleasure he gets from good action only comes from the 
anticipation of a good product such as health. (2012: p. 154) 
 
 According to Coope, the above features characteristic to the continent agent point to a 
rational failing on his part. The reason that it is a rational failing, for Coope, concerns that fact 
that the appreciation and discernment of the fine needed to take pleasure in it is attributed to 
reason or the rational faculty. When pleasure is not experienced, or worse, the agent is pained, it 
is an indication that the rational part is not working properly, or tracking the wrong objects. 
Coope makes this point:  
Why suppose that the pleasure taken in the fineness of an action 
must be a pleasure of the rational part? The answer, I shall argue, 
is that Aristotle takes the capacity to discern the fineness of an 
action to be a rational capacity, and he assumes that if the capacity 
to discern Fness is rational, the pleasure taken in Fness must be a 




Discernment of the fine, for Coope, is taken to be a feature of practical wisdom, or phronesis. It 
is intellectual as well as perceptual. In seeing fine action as proper or fitting, the virtuous agent is 
capable of appreciating it in itself as the right thing to do, in accordance with reason, and for that 
reason alone.  
 According to Coope, in order to appreciate the fineness of an action fully an agent must 
take the appropriate pleasure in that action. The appropriate pleasure in a way completes the 
activity:  
From this, I think, it follows that the pleasure taken in this kind of 
fineness is a rational pleasure. Though Aristotle does not explicitly 
endorse this view, it is strongly suggested by his remarks about the 
relation between pleasure and perceptual or intellectual activity. 
Aristotle describes the pleasure taken in Fness as a kind of 
completion of the activity of perceiving or grasping Fness. (Coope 
2012: p. 156) 
 
What Coope is getting at is the idea that appreciating the fine is more than a belief about the 
rightness of the action. It is meant to incorporate a full understanding of the value of that action 
as fine. And for Coope full understanding "would require a kind of pleasurable engagement" 
(2012: p. 158).  
 Because the continent agent does not take the appropriate pleasure in performing the right 
action, it shows that he is unable to understand or grasp its fineness fully. That is not to say that 
the continent agent cannot see the right action as appropriate in the circumstances. Rather, the 
continent agent, because he is unable to take the proper pleasure in engaging the right action, 
shows himself to be subject to a rational flaw. Coope explains:  
Since it is, in the virtuous person, the rational part that takes 
pleasure in fine action, the failure to take this kind of pleasure is a 
failure of the rational part. The self-controlled person is able to 
discern what is appropriate to do in particular situations, and in this 
he has an ability that is similar to that of the practically wise 
person. But unlike the practically wise person, he does not take 
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pleasure in the fineness of appropriate action. It is because of this 
rational failing that he falls short of practical wisdom. (2012: p. 
157) 
 
From what was discussed, we should be able to demarcate the continent agent from the virtuous 
agent. The continent agent possesses a rational flaw contributing to his inability to fully discern 
or appreciate the fineness of an action. That is, his rational flaw prevents him from properly 
apprehending the value of fineness in itself, or recognizing the full worth of its objects. To be 
clear, the continent agent does pick out and is capable of seeing fine actions or objects as fine, in 
that they are to be taken as having value, simpliciter. So he is not irrational or arational in the 
same sense as the vicious agent. But the failure of the continent agent to take rational pleasure in 
fine action prevents him from fully engaging the fine for its own sake. So, while the continent 
agent is capable of setting and following a rational principle, he is less than fully rational, and 
thus does not possess practical wisdom in the sense that the virtuous agent possesses practical 
wisdom.  
 In support of the above claim, we might also think of the continent agent's defect as 
representative of a disconnect between the rational and nonrational (appetitive) part of the soul. 
Aristotle takes the function of the rational part of the soul to at least partly consist in persuading 
the nonrational part to follow its prescriptions (NE 1102b29–35). Because the rational part is 
unable to persuade the nonrational part to (fully) agree with its prescriptions in the continent 
agent, it points to some malfunction or deficiency of that faculty in performing its function. 
Coope explains: 
Though the nonrational part cannot itself discern fineness, it is 
responsive to pleasure. The (rational) enjoyment of fine action (or 
of the prospect of fine action) is just what would be needed to 
'persuade' the nonrational part, and to rid the soul of strong and bad 
appetites. Thus, because the self-controlled person does not take 
proper (rational) pleasure in the fineness of right action, her 
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rational part cannot perform one of its essential functions: it cannot 
'persuade' her nonrational part to agree with it. This, then, is a 
further respect in which the self-controlled person's rational part is 
at fault, and it provides a further reason for denying that the self-
controlled person is practically wise. (2012: p. 160) 
 
Under Coope's view, rational pleasure is a tool utilized by reason to persuade the nonrational part 
of the soul to agree with its decision. While the nonrational part of the soul cannot discern the 
worth of the fine, or appreciate it in itself, it does respond to the pleasure that is produced 
(indirectly) by the intellectual activity of discernment and appreciation. While it is unclear 
whether Coope–in regard to this specific argument–take this rational pleasure to be of greater 
quantity or intensity than the countervailing pleasure to do otherwise, or simply takes it to 
contribute or add to the already existing pleasure or reasons counting in favor of performing the 
right action, it is apparent that an agent who lacked this capacity would be less successful, or 
incapable of fully persuading the nonrational part of the soul to accept the rational part's 
prescriptions. The continued presence of conflicting desires in the continent agent is indicative 
that his rational part is unable to fully persuade the nonrational part, and thus this failure is to be 
attributed to a rational defect.76 To sum up, on account of a prior rational defect, the continent 
agent cannot discern or appreciate the fine fully, which in turn prevents him from taking the 
rational pleasure in acting rightly that would be needed to quell countervailing strong or bad 
appetites, or persuade the nonrational part. Thus, as a result, the agent is pained in acting rightly; 
and this is what continence is.  
   
6. Reintroducing Choiceworthiness 
                                                
76 Coope (2012) is unclear on whether or not persuasive failure between the two parts of the soul is a minor rational 
defect or a major rational defect. For our purposes, I think the more important issue is that the continent agent is 
rationally defective, not the extent to which he is defective.   
 
 89 
I have argued in the previous two sections that the continent agent fails to appreciate the fine 
(contributing to his pain when acting rightly) and that this is representative of a rational defect on 
his part. This section goes further to argue that the continent agent is unable to differentiate the 
worth of choiceworthy goods in the more general sense. (Remember, 'fine' in the sense that it has 
been being used is representative of something like 'the noble', or goods that are ends in 
themselves.) In the more general sense, I believe we can talk about the employees' jobs or 
mortgages in a coherent way; even though they are pursued for some further end. The argument 
in this section is that the continent agent cannot make sense of cases involving competing 
choiceworthy goods. 
  To start, it should be clear that the continent agent by definition experiences inner 
conflict or pain when performing the right action. If this is not the case, then we really have no 
idea what continence is.77 So, I think it is necessary to rule out cases where no pain is present.78  
But there are a large number of cases where pain might be felt. Section 3 argued that not 
receiving objects of taste and touch are capable of causing pain in the continent agent. Because 
taste and touch are bodily pleasures, and bodily pleasures are taken by Aristotle to be non-
choiceworthy, the pain in the case would be in response to a non-choiceworthy good. 
Alternatively, we take it that the pain the continent agent experiences cannot be in response to 
performing the right action in isolation–where the temptation of bodily pleasures is absent.79 
Thus, if we accept the analysis, it follows that the desire for non-choiceworthy goods alone is (at 
least) capable of causing the continent agent to be pained.  
                                                
77 See Chapter 2 for a defense of this claim.  
78 It should be pointed out that there is some space allowed for holding the continent agent to be pained without 
inner conflict (in particular, see my discussion of Broadie's solution; and to a lesser degree Stark, in Chapter 3). But 
this fails to adequately account for the problem case. 
79 To be thorough, it is at least conceivable for an agent to always be pained at doing the right thing in the absence 
of competing considerations. But this condition would be far worse than continence.  
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 Sections 4 and 5 argued that the continent agent is unable to appreciate or discern 
fineness, and that this can be attributed to a defect in his rational faculty. Connecting this to my 
claims in Section 2, we might say that because choiceworthiness (in the general sense) must 
make reference to the rational faculty, and objects are more or less choiceworthy to the extent of 
their relation and responsiveness to reason, the continent agent's faulty rational faculty would 
also fail, or be defective at discerning or appreciating choiceworthy goods in some way.80 And if 
this is the case, because the fine is a category of the choiceworthy, we could hold that if the 
continent agent is unable to properly discern or appreciate choiceworthy goods it will follow that 
he would be unable to appreciate fine goods. Thus, we might simply claim that the continent 
agent is unable to discern or appreciate choiceworthy goods.  
 It was also argued in Section 5 that part of the continent agent's failure to appreciate the 
fine had to do with his inability to take the proper pleasure in it. So even though the continent 
agent is able to pick out the fine, and see it as valuable, or as the right thing to do, he is unable to 
fully understand or appreciate it for its own sake on account of his inability to properly engage it: 
by taking a rational pleasure in it.81 Therefore, as Coope was keen to point out, the nonrational 
part will not be properly persuaded by the rational part to abandon "its strong and bad 
appetites."82 If strong and bad appetites remain, it will follow that these appetites are capable of 
causing the continent agent pain.83 Thus, if the continent agent is unable to take the proper 
                                                
80 I will admit that I can only assume this to be true. But unless 'the fine' requires some unique or limited category of 
reasoning, the rational faculty in the general sense should be able to pick out both choiceworthy and fine goods 
(where remember, the fine is a category of the choiceworthy) if it is functioning properly. 
81 I should note that I am assuming the continent agent will need to pick out the right action (or object) as such. If 
this were not the case then the continent agent could presumably act arbitrarily or viciously; diminishing the 
praiseworthiness of the status. See Chapter 1 for some support of this claim; in particular the discussion of 
Hursthouse's third condition: mainly, acting for the right reason.    
82 See Section 5 for a reminder of Coope's argument. 
83 If by strong and bad we mean objects of taste and touch, this should follow from my argument in Section 3, 
though Coope is unclear on what she means by "strong and bad." 
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pleasure in the fine that is needed to rid him of bad appetites, and these bad appetites are taken as 
non-choiceworthy, then the continent agent is able to be pained by not pursuing a non-
choiceworthy good in cases involving a competing non-choiceworthy good and choiceworthy 
good–where the fine is taken to be choiceworthy.  
 Finally, because it was stipulated that the continent agent will not be pained when 
performing the right action in itself, if he is pained the pain must come from somewhere else. 
Presumably, this pain will have to come from not receiving a choiceworthy good or not receiving 
a non-choiceworthy good. But it would seem to follow that because the continent agent's rational 
defect results in him being unable to properly discern the fine, and take pleasure in the fine, it 
would prove unfit for him to be pained by these objects on account of the fact that he cannot take 
the appropriate rational pleasure in them. If the continent agent should not be pained by 
something he cannot appreciate or take pleasure in, then he should not be pained at the loss of 
choiceworthy goods. If this is the case, the only way to consistently account for the continent 
agent's pain is to attribute it to a non-choiceworthy good that he can appreciate independently of 
his rational faculty, in virtue of his necessary animal nature.84 Thus, there is good reason to limit 
continence to cases that involve at least one non-choiceworthy good, of which temperance is a 
clear instance.  
 
7. Conclusion: Is the Problem of Continence a Problem for Continence?  
From what was argued, we can now understand why the scope of the harmony thesis needs to be 
limited to temperance. Contrary to Stohr, the defect in the continent agent does not concern the 
fact that he possesses too much or too little pain, but rather that he possesses any pain at all. Any 
                                                
84 See Section 3 for a reminder of this argument. 
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disturbance or pain, however small, is necessarily indicative of irrationality. But while I reject 
Stohr's proposed solution and demarcation of continence, her problem still remains. We do 
intuitively feel that an agent in the company owner's situation should be pained at the loss of 
something choiceworthy. Where I disagree with Stohr is in labeling the case of the company 
owner as a problem for continence. Something other than continence is at issue. This, according 
to my argument, follows because continence can only apply to cases where pain is felt at the loss 
of a non-choiceworthy good. The case of the company owner, on the other hand, involves 
competing choiceworthy goods. Thus, a discussion of continence is out of place in finding a 
solution to the problem of continence because it cannot respond to cases like Stohr's. In 
addressing problem cases involving competing choiceworthy goods, I suggest we instead look 















Chapter 5: Using Aristotle's Virtue of Endurance to Solve the Problem of Continence 
 
1. Introduction  
Endurance was not an uncommon concept in the ancient world, operating as a theme in Greek 
tragedy85 and receiving serious treatment in Plato's Laches. But in most cases, endurance is 
treated as or as part of the virtue of courage. This chapter argues that Aristotle uses endurance in 
a special way, and that he takes it to be a virtue in its own right. I start, in Section 2, by trying to 
provide an account of Aristotle's concept of endurance from what is available in the texts. 
Sections 3 and 4 use this account of endurance to help make sense of mixed action, and establish 
its importance regarding competing choiceworthy goods. In Section 5, I go on to establish 
endurance as a moral virtue and mean, with opposing vices that I refer to as moral apathy and 
moral squeamishness; as well as placing hardness and softness (regarding pain) as analogues to 
continence and incontinence. Section 6 uses the given demarcation to solve the problem of 
continence, before suggesting a revised formulation of the harmony thesis in Section 7, and 
concluding in Section 8.   
 
2. Endurance: A Rudimentary Account  
Aristotle’s concept of endurance is largely neglected by contemporary scholars. The reason for 
its neglect is not entirely clear, though the scarce treatment of the concept in the Nicomachean 
Ethics is likely a contributing factor. Still, there is evidence that Aristotle took endurance 
seriously, stating its delineation from continence as the third major task of NE Book 7: 
We must consider first, then, [1] whether incontinent people act 
knowingly or not, and in what sense knowingly; then [2] with what 
                                                
85 For example, see the works of Euripides and Sophocles.  
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sorts of object the incontinent and continent man may be said to be 
concerned (i.e. whether with any and every pleasure and pain, or 
with certain determinate kinds), and [3] whether the continent man 
and the man of endurance are the same or different; and similarly 
with regard to other matters germane to this inquiry. (1146b5–15)86 
 
Of the three major tasks stated in the passage, the first is widely covered by scholars, the second 
less so (though I hope to have given it some treatment in the previous chapter), and the third 
remains undeveloped by Aristotle. While Aristotle never delivers on his promise to complete the 
third task of delineating endurance in the extant works, I believe there is enough mention of the 
concept to reconstruct a rudimentary account capable of meeting the needs of the current 
problem.  
 To start, endurance is claimed to be primarily concerned with pain (NE 1150a10–15), 
though it seems capable of assisting temperance in some cases: “The temperate man all men call 
continent and disposed to endurance” (NE 1145b14–15). It is also associated with courage, 
helping agents both face and resist the pains involved in fearful situations (NE 1117a30–35). 
Endurance admits of a defective state referred to as softness by Aristotle. There are at least two 
different types of softness that are demonstrated. The first type involves not being able to 
overcome the same pain that most men could tolerate in the situation (NE 1150b13–16). An 
agent, in this case, is taken to be unable to resist the same amount of pain that most men are able 
to resist, or experiences more pain than most men would in the situation. The second type of 
softness involves choosing to avoid pain, rather than being prone to be defeated by pain. 
Aristotle uses the example of someone who drags his cloak rather than carry it to represent the 
latter type of softness (NE 1150b1–6). The lover of amusement is also claimed to be soft in a 
similar way: “The lover of amusement, too, is thought to be self-indulgent [intemperate], but is 
                                                
86 All references to Aristotle in the chapter are taken from The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford 
Translation. Ed. Jonathan Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. (Previous chapters used Terence 
Irwin's 1999 translation of the Nicomachean Ethics.) 
 
 95 
really soft. For amusement is relaxation, since it is rest; and the lover of amusement is one of the 
people who go to excess in this” (NE 1150b16–18). Amusement in this case is taken to be less 
about enjoyment and more about avoiding the pains required of labor. What Aristotle is trying to 
get at here is the fact that an agent who excessively avoids work to seek relaxation does not 
necessarily do so on account of an inability to tolerate the pain involved. Rather, he chooses to 
avoid pain simpliciter. In the same way, the man who drags his cloak could lift and successfully 
carry it if he wanted to, but avoids doing so. He is simply opposed to experiencing pain, however 
small.  
 The second type of softness might also be framed as allowing oneself to suffer something 
shameful or act shamefully on account of pain. Aristotle seems to suggest this when he points 
out in the above case that the agent who drags his cloak is content with being perceived as an 
"invalid" (NE 1150b1–6). Some support for this view can be found in Rhetoric 2.6: 
[W]e feel shame at such bad things as we think are disgraceful to 
ourselves or to those we care for... [including] refusing to endure 
hardships that are endured by people who are older, more 
delicately brought up, of higher rank, or generally less capable of 
endurance than ourselves; for all this shows effeminacy [softness]. 
(1383b15–1384a5)87 
 
If we read the above passage as concerning itself with endurance in the same sense as the 
Nicomachean Ethics, it should follow that an agent with endurance, unlike the soft agent, would 
be willing to face pain to avoid something shameful. This is an important point that I will return 
to in Section 3.    
 There is also a deficient state of endurance in which an agent is less pained than he 
should be or faces pain unnecessarily. To get a description of this type we must turn to the 
Eudemian Ethics:  
                                                
87 I am treating effeminacy here as a type of softness. My justification for this move comes from NE 1150b3–4, 
where Aristotle claims: "for effeminacy too is a kind of softness."   
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Further, one who can endure no pain, even if it is good for him, is 
soft; one who can endure all pain alike has no name literally 
applicable to him, but by metaphor is called hard, patient, or ready 
of submission. (1221a28–31) 
 
We can see that Aristotle has a discrimination of intensity and which pains to face in mind here. 
The endurant agent can tolerate the same pain as most men, feels the appropriate amount of pain 
toward the loss of something valuable, and will not purposely face just any pain, but only those 
pains that are worth facing. I take it that Aristotle holds choiceworthy goods to be worth facing 
pain over. This is both in the pursuit of choiceworthy goods and at their loss. What we might call 
a hard agent can seemingly go wrong in at least two ways: by feeling less pain than most men in 
the situation, specifically, at the loss of choiceworthy goods, and his willingness to 
indiscriminately face (any) pain for something non-choiceworthy.  
 Though there is only a single paragraph referencing endurance in the Magna Moralia, it 
provides a clear answer to the basic question of whether the continent man and man of endurance 
are the same or different: 
Are self-control [continence] and endurance the same thing? 
Surely not! For self-control has to do with pleasures and the man 
of self-control is he who masters pleasures, but endurance has to 
do with pains. For the man of endurance is he who endures and 
undergoes pains. (1202b29–32)88 
 
The delineation of endurance proves to be more complicated. While continence and endurance 
are not the same, Aristotle seems to draw parallels between the two concepts. Both are claimed 
to be good and praiseworthy (NE 1145b8–10). The opposing concepts are also taken to be 
similar. For example, he claims that incontinence is opposed to continence in the same way that 
                                                
88 I am taking self-control to be equivalent to continence in this passage. But other interpretations are possible. The 
passage continues: “Again, lack of self-control and softness are not the same thing. For softness and the soft person 
is he who does not undergo pains–not all of them, but such as any one else would undergo, if he had to; whereas the 




softness is opposed to endurance (NE 1150a32–34). This analogy is not completely developed by 
Aristotle but would seem to point to the first type of softness, where an agent is overcome by an 
overwhelming amount of pain in the situation. The comparison would then be an agent that is 
overwhelmed by pleasure. The continent and endurant agent then would be capable of 
overcoming the corresponding pleasure or pain, respectively.  
 While it is a convenient analogy, there are admittedly some differences between the two 
types of agents. In the case of continence an agent is said to conquer pleasure, while in the case 
of endurance an agent resists pain. These for Aristotle are different things: “For endurance 
consists in resisting, while continence consists in conquering, and resisting and conquering are 
different, as not being beaten is different from winning” (NE 1150a34–36). Resisting is taken to 
entail an agent passively accepting the presence of a pain, while conquering involves an agent 
actively trying to drive a pleasure out or nullifying it. This is why Aristotle claims that 
continence is “more worthy of choice than endurance” (NE 1150a35–36). We must be careful 
here concerning what Aristotle means by “more worthy of choice.” He is not saying that acting 
continently is superior or more difficult than acting from endurance. This is supported by 
Aristotle’s claim that “it is harder to face what is painful than to abstain from what is pleasant” 
(NE 1117a33–35). Instead, choiceworthiness here has to do with voluntariness. Endurance 
contains an involuntary aspect that continence lacks. The endurant agent would prefer not to 
experience the pain, but does so anyway in order to gain some choiceworthy good at a later time. 
The continent agent on the other hand chooses to conquer the conflicting pleasure.  
 
3. Endurance and Mixed Action 
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The given delineation provides us with some insight regarding Aristotle’s discussion of mixed 
action: “For such actions [mixed actions] men are sometimes even praised, when they endure 
something base or painful for great and noble objects gained” (NE 1110a20–21). Though there is 
a sense of involuntariness involved in facing pain, it is also voluntary in the sense that the agent 
resists or faces the pain in order to possess some choiceworthy good. The example Aristotle 
gives is of a ship captain that has to throw his cargo overboard during a storm to save his ship 
(NE 1110a8–13). The pain the captain endures is appropriate and praiseworthy in the sense that 
its object is something choiceworthy: saving the ship. If the pain were experienced for its own 
sake or for something non-choiceworthy, it would not be appropriate or praiseworthy in the same 
way. This helps explain how agents can be pained while acting virtuously at the same time. The 
clearest example of this can be found in Aristotle’s discussion of courage: “Death and wounds 
will be painful to the brave man and against his will [italics mine], but he will face them because 
it is noble to do so or because it is base not to do so” (NE 1117b5–10). The agent in this case 
does not choose to experience the pain, nor conquers the pain, but simply endures it.  
 Stohr's company owner should come to mind here. Like the ship captain, the company 
owner must act in response to external circumstances she has no control over. Just as the ship 
captain would never throw his cargo overboard under normal circumstances, the company owner 
would never fire the employees under normal circumstances. Both act only to bring about 
something more choiceworthy (saving the ship or saving the company) at a later time. I am 
willing to go as far as to claim that the case of the company owner is an example of mixed action. 
This is not to say that Stohr's argument needs to be limited to mixed action. The force of her 
argument allows for a broader scope. I will return to this point. 
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 There is also another sense of mixed action that is worth discussing. For Aristotle, an 
agent should also be willing to endure pain in order to avoid doing something shameful. That is, 
avoiding a shameful act is in some aspect choiceworthy or good in itself, even if a choiceworthy 
object is lost by avoiding that action. This aspect of mixed action is brought to light in Robert 
Heinaman's deft paper "Rationality, Eudaimonia, and Kakodaimonia in Aristotle." Heinaman's 
paper starts by calling into question whether Aristotle is a strict eudaimonist about value. He 
claims: 
On the eudaimonist view, the impossibility of eudaimonia means 
that nothing in my life can have any value. In that case it cannot be 
worth living. So on the eudaimonist view Aristotle should say that 
the impossibility of eudaimonia makes life not worth living. But, 
on the other hand, Aristotle says that the good man will endure 
with nobility the misfortunes that destroy eudaimonia, and he does 
not suggest that this does not hold in those cases where the 
misfortune is severe enough to render future eudaimonia 
impossible. (Heinaman 1993: p. 36) 
 
The passage is pointing to Aristotle's view that the virtuous agent will never be miserable, even if 
the possibility of happiness is taken from him due to external circumstances he has no control 
over (see NE 1101a34–1101b8; Politics 1332a8–27). Heinaman goes on to ask why this is the 
case. Why shouldn't the virtuous person be miserable in such hard cases? With eudaimonia out 
of reach, why even care? 
 The answer to the above questions, according to Heinaman, concerns the idea that it is 
possible to act rightly under the circumstances. What would make the virtuous person miserable, 
and make him truly unhappy, would be to act shamefully; as the vicious person would act. To act 
in this type of way would subject the agent in question to what Heinaman calls kakodaimonia, or 
wretchedness. He claims, "Virtue of character is not justified only if it promotes eudaimonia. 
Even when virtue fails to promote eudaimonia in specific cases it is justified by its prevention of 
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wretchedness (kakodaimonia). The truly virtuous man who has lost eudaimonia due to great 
misfortune will never suffer the worst and become wretched 'for he will never do what is hateful 
and base'" (Heinaman 1993: p. 55). What Heinaman is getting at is the idea that avoiding 
kakodaimonia is choiceworthy in itself. Becoming wretched is a worse condition than having 
everything (external) taken away or losing the possibility of happiness. Even when virtuous 
action is diminished it "need not be reduced to zero" (Heinaman 1993: p. 45). This helps explain 
the Aristotelian position that the courageous person would be willing to die rather than act 
cowardly (see NE 1117b10–15). While dying surely reduces that agent's positive potential for 
virtue, it might be said that performing a vicious action is negative to a greater degree. In fact, 
Heinaman says kakodaimonia is "the worst affliction that a human being can suffer" (1993: p. 
56). So, in terms of acting rightly, avoiding the condition of wretchedness could be said to be 
preferable and more valuable than any potential opportunity for virtue.  
 Referencing courage Heinaman claims, "Even if he [the virtuous agent] cannot achieve 
the greatest human good he may still act rationally to avert the greatest evil" (1993: p. 55). The 
idea being brought to the surface, I believe, has to do with the non-ideal nature of mixed actions. 
The greatest good would be achieved if nothing of value had to be sacrificed. But in the case of 
mixed action this is not possible, and something will need to be lost. Although, in these types of 
situations there is, as was said, the option to avoid doing something shameful or wretched, which 
if we take the argument seriously, will supersede the worth of either of the competing goods. 
That is, the virtuous agent's action "must not be an example of an intrinsic evil" (Heinaman 
1993: pp. 46–47). This might called the 'avoid kakodaimonia' requirement. To see this, think of 
Aristotle's ship captain again. There is nothing inherently shameful or wretched about throwing 
the cargo overboard. The same would follow with firing the employees. So both examples, while 
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mixed actions, pass the 'avoid kakodaimonia' requirement. But what about the case of 
Agamemnon?     
 In Euripides' Iphigenia at Aulis, Agamemnon sacrifices his daughter to ensure the safety 
and glory of the Greek fleet. This I take to be an example of mixed action. Assuming 
Agamemnon cares about his daughter, something choiceworthy is being sacrificed for the greater 
good or something more choiceworthy: the fleet. But we do take the case of Agamemnon to be 
different from Aristotle's ship captain and the company owner. Why? This, I hold, has to do with 
the fact that Agamemnon has to murder his daughter to bring it about. He has to do something 
shameful. As such, it violates the 'avoid kakodaimonia' requirement and should not be done. The 
thing to be made clear is that there is a second type of mixed action that needs to be responded to, 
albeit briefly.89 An agent, like Agamemnon, can presumably act to bring about a lesser evil as 
well as a greater good. But this, for Aristotle, will not be the right action in the case. I return to 
this example in the next section.              
 The point is that, while it is indeed possible that agents can find themselves needing to 
react in unsavory cases (i.e., Agamemnon), where they must do something base to prevent a 
greater evil, the virtuous agent is not subject to these types of mixed actions. There is no lesser 
evil for the virtuous agent. In terms of acting rightly, a virtuous agent will never intentionally 
perform an evil or shameful act; however small. And this is what the 'avoid kakodaimonia' 
requirement is pointing to. But, again, there is also a class of mixed actions that do not require an 
agent to act shamefully, where a lesser good needs to be sacrificed for a greater good, and pain is 
necessary and appropriately felt in bringing it about (i.e., Aristotle's ship captain, Stohr's 
                                                
89 That is, if we want virtue ethics to be a robust normative theory capable of responding to hard cases other than 
Stohr's company owner.  
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company owner). These are the cases of mixed action that the virtue of endurance concerns itself 
with.        
 
4. Endurance, Mixed Action, and Choiceworthiness  
If we accept the claims in the previous sections, it will follow that a virtuous agent be willing to 
face pain in bringing about choiceworthy goods and in avoiding something shameful. But this 
does not simply entail a willingness to endure some raw physical pain.90 It goes much further 
than this. This is why endurance, as I am using it, is different from courage. Again, there is 
nothing special, or necessarily appropriate about the discomfort, pain, fear, agony, etc., of 
performing a courageous act. Rather, it is something the courageous agent must simply deal with 
in order to act rightly. The bleeding wound, ghastly scar, and aches do nothing to make the 
soldier more courageous; it would be better if the pain weren't there. But for the virtue of 
endurance, the pain is appropriate, praiseworthy, needed: it comes from within. And pain of this 
sort can only, or should only, be attributed to something that is choiceworthy. This also says 
something about the puzzle of praiseworthy akrasia.91 When Neoptolemus foils Odysseus' plan 
on account of the difficulty he faces in telling a lie, we admire him for it.92 What we admire 
about Neoptolemus does not concern his overcoming any physical obstacle or the fact that he 
fails to carry through with an action that he believes to be right–even though it all works out in 
the end–but rather the pain he experiences at the prospect of doing something he deems 
dishonorable.    
                                                
90 It should be acknowledged that endurance is given a unique set of associated pains like cold, heat, hunger, and 
thirst; distinguishing it from the pains characteristic of courage: i.e., wounds, death, fear, etc. See NE 1148a5–18 
and Eudemian Ethics 1229b1–21. But I am using endurance in a special sense. For example, Aristotle's ship captain, 
when throwing the cargo overboard, is not necessarily taken to have to overcome cold, hunger, thirst, exertion; or 
physical pain for that matter. The pain of losing the cargo is of a different kind.  
91 See NE 1151b17–22.  
92 See Sophocles' Philoctetes.  
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 I would go on to say that Neoptolemus is subject to a type of softness in the case–even 
though Aristotle attributes the failure to a noble pleasure.93 To see this, imagine that the story 
was less benign than Sophocles makes it out to be. For instance, after learning the plot against 
him, Philoctetes upon retrieving his bow kills Neoptolemus and Odysseus instead of sparing 
them.94 I take it, Neoptolemus by his own standards, would say that he should have kept his word 
to Odysseus and not have foiled the plan.95 But imagine Neoptolemus does keep his word and 
carries through. We expect that he would still be strongly pained in having to forgo the honest 
act, and this pain is what we admire about him; not that he acted one way or another. I take this 
type of pain, in this sense, to capture what endurance is supposed to represent. It is appropriate 
because it is in response to the loss of a choiceworthy good. If Neoptolemus, when performing 
the right action (keeping his word), failed to experience this type of pain we would not admire 
him in the same way. So, admirable pain, which endurance concerns itself with, is taken to be 
appropriate only in the sense that it is in response to something choiceworthy. 
 If we accept the above along with the 'avoid kakodaimonia' requirement we can also 
respond to cases of mixed action like that of Agamemnon, and presumably the standard mill of 
moral dilemmas.96 For instance, even if Agamemnon were pained to a significant degree by his 
daughter's death (where the daughter's life is choiceworthy) it will not represent endurance or 
virtue, mainly because he murdered his daughter, which for Aristotle, and most of us, is taken to 
be shameful. And I take it that it would be the same with the company owner if she were 
required to murder the same employees to save the company. The right action would always be 
                                                
93 See NE 1151b17–22. 
94 See Philoctetes, lines 1290–1310.  
95 Neoptolemus, like Odysseus, believes that Philoctetes' coming to Troy is crucial to winning the war. Revealing 
the plot puts this goal in jeopardy; and it is only a matter of luck that Heracles appears and convinces Philoctetes to 
join the Greek cause rather than remain on the island. See Philoctetes, lines 1390–1471.  
96 The question might be raised whether or not there can be genuine moral dilemmas in virtue ethics? But such a 
topic exceeds the scope of this dissertation, and is best avoided.  
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not to murder the employees, no matter how many jobs were on the line–and I take it, it would 
be inappropriate for the company owner to look back with regret or pain at not killing the 
employees. These are not cases in which endurance, as we are using it, would apply. Aristotle, in 
terms of acting well, enforces this position when he says: 
But some acts, perhaps, we cannot be forced to do, but ought to 
face death after the most fearful sufferings; for the things that 
forced Euripides' Alcmaeon to slay his mother seem absurd. (NE 
1110a25–28) 
 
In the example that Aristotle is referencing, Alcmaeon kills his mother for betraying his father.97 
In the case, even if it is taken into account that Alcmaeon committed the act to avenge his father, 
or as part of familial honor or duty, these conditions fail to justify or warrant the murder, and 
such actions are taken by Aristotle to be shameful and avoided in the case.  
 To be fair, I should acknowledge that the circumstances in which actions are taken to be 
shameful, or wretched, are not always made readily apparent by Aristotle. For example, Aristotle 
in NE 3.1 leaves it open whether a virtuous agent would do something base to save his children 
or parents from being held hostage by a tyrant (1110a4–8). While unclear, I do take it that 
murdering someone else's family to appease the tyrant, for instance, would likely be 
representative of a shameful act and impermissible in Aristotle's view.98 In any case, I am 
holding that, if an act is in fact shameful a virtuous agent would not perform it or be pained by 
not performing it.99      
                                                
97 The reference is to Euripides' lost play Alcmaeon. For a reconstruction of the play see Teevan (2004).  
98 See NE 1107a9–12 where Aristotle gives a list of absolute prohibitions including: adultery, theft, and murder. He 
goes on to say, "It is not possible, then, ever to be right with regard to them [adultery, theft, murder]; one must 
always be wrong" (1107a12–13).     
99 This gets some further support from Aristotle's claim that "the sense of disgrace is not even characteristic of a 
good man, since it is consequent on bad actions, for such actions should not be done..." (NE 1128b22–25) and "the 
excellences are not subject to such a qualification [regarding shame]" (NE 1128b29–31).  
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 Therefore, I am taking endurance, as a virtue, to not concern itself with cases that require 
an agent to do something shameful (whether for the greater good, saving one's own life, the 
welfare of others; whatever). I also claimed that an agent with the virtue of endurance will be 
appropriately pained by the loss of a choiceworthy good. Thus, the virtuous agent will not 
perform a shameful action and will only be pained by the loss of something choiceworthy. I am 
also holding that Aristotle takes all right actions–or at the very least, all virtuous actions–to be 
choiceworthy to some degree, and vice versa with wrong actions. Without making this move 
there would be no reason to value the right action (or virtue) as such, or as good in itself.100 If 
this is the case, I believe it follows that, if a virtuous agent with endurance performs an action 
that is in fact the right action it will need to be choiceworthy to some degree, and if that agent is 
pained then (for it to be appropriate pain) it will need to be in response to a choiceworthy good.      
 If the above claims are correct, the virtue of endurance will only concern itself with cases 
of mixed action that involve competing choiceworthy goods. 
  To move forward, while endurance was claimed to be limited to a specific type of mixed 
action, it is least conceivable for there to be cases where continence also plays a role. Imagine a 
situation where an agent has to both tolerate some pain for a future choiceworthy good and 
overcome some present competing bodily pleasure. An example might involve the roles of diet 
and exercise in obtaining fitness or health. Here we need both continence to conquer the desire 
for the competing pleasure (i.e., unhealthy food, alcohol, etc.) and endurance to tolerate the pain 
(i.e., jogging, lifting weights, etc.) needed to bring about the choiceworthy good. It could be 
contended that a temperate agent would not have the strong desire for the pleasurable object to 
begin with. This is a fair assessment, but what do we say about the agent resisting the pain? We 
                                                
100 See Chapter 4, Section 5. Though I take it to be intuitive from a virtue ethical standpoint that the right action be 
choiceworthy. At the very least, we must accept the above if we want to maintain the traditional harmony thesis, or 
if we want to be able to make sense of temperance.  
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have some difficulty with the moral vocabulary. Part of this concerns an ambiguity in how 
endurance is described. It is both used to mean the capacity to tolerate strong pains, as well as the 
quality of not being overly pained or under pained in response to pursuing something 
choiceworthy. We lack the appropriate virtue terms. I suggest we make a similar move to 
Aristotle’s treatment of temperance and continence. In a similar vein, we might stipulate that the 
capacity to tolerate strong pains is contained within the virtue of endurance proper. Just as all 
temperate agents are also continent in regard to their capacity to conquer pleasure,101 all 
endurant agents are also endurant–in the sense of being tolerant–in regard to their capacity to 
resist strong pains.   
 I am not sure exactly how far Aristotle would want to extend the usage of endurance, but 
it should be able to cover many cases of mixed action where a choiceworthy good is lost. Or at 
least, it will operate to some extent whenever pain is necessary or appropriate in the situation. In 
following my rudimentary account, I will not speculate further on how Aristotle intended 
endurance to be used here. Instead, I will briefly offer a positive account (derived from the texts) 
of what endurance would entail if treated as a virtue. As a virtue, endurance will require an 
appropriate amount of pain corresponding to the value of a lost choiceworthy good. If an agent is 
overly pained he is deemed soft. If he is less pained than he should be he is deemed hard. 
Softness and hardness also have further distinctions. An agent who has the capacity to resist pain 
for something choiceworthy, but chooses to avoid pain altogether, is subject to a type of softness. 
An agent who chooses to suffer pain in the pursuit of non-choiceworthy objects is subject to a 
type of hardness. Of the derivations, the second type of softness has some parallels to 
intemperance. Like the intemperate agent who pursues objects contrary to reason on account of 
                                                
101 See NE 1151b32–1152a5.  
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pleasure, the soft agent avoids objects he should not on account of pain. In addition, there are 
restrictions on which objects are to be responded to. Just as an agent should not take pleasure in 
certain objects (NE 1118b22–27), an agent should also not be pained by certain objects. All other 
cases would have to fall under some qualified class of continence/incontinence.  
 
5. Endurance: Addressing Difficulties in Terminology  
The above demarcation, while promising, is subject to certain difficulties. Because of the scarce 
treatment of endurance in the texts we find ourselves working with a limited and inadequate 
terminology. Roughly, the available terms either confuse or overlap one another. This section 
goes beyond Aristotle to introduce some new virtue terms and distinctions to help alleviate this 
concern.   
 To start, because endurance is a moral virtue it is appropriate to establish it as a mean 
between two extremes in a similar fashion as the other moral virtues. The extremes and vice 
terms related to endurance I will call moral apathy and moral squeamishness. Moral apathy is 
the deficient state where some pain is felt at the loss of a choiceworthy good, but in an amount 
that is less than appropriate. For example, if the company owner were pained in firing the 
employees, but only to the degree that he might feel toward getting a bad haircut or dropping his 
wallet, he would fail to act virtuously in the situation. Moral squeamishness is the excessive state 
where an agent is pained in performing the right action (at the loss of a choiceworthy good) but 
in a degree exceeding what is appropriate. For example, if the company owner after firing the 
employees suffered severe depression and couldn't go on, or her life was ruined and so on, we 
would think this was far too extreme. Firing the employees is indeed a pity, but such a reaction is 
probably inappropriate and uncalled for; and intuitively we can even imagine the fired 
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employees themselves telling the company owner things like: "Cheer up!," "We'll be fine," "Life 
goes on," and the like in this case.     
 What about hardness? In the previous sections we treated hardness as a general category 
for not feeling enough pain. While useful, this is not strictly correct. To differentiate hardness 
from moral apathy further clarifications are in order. Because the company owner, under dispute, 
feels no pain or even pleasure when firing the employees we need a way to account for it–and 
moral apathy doesn't quite cover it. So hardness, in the proposed view, is not simply a general 
category of not feeling enough pain, but rather a special case of feeling no pain at all in the loss 
of a choiceworthy object. If we accept this distinction we can see the parallels to my account of 
continence in Chapter 4. Hardness is to endurance as continence is to temperance. The hard 
agent, like the continent agent, fails to appreciate the worth of choiceworthy goods. But where 
the defect of the continent agent lies in his failure to take a type of rational pleasure in these 
objects the hard agent fails to take a type of rational pain at their loss. What is rational pain in 
this sense? This is difficult to capture, be we can, I hope, get some understanding of it by 
imagining our reaction to a landmark or precious work of art being defaced or destroyed. It hurts 
in a special way; deep down. But of course, we can imagine people who could care less. And this 
in a sense captures what hardness is, whether it be attributed to jadedness, being desensitized, or 
the natural make-up of a person.  
 Softness in the previous sections was also being used in a very general way to refer to 
feeling too much pain. But to be clear, softness is not the same as moral squeamishness. Softness, 
in the proposed view, requires an agent to act wrongly on account of pain. Moral squeamishness 
on the other hand entails that an agent still perform the right action, but in the presence of 
excessive pain, or more pain than is appropriate at the loss of a choiceworthy good. So, softness 
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is to be treated as an analogue to incontinence rather than as a moral vice. But the soft agent fails 
to act rightly on account of pain, whereas the incontinent agent fails to act rightly on account of 
pleasure. To wrap up, while there are likely additional distinctions that might be made, I believe 
the suggested terms are enough to move forward with my argument. For clarification, the given 
moral terms and distinctions are: endurance, moral apathy, moral squeamishness, hardness, and 
softness.  
 
6. Endurance and the Problem of Continence  
The problem of continence involved the failure of the robust conception of the harmony thesis to 
account for hard cases involving competing choiceworthy goods. I have argued that the problem 
of continence is not an issue for continence per se, but rather involves a lack or failure of an 
undelineated moral virtue.102 From what was discussed, I think it is possible to fill in that moral 
virtue by appealing to endurance. This move, I take it, allows us to make sense of cases 
involving competing choiceworthy goods in a way that captures many of Stohr's intuitions about 
the problem case, while at the same time allowing us to hold onto our common understanding of 
continence under the harmony thesis.   
 Let's return to the case of the company owner. It was argued that there is something 
intuitively wrong with an agent in the company owner's situation that fails to experience inner 
conflict or pain in firing the employees. We can now see that the problem with the agent in 
question is that he is subject to the defect of hardness. Because he feels no pain, or acts with ease 
in the case, he shows himself not to value the employees' well-being as much as he should. An 
endurant agent will be appropriately pained at the loss of choiceworthy objects. At the same time, 
                                                
102 See Chapter 2 for a reminder of this argument.  
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he will not be pained at the loss of non-choiceworthy goods, making endurance compatible with 
possessing the virtue of temperance. We also saw in Section 5 that an agent who is pained at the 
loss of a choiceworthy good can go wrong in feeling too much or too little pain. For example, if 
the company owner were so overwhelmed by conflict or pain that it prevented or made it almost 
impossible to do what needed to be done (saving the company) then we might say that agent is 
subject to the vice of moral squeamishness. At the same time, if the agent was pained but 
experienced less pain than is appropriate we might say that he is subject to the vice of moral 
apathy. These are our extremes, and vice terms, in contrast to endurance, which is the mean. The 
point then, is that the problem with Stohr's counterexample concerns the fact that the agent in the 
case is less than virtuous, not that "continence is indicative of virtue." We can now show that an 
agent who acted without pain in the situation is indeed lacking in one of the moral virtues: 
endurance. Only by expressing the appropriate amount of pain can she be deemed fully virtuous.  
 We should now be able to see that the agent who is pained or conflicted in firing the 
employees is not morally lacking. She does not fail to act virtuously on account of experiencing 
inner conflict or pain in the case. In fact, if she were not pained, it would show that she is 
morally lacking on account of not possessing the virtue of endurance. So, the right and virtuous 
action in the case will entail the presence of the appropriate amount of pain. By the same 
standard, other hard cases–involving competing choiceworthy goods–would also require pain 
and inner conflict to act virtuously. Thus, virtue ethics is able to respond to problem cases and 
capable of being a robust normative theory.  
 The question might be raised concerning how endurance is to respond to cases involving 
non-choiceworthy goods like bodily pleasures? The easy answer is that it does not have to. The 
virtue of temperance is capable of capturing the appropriate response to bodily pleasures. In 
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these cases, desiring the pleasures too much or less than is necessary would represent moral vice. 
On the other hand, if there is any pain resulting from the desire for pleasurable objects, it can be 
captured by our ordinary understanding of continence. Further, in the modern context, we do 
have an understanding of non-choiceworthy goods that in many cases are not normally 
considered to be bodily. Watching a television program would be one case. This points to a need 
to expand our understanding of temperance. This is a tricky move. As I argued in Chapter 4, 
Aristotle has reasons for limiting temperance and continence to the senses of taste and touch. 
While this is a serious obstacle, it could be argued that any non-choiceworthy object taking on 
the same unique character of the bodily pleasures of taste and touch are open for inclusion. For 
instance, an excessive desire for watching television programs or playing video games seems 
capable of developing similar destructive tendencies as objects of food, drink, and sex. Whether 
the mere absence or desire for these objects are capable of causing pain in the same way as the 
traditional non-choiceworthy goods is debatable, though we have good evidence from people 
familiar with the phenomena to attest to the possibility. While I do not take up the challenge 
directly, the next section, in a weaker sense, pushes beyond strict temperance and proposes a 
formulation for demarcating competing goods in virtue of its general status as choiceworthy or 
non-choiceworthy.103   
 
7. A Revised Harmony Thesis  
From what has been discussed, we should now be able to draw two primary demarcations of 
right action. In my schema, cases involving at least one non-choiceworthy good will utilize the 
traditional virtue/continence distinction. And cases involving competing choiceworthy goods 
                                                
103 I also try to expand the scope of temperance in Chapter 6.  
 
 112 
will utilize the virtue/hardness distinction (where endurance is the virtue term to be filled in). 
Combined, these paradigms might be represented in the following formulation, which might be 
called the harmony thesis+:   
Harmony Thesis+ – A virtuous agent, when performing the right 
action, will not experience inner conflict or pain at the loss of non-
choiceworthy goods, but will experience inner conflict or pain at 
the loss of choiceworthy goods. 
 
In demarcating the virtuous agent we make the following distinctions: 
Continence – A continent agent, when performing the right action, 
will experience inner conflict or pain at the loss of non-
choiceworthy goods.  
 
Hardness – A hard agent, when performing the right action, will 
not experience inner conflict or pain at the loss of choiceworthy 
goods.  
 
By using the formulation above I believe we can respond to all, or most cases, as well as 
preserve continence in its traditional place alongside temperance. Hence, if we accept my 
proposal, the virtue/continence distinction can be drawn and virtue ethics can remain a robust 
normative theory.   
 
8. Conclusion  
In this chapter, I used Aristotle's virtue of endurance to solve the problem of continence. I think I 
have offered a solution that is viable and capable of addressing the case put forward by Stohr, as 
well as problem cases more generally. I did this in a way that avoided the need to sacrifice any of 
a number of plausible virtue ethical intuitions discussed, namely that our commonsense 
intuitions about Stohr's problem case are correct, that the harmony thesis is true, and that the 
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virtuous agent is not morally defective.104 Although certain revisions were inevitable, I believe 
each of these plausible intuitions remain largely intact after the argument. Finally, while my goal 
in writing this dissertation has been to solve the problem of continence, I hope to have also 
accomplished something more in showing that the virtuous agent is more morally complex than 
initially thought. The next chapter picks up this extended task, and goes a little further to try to 

















                                                
104 See Chapter 3, Section 7.  
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Chapter 6: The Virtue of Endurance and Contemporary Virtue Ethics 
 
1. Introduction  
The previous chapter used Aristotle's virtue of endurance to solve to the problem of continence 
and developed a revised harmony thesis. This chapter takes the solution further and attempts to 
incorporate some of the proposed ideas into contemporary virtue ethics. Sections 2-5 return to 
the virtue ethical theories of Foot, McDowell, Hursthouse, and Annas; and use the foregoing 
discussions to better make sense of the harmony thesis within these theories, as well as offer 
some potential improvements. In Section 6, acknowledging that the traditional harmony thesis 
needs to be limited in scope to be viable, I suggest that Aristotle might have limited the harmony 
thesis more than he needed to. I go on to look for some slack in the harmony thesis' theoretical 
structure to accommodate the intuition in the contemporary debate that part of the virtuous 
agent's appeal is the fact that he does the right thing so easily (generally). Finally, Section 7 
looks at some difficulties that endurance will have to face to gain acceptance in contemporary 
virtue ethics, before concluding in Section 8.         
 
2. Foot Revisited  
In Chapter 2, I looked at how a number of major virtue ethical theories were effected by the 
problem of continence, the first of which came from Foot. I argued that Foot's theory could not 
make sense of Stohr's problem case because the fault of the agent came from virtue itself rather 
than some non-virtuous temptation: such as the desire of the poor man to steal a purse in Foot's 
discussion. With all that has been discussed, I think it is now possible to go deeper and get more 
from Foot's theory. The details matter. Assuming the agent in question is not a criminal or thug, 
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we might ask what is his motivation for stealing the purse? There is a huge difference, for 
instance, between the desire for fashionable jewelry and clothes and feeding oneself. If the poor 
man is starving, or has hungry children at home, or even needs to pay his rent, there is a certain 
sense in which these things have a legitimate moral pull. The man in the situation, who does not 
give a second thought to providing shoes for his daughter, while praiseworthy in some lofty 
sense, seems to be missing something. I am willing to say that the poor man's health, his 
children's happiness, keeping the lights on, are all choiceworthy goods. So while this agent, to be 
certain, will not steal the purse or desire to steal as such, we might say it is completely 
appropriate (especially if he is poor) that he be pained or conflicted in the situation on account of 
what is to be lost: for instance, his child not eating that night. Or, we might even go as far as to 
say that the man who fails to appreciate that providing his daughter with shoes is choiceworthy is 
subject to hardness or moral apathy–even though this person, if he is to be virtuous, will still not 
steal in spite of the pain. Our moral lives are not black and white, and it is worth recognizing that 
it is sometimes hard to do what's right. I believe the force of Foot's example could be viewed in 
this way and representative of a more mature view of virtue. What about Foot's example of 
charity?       
 Foot holds that the man who helps another easily, say a rival, is more praiseworthy than 
one who struggles to do so.105 Again, the details matter. For example, what is it that would make 
it difficult to help a rival in need? If the answer is spite, or resentment, or even some satisfaction 
the agent might take in seeing the antagonist down on his luck, it fails to qualify as an 
appropriate consideration. These things are not choiceworthy. If these things need to be 
overcome or generate pain, this shows that the agent has some flaw in his character. For the 
                                                
105 See Foot (1978: p. 11). 
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virtuous agent such things are not important,106 and he would, I take it, help easily and without 
inner conflict or pain in the case.    
 So, we might then claim, that in certain cases (where something choiceworthy must be 
sacrificed) acting virtuously is difficult, and the more difficult the case the more praise and virtue 
the agent shows in acting well; while also holding that in other cases, the agent shows the most 
virtue by performing the right action easily. The harmony thesis+ put forward in the previous 
chapter, at least in part, could be said to capture this intuition.    
 
3. McDowell Revisited  
McDowell's theory could not make sense of Stohr's problem case due to the fact that competing 
considerations (opposed to performing the right action) need to be silenced–remember, without 
making this move there is no way to demarcate the virtuous agent from the continent agent. But 
of course we want to say that any concern for the employees' well-being should not be silenced 
in the case. Because we already established and defended that the company owner's concern for 
the employees should be heard and that she should be pained in the case, in order to get more 
from McDowell's theory we will need to weaken (or modify) his view in some way. Though, in 
light of the foregoing discussions, I believe that incorporating the virtue of endurance and its 
derivations could act to reinforce McDowell's view and give more than it takes.   
 Before moving forward, it is worth exploring McDowell's primary choice of application 
of the harmony thesis: to temperance and courage. While the former is largely consistent with the 
traditional usage of the harmony thesis, the latter leads to some strange implications. McDowell 
applies the traditional harmony thesis to courage in the same way that he does to temperance. 
                                                
106 I am simply taking it for granted that the virtuous agent would not concern himself with the mentioned 
considerations. But, if needed, there is some support for this view from Aristotle's discussion of the magnanimous 
person in NE 4.3.   
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The result is his famous exemplar of the stoic at the gate who faces death and injury with a 
"certain sublimity" and "sort of serenity."107 This is a puzzling example. In one sense, the agent 
seems to be lofty, or heroic, or non-human. And in another sense, it seems that such an attitude is 
praiseworthy or something to strive for. My answer to the puzzle is, that McDowell's stoic at the 
gate is representative of the hard agent. Remember, hardness is praiseworthy in the same way 
that continence is praiseworthy; but it falls short of virtue. So, we might recognize that in strictly 
applying the traditional harmony thesis outside of temperance (or at least to courage in this case) 
we will end up with the hard agent. This captures the strangeness of the example while also 
explaining why that action (as the right action) is praiseworthy. More generally, I think, we 
might look at McDowell's dichotomy as an attempt to accommodate considerations other than 
bodily pleasures.  
  I argued in Chapters 4 and 5 that, in order to consistently account for cases outside of 
bodily pleasure (or non-choiceworthy goods) we will need to rely on the virtue of endurance. 
Because courage, I take it, is not a case of bodily pleasure, a similar move could help McDowell. 
We might ask why the courageous agent needs to silence competing considerations? In the case 
of temperance, the answer was pretty straightforward: these things don't matter; are opposed to 
reason; are non-choiceworthy, etc. But the same line of argument fails to account for things like 
losing an arm or your life. The same would apply to the fired employees. McDowell wants to 
hold and goes onto claim that such types of considerations, if contrary to the right action, "count 
for nothing."108 Of course we don't want to accept this, and believe that an arm, a life, the well-
being of the fired employees, counts for a lot. But I believe it is possible to give some ground. 
While hard to swallow, we must admit that even typically noble or choiceworthy considerations 
                                                
107 See McDowell (1978: p. 27).  
108 See McDowell (1978: p. 27).  
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are capable of being an impediment to acting virtuously if they compete with something that is 
more choiceworthy–the right action. This is the whole point and problem of moral 
squeamishness. But in forming a compromise, this is not to say that such considerations should 
not be heard. Of course they should. And the virtuous agent will hear and take such 
considerations seriously because he is virtuous. But if such considerations are justifiably very 
strong–say, the desire not to suffer a torturous death–they will need to be controlled and brought 
down. And this is why we need endurance in these types of cases to quell the pain.  
 
4. Hursthouse Revisited 
Holding Stohr's problem case to depend on a conflict between Hursthouse's v-rules (e.g. 
concerning charity and benevolence) proved unsatisfactory due to the fact that Hursthouse's 
conception of the virtuous agent allows for him to resolve conflicts between v-rules using moral 
wisdom.109 Again, we might claim that the continent agent is unable to resolve conflicts in the 
same way and at a loss as to what he should do. But Stohr is very clear that this is not the case in 
her example: both the company owner who acts easily and the company owner who must 
struggle know that saving the company is the right thing to do and that the fired employees will 
be hurt in the process.110 In looking for a resolution, we might now go on to claim that endurance 
as a moral virtue will issue its own v-rules like 'Be pained at the loss of something valuable.' If 
we accept a v-rule like this then it will follow that an agent in the company owner's position will 
fail to act well if she is not pained in the case (because the employees' well-being is valuable). 
Thus, if we incorporate endurance it becomes less a case of a conflict of v-rules and more a case 
                                                
109 See Chapter 2, Section 3; Hursthouse (1999: pp. 80–81) for a reminder.  
110 See Chapter 2, Section 3; Stohr (2003: p. 343).  
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of an agent failing to abide by v-rules that are issued. And there seems to be no apparent conflict 
between saving the company and being pained in doing so.  
 It might be argued that the above v-rule issued by endurance comes into direct conflict 
with the harmony thesis. But, I must remind the reader that the harmony thesis is not a moral 
virtue–so it will not issue v-rules directly by Hursthouse's conception. The harmony thesis can 
only be represented as a particular aspect of temperance, which in turn would issue a prescription 
like 'Don't be pained over something invaluable.' I hope to have shown in the dissertation that a 
case like the one above does not involve temperance. Because temperance is not salient in the 
circumstances there is no reason why considerations or prescriptions concerning that moral 
virtue should factor into the decision-making process. Instead, the company owner who fires the 
employees easily and the company owner that must struggle to do so could be said to be 
represented as not abiding by the issued prescription in the first case and abiding by the issued 
prescription in the second case. As I have argued throughout, the company owner who fires the 
employees easily is morally lacking in some way–lacking in endurance if we accept my 
arguments. So the case is not necessarily representative of a conflict of v-rules but rather 
involves one agent who acts morally well and the other who does not. Using Hursthouse's 
concept of v-rules (and adding endurance's prescriptions) allows us to specifically point out 
where the morally defective agent fails in regard to right action in the case.  
 I also believe the virtue of endurance has something to offer Hursthouse's theory in terms 
of action-guidance. While contemporary virtue ethics' normative project, following my argument, 
has the tools to deal with Stohr's counterexample, Hursthouse's theory is subject to certain 
deficiencies regarding the virtuous agent's ability to act well in all cases. One of the biggest gaps 
concerning right action in Hursthouse's theory involves the virtuous agent's capacity to act well 
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in what Hursthouse refers to as Tragic Dilemmas. Some of my discussions in the dissertation, I 
believe, can help to fix or lessen this deficiency.  
 Regarding tragic dilemmas Hursthouse claims: 
However, if a genuinely tragic dilemma is what a virtuous agent 
emerges from, it will be the case that she emerges having done a 
terrible thing, the very sort of thing that the callous, dishonest, 
unjust, or in general vicious agent would characteristically do–
killed someone, or let them die, betrayed a trust, violated 
someone's serious rights. And hence it will not be possible to say 
that she has acted well... The actions a virtuous agent is forced to in 
tragic dilemmas fail to be good actions because the doing of them, 
no matter how unwillingly or involuntarily, mars or ruins a good 
life. (1999: p. 74) 
 
The difficulty with tragic dilemmas for Hursthouse involves the fact that by performing the 
heinous act, the virtuous agent is forced to lose his moral status or have it called into question. 
He in a sense ceases to be virtuous, and can no longer act as the standard of right action.111 And 
importantly, this will be the case no matter what action the virtuous agent chooses in a tragic 
dilemma. Hursthouse gives Bernard Williams' example of the 'Jim and Pedro case' to help make 
her point.112 Whether Jim kills the one or lets the twenty die he will not be able to live with 
himself afterward. His life will be "forever marred."113 This of course is a serious normative 
problem. In such cases, we are unable to rely on the virtuous agent to tell us what to do. There is 
no right answer. As Hursthouse aptly puts it: "Yes, there are tragic dilemmas, namely situations 
from which a virtuous agent cannot emerge having acted well" (1999: p. 77).   
                                                
111 It might be argued that a virtuous agent can only not act virtuously in a tragic dilemma, but Hursthouse is clear 
that she is making the stronger claim that he cannot act rightly when she says: "An action is right iff it is what a 
virtuous agent would, characteristically, do in the circumstances, except for tragic dilemmas, in which a decision is 
right iff it is what such an agent would decide, but the action decided upon may be too terrible to be called 'right' or 
'good'. (And a tragic dilemma is one from which a virtuous agent cannot emerge with her life unmarred.) (1999: p. 
79).  
112 See Smart and Williams (1973: pp. 93–100) for a reminder of the case. 
113 See Hursthouse (1999: p. 75). I should note that Hursthouse uses "her" life instead of "his" life in the case, but I 
use 'his' to refer back to Jim.  
 
 121 
 In closing this normative gap, I propose a two-pronged attack. First, we might make use 
of the 'avoid kakodaimonia' requirement that I defended in Chapter 5. Murdering the one, even if 
for a good reason (i.e., they're all going to die anyway if he doesn't), is still a shameful and 
horrible thing to do. And we might say, in alignment with the 'avoid kakodaimonia' requirement 
that the virtuous agent would never do such a thing. To see this more clearly, think of the 
familiar crying baby case, where a parent must suffocate her child to prevent enemy soldiers 
from discovering her and a group of people hiding in a basement. We, I take it, simply cannot 
imagine the virtuous agent smothering her baby to death, as hard as we try. The virtuous agent 
would choose to die rather than do such a thing–it just happens to be a shame that the other 
people in the group will have to die along with her. So if we accept the 'avoid kakodaimonia' 
requirement there is clear, right action in the cases, mainly, not to suffocate the baby or murder 
the Indian.  
 The second prong of the attack involves the fact that, for instance, even if Jim chooses 
not to kill the one, he will be plagued by guilt, remorse, regret, and so on, at letting the twenty 
die. As Hursthouse claims, "Here again, we arrive at a situation that deserves to be called 
'tragic'–not because the dilemma was irresolvable, but because, resolving it correctly, a virtuous 
agent cannot emerge with her life unmarred" (1999: p. 77). The point Hursthouse is getting at 
here, I think, is that even if the action is evaluated as right, the virtuous agent in a tragic dilemma 
someone still fails or the action is morally subpar or less than virtuous: and all the guilt, remorse, 
regret, etc. is indicative that this is the case. But by using the virtue of endurance, we might flip 
this and claim that: the fact that the agent has so much guilt, remorse, regret, etc., in the case 
shows not that the action is unvirtuous but rather that it is virtuous, or that agent shows himself 
to have virtue because of it. Thus, an agent does not lose his virtue, but preserves it in the case. 
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The agent who would fail to act virtuously–though rightly–in the case would be the one who was 
not so conflicted.114 Roughly put, we know what the virtuous agent would do in tragic cases like 
the one given: He would not kill the one Indian and feel awful about letting the twenty die. 
While maybe not the most appealing of solutions, this move does offer action-guidance and tells 
us how we should act in tragic cases, while also fixing a hole in Hursthouse's normative theory 
regarding tragic dilemmas.115 
  
5. Annas Revisited  
The problem with Annas' theory was that it needed to work in reverse to respond to Stohr's 
problem case. The company owner, as a learner, would have to start by firing the employees 
easily and then find it harder and harder to do so as she moved from learner to moral expert (the 
virtuous agent).116 While complicated, I believe there is a way to reconcile this move with Annas' 
theory. To get a solution, we might think in terms of the agent's attitude toward pain. An agent 
can through experience become more accustomed to and familiar with different types of pain. 
For example, a boxer will need to learn to keep hits from affecting his focus and performance. 
There is no denying that a boxer (even an expert) feels and is hurt from getting punched in the 
jaw. But we might say that he gets better at coming to terms with the pain over time: at first as a 
rookie he is dazed and can barely react afterward; and later as a professional he takes blows 
                                                
114 I should note that Hursthouse's theory is eudaimonistic. So it might be better, according to her theory, if the 
agent's life were not marred in the case. The 'avoid kakodaimonia' requirement will need to reject at least strict 
eudaimonism. See Chapter 5, Section 3.   
115 There, it should be acknowledged, are certain cases that prove more difficult than the ones mentioned (or treated 
by Hursthouse). For example, take Ruth Marcus' (1980) symmetrical dilemma involving a doctor who can only save 
one of two identical twins. My intuition is that he should save either twin, and feel an appropriate amount of pain at 
the death of the other twin. But of course this would point to more than one right action in the case. Something like 
the trolley case also seems to push in opposing directions. In such cases my arguments are not of much help, and I 
admit it as a weakness in my theory, though I am content with the capability of the 'avoid kakodaimonia' 
requirement and the virtue of endurance to provide action-guidance in at least most cases.      
116 See Chapter 2, Section 3. 
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without flinching. The pain itself remains fixed, but the reaction changes. But there is another 
way to think of improving one's attitude toward pain. An agent might be said to expand his 
perception and appreciation of pain as he becomes more morally mature.  
 Take the case of the consultant again who is in charge of advising numerous companies 
on maintaining solvency117–and for the case, take this person to also be directly in charge of 
firing the specific employees at these companies. For argument, we could imagine that this 
consultant at first, in agreement with our intuitions, is (appropriately) pained at seeing the 
employees lose their jobs.118 But we might also imagine that this agent, after numerous 
consultations, starts to also pick up on the fact that many of the non-fired employees are 
negatively affected by the firings: they lose a friend, they fear for their own jobs, are caused 
stress, etc. We might say his perception and appreciation of pain has expanded here. In response, 
he might act to institute a better transition policy or provide counseling to those affected by the 
ordeal and so on. In this way, the consultant could be said to become more pained (in that he is 
more responsive) as he becomes better at his job, while also gaining a better grasp and 
understanding of that pain over time. As he comes to see the bigger picture, the anguish of firing 
the employees, while still there, will be put in its proper place and come to terms with. So, in this 
view, we might recognize a complex interplay, and acknowledge that as the learner moves 
toward becoming a moral expert, acting well becomes easier in some ways and harder in others. 
Whether this move is satisfying is debatable. But it does offer a way to reconcile Annas' view of 
moral expertise with the problem case.  
                                                
117 See Chapter 2, Section 3 for a reminder.  
118 And we might also hold, that at the early learner stage the consultant only sees saving each company as valuable 
and is only pained at that prospect, and so on. This move, to be consistent, would need to involve a transition from 
hardness to virtue–e.g. endurance–rather than continence to virtue.  
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 Outside of the problem case, the virtue of endurance might enhance Annas' general 
theory. Take the boxer again. As he moves from learner to expert he is better able to control his 
reaction to pain, or at least prevent it from effecting his performance. Endurance is needed here. 
But we might also utilize the more sophisticated sense of endurance. Any boxer should have 
some concern for his opponent, in at least the sense of not killing him or causing him serious 
bodily harm. But if the boxer is more affected or pained then he should be at the prospect of 
hurting his opponent–i.e., he pulls his punches–it will prevent him from carrying out his intended 
goal: winning the match.119 In terms of performance, moral squeamishness seems to be a bigger 
hindrance than apathy. So, beyond physical pain, an agent will also need to control competing 
considerations to the extent that they do not affect his performance–even if they are 
choiceworthy. The same could be said of a doctor or nurse, for instance. While he should be 
responsive to his patients, his compassion must not interfere with helping them. He must not 
hesitate to make an incision or perform a tracheostomy or give a shot. Being overly sensitive 
would only make it harder to do what is required or right in the case. So we might say endurance 
is needed here too.  
 If we accept the above, endurance will be needed for the flow experience to be 
expansive.120 While many examples of flow can be said not to warrant any pain, the argument in 
this dissertation has shown that in at least some cases pain is appropriate. Endurance offers a way 
to account for this pain while also providing a means to control, or keep this pain to an 
acceptable level. We might now claim that an 'acceptable level' of pain is one where it does not 
effect the smooth performance of the right action.121 When it does effect the performance, or 
                                                
119 The same would be the case if the boxer were overly concerned with not getting injured himself. 
120 See Chapter 1, Section 4 for a discussion of the flow experience.  
121 In non-moral cases of flow, an 'acceptable level' of pain would entail the threshold in which the agent can still 
smoothly perform the intended action.  
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worse prevents the performance of the right action, it could be said to represent moral 
squeamishness in the first case and softness in the second. Finally, more simply, the flow 
experience will have to account for the nitty-gritty of many actions. The boxer will feel the 
punches. The soccer player will ache when sprinting to make the winning kick. Even the piano 
maestro's fingers will hurt from time to time. To say that the boxer when acting with flow–
following the harmony thesis–somehow doesn't feel the punch in the case, or is not pained by it, 
seems counterintuitive. But if we accept the virtue of endurance, the flow experience becomes 
more plausible and workable as a concept. In this way, along with the harmony thesis, endurance 
could be held to be necessary for flow–in the expanded sense.122     
  
6. Expanding the Traditional Harmony Thesis  
I have argued throughout that the harmony thesis needs to be limited in scope to be viable, in 
particular, that it must be limited to temperance. I would now like to qualify this view slightly. 
While it is true that the harmony thesis needs to be limited, there is no reason why it necessarily 
needs to be limited to only temperance, much less to taste and touch.123 While this view, 
undoubtedly, comes into tension with the standard Aristotelian interpretation, I believe it is 
workable if given a little wiggle room. I make two moves in this section. I first take the 
traditional harmony thesis, without alteration, and try to consistently apply it to some of the other 
                                                
122 I am intentionally avoiding pursuing the new problem of how to reconcile the flow thesis with what might be 
called the robust flow thesis. The point I hope to get across is, that in at least some cases endurance will be 
necessary for the flow experience.  
123 This move could seem to conflict with the arguments made in Chapter 4. But I will point out that Chapter 4 held 
that Aristotle's motivation for limiting the harmony thesis to temperance rested on the fact that temperance, as 
necessarily involving at least one non-choiceworthy good, provided a consistent means to draw the virtue/continence 
distinction. While, I admit, it will follow that if bodily pleasures are the only non-choiceworthy goods then the 
harmony thesis will need to be limited exclusively to temperance; but this section proposes that bodily pleasures are 
not the only non-choiceworthy goods, allowing for some extension.  
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moral virtues–outside of temperance. I then try to expand the scope of temperance itself, to 
accommodate a larger range of cases.  
 Before attempting to expand the harmony thesis it is worth reiterating that there are good 
reasons for it being ascribed to temperance. In fact, the harmony thesis will come into play in all 
cases of temperance, as traditionally understood (where the agent performs the right action). But 
just because the harmony thesis can be consistently applied to such cases does not mean that it is 
specific to it. The harmony thesis and temperance can be separated from one another. In this 
section, I will hold that the only thing that Aristotle is necessarily committed to, regarding the 
harmony thesis, is that it must apply to cases that involve at least one non-choiceworthy good. 
The further claims that it be derived from temperance, or taste and touch, while consistent with 
this commitment, are not necessary. Finally, I will use the category of non-choiceworthy in a 
more flexible sense than Aristotle might endorse. But, if we allow these concessions, I think we 
can do some real work in making the theory more compatible with some contemporary intuitions 
about the virtuous agent.  
 I start with a familiar example in virtue ethics. When we talk up the virtuous agent, we 
might give examples of his readiness to give to charity, or pick up the bill, or loan a friend 
money and so on; in the sense of him being generous. We might then go on to give examples of 
how non-virtuous people fall short. If a friend, for instance, begrudgingly treated you to a nice 
restaurant on your birthday, you would likely hold him to be lacking in the virtue of generosity. 
Even if he put on a show and hid his reluctance, if you found out afterward that it was difficult 
for him, again, that friend shows himself to be morally lacking. What if it was only a little 
difficult for that friend to treat you? While surely a nice guy, your friend still falls short: the 
virtuous agent would do better. The issue I think we are having, intuitively, is that anything short 
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of performing the generous act easily (or without inner conflict or pain) is unbecoming of the 
virtuous agent. The robust harmony thesis seems to have resurfaced.   
 In order to make sense of this intuition, and make it consistent with previous arguments, 
we might look at what is involved in the above case concerning generosity. Why would it be 
difficult for your friend to buy you dinner? Assuming the answer is not something like, 'you're 
not really friends after all', we might point to the fact that he cares too much about spending the 
requisite money. I am willing to hold that a small amount of money is non-choiceworthy in the 
case.124 So, the fact that the friend is pained by something non-choiceworthy points to the fact 
that he is not truly generous–even if it was never a question of whether or not he would treat you 
to the dinner: the right action. Following this line of thinking, the case can then be made out to 
be one involving a non-choiceworthy good (a small amount of money) and a choiceworthy good 
(doing something nice for a friend). If this is the case, the harmony thesis can be applied to 
generosity in the same way that we would apply it to temperance. Because the virtuous agent 
will not be pained or conflicted at the loss of a non-choiceworthy good, he will perform the 
generous action easily in the case.125 And this is what we typically expect in contemporary virtue 
ethics.  
 Take another case. We expect the virtuous agent to be honest, or keep his word, or tell the 
truth and so on. And we expect him to do this very easily. To understand this intuition, we might 
point to the many things that would make someone act otherwise. An agent might exaggerate his 
accomplishments for undue praise, or break a promise to gain some immediate benefit, or lie to 
get out of some obligation. But for the virtuous agent, I take it, these things are not important. 
They are we might say non-choiceworthy for him. The person who recounts how much strength 
                                                
124 Although, if the friend is very poor the money might be choiceworthy in the case.  
125 See Chapter 5, Section 7.  
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it took to overcome some obstacle and stay true to his word fails to appreciate an important point. 
There should not have been a struggle at all. The same would be the case with the just person or 
the friendly person. The things that might commonly steer him amiss like greed, or selfishness, 
or jealousy, or vanity, are not considerations for him. They are non-choiceworthy. So, like 
honesty, or generosity, or temperance; the harmony thesis comes into play for these moral virtues. 
 The above examples capture contemporary intuitions about the virtuous agent, in the 
sense of him performing the right action easily (or without inner conflict or pain) generally. But 
the fact that the harmony thesis can be applied to multiple moral virtues does not necessarily 
mean that the robust harmony thesis has resurfaced (in the strict sense). For example, let's go 
back to the virtue of honesty. Most contemporary virtue ethicists will want to claim that the 
virtuous agent would lie to prevent significant harm to another. In a case like this, it would not be 
appropriate to perform the right action easily, as the harmony thesis would typically advise. 
Instead, an agent should be pained or conflicted in telling the lie–the right action. Following my 
theory, this would be the case because there are two competing choiceworthy goods in play. So 
we will have to appeal to endurance rather than the harmony thesis to respond to the case. To 
sum up, the harmony thesis does work in many cases, and is capable of accounting for the 
contemporary intuition that the virtuous agent performs the right action easily, generally, but it 
still needs to be limited in scope and cannot be robust in the strict sense. (But where it does fail, 
endurance is capable of picking up the slack.) 
 I claimed that the harmony thesis will apply to all cases of temperance. In the Aristotelian 
view, temperance will involve the senses of taste and touch, with food, drink, and sex being its 
objects. But we also might talk about temperance regarding something like alcohol. For example, 
Aristotle claims that all humans "enjoy delicacies and wines [italics mine] and sexual relations in 
 
 129 
some way, though not all in the right way" (NE 1154a15–20). By not in the right way, I take it, 
Aristotle means intemperately. In the spirit of gaining ground, there is an important discrepancy 
that we might point to. While it the true that objects like food and sex are necessary and natural, 
as Aristotle understands the terms, this clearly cannot be the case with wine, or alcohol more 
generally. As far as we know, no non-human animals drink wine or have it as a necessary 
requisite for survival. So an argument to the affect that wine can be an object of temperance (like 
food or sex) on account of its association with our necessary animal nature (and hence non-
choiceworthy) loses support.126  
 The above being said, it would not be unreasonable–in both the modern and traditional 
views–to hold alcohol to fall in the domain of temperance, and allow that it is non-
choiceworthy.127 The same could be said about alcohol having similar destructive tendencies as 
food or sex, in that it is possible for its object to cause pain in its absence or in the desiring of 
it.128 And here's the move. Looking at the phenomena, it is clear that many people enjoy the 
pleasures of alcohol beyond the fact that it tastes good, or quenches thirst, and may seek it for the 
sole purpose of becoming intoxicated, relaxed, etc. But the pleasurable sensation of being 
intoxicated, for instance, cannot solely be attributed to the senses of taste or touch. If this is the 
case, we have an example of temperance being applied outside of the senses of taste and touch. 
With a little flexibility, I hold, it is not too difficult to capture many forms of drug use, or even 
                                                
126 While this move may seem to conflict with some of my arguments it need not to. The claim in Chapter 4 was 
that the pleasures of taste and touch are non-choiceworthy on account of their association with our necessary animal 
nature. The above move, on the other hand, is simply claiming that something like wine cannot be held to be non-
choiceworthy by the same criteria. But this does not mean it is not non-choiceworthy. A rock, for instance, is non-
choiceworthy. And so is poison. Furthermore, in order to fall under the domain of temperance (or so I argued) an 
object needs to take on the unique, destructive characteristics of taste and touch; which something like wine might 
possess, and objects of sight, hearing, and smell will lack (see Chapter 4, Section 3; also see Chapter 5, Section 6).   
127 To see the intuition, think of our resistance to the claim that it is appropriate to be pained at not having another 
drink. We want to hold that the temperate person would not be pained by this prospect–compared to his health–on 
account of the drink being non-choiceworthy. But I admit, I am simply stipulating that this is the case.  
128 See Chapter 4, Section 3.  
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certain thrill seeking forms of behavior like gambling, and the like, under the same description. 
The point to be made, without simply deriving an extended list, is that there is some room for 
temperance to operate outside of taste and touch. Whether it be a certain class of pleasurable 
sensation, or pleasure more generally understood, the virtue of temperance could be expanded to 
a larger range of cases then allowed by the traditional view.129 I take an extension of the virtue of 
temperance–small or large–to be desirable and conducive to accommodating contemporary 
virtue ethics, both in its held intuitions and in its normative project.  
 
7. Some Difficulties for Endurance in Contemporary Virtue Ethics 
The virtue of endurance, I argued, would prove a valuable addition to contemporary virtue ethics. 
But there are a number of obstacles that could deter or work against its acceptance. The first is 
that contemporary virtue ethicists simply might not want it. The case for endurance, in a large 
way, depends on the acknowledgement that the problem of continence is a real problem. But the 
significance of the problem of continence could be discounted by virtue ethicists. I see at least 
two camps that would prove problematic in this regard. The first would involve philosophers 
who are happy with the robust harmony thesis as is, and see no need to modify it in face of the 
problem of continence. The second camp would be philosophers that do not make use of the 
harmony thesis in their theories. In order to appeal to both camps of philosophers, one of two 
things needs to be done. The first thing entails convincing philosophers that the problem of 
continence is a serious problem. More can be done, and further arguments made in this regard. 
But it is worth pointing out that it is quite possible that many virtue ethicists who accept the 
                                                
129 The project itself is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
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harmony thesis might be unaware that it leads to problematic implications. This dissertation, in 
part, could be seen as a way to raise awareness of the problem of continence.  
 As far as convincing the second camp of philosophers above, another issue and difficulty 
involves the fact that endurance seems to come as a package deal with the acceptance of the 
problem of continence. I acknowledge that I have argued in a way that forwards this view. But, 
of course, theories that do not accept or make use of the harmony thesis have no reason to see a 
solution to the problem of continence as very important or relevant. So, in order to reach out to 
these philosophers regarding the value of endurance, we will have to find a way to separate it 
from the problem of continence and deliver it by itself. I believe this can be done, and that the 
virtue of endurance has a lot to offer, other than its ability to solve a particular problem.  
 The second obstacle involves the fact that contemporary virtue ethics might not need the 
virtue of endurance. I have drawn a series of moral demarcations and distinctions to account for 
problem and non-problem cases. But it seems possible that the same work could be done with 
less technical or non-philosophical terminology–or with terminology other than my own. In the 
extended sphere there are a large array of concepts to draw from like empathy, callousness, 
kindness, coldness, ego-depletion, willpower, insincerity, integrity, and so on. While messy, it is 
likely possible to do many of the same things I have done throughout the dissertation with less 
technical or varied concepts. But I will say this. In my view, endurance is not just one of, or the 
same as, many of the recent virtue concepts now in use.130 I believe it is just as important and has 
the same stature as the moral virtue of temperance. And just as temperance fails to be adequately 
captured by like terms the same is the case with endurance. That being said, while the 
temperance/endurance division proves to be a valuable means for accounting for problem and 
                                                
130 That is, just because endurance lacks the authority of more recognizable traditional moral virtues like courage, 
generosity, mildness, wit, etc., this is not reason to associate it with the larger share of novel virtues currently in use 
(like: industriousness, curiosity, patience, love, respect, tolerance, compassion, care, and so on). 
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non-problem cases, there is still much room and need for additional terms, both philosophical 
and non-philosophical.  
 The third obstacle for the virtue of endurance is that, even if accepted, it might not be 
compatible with a number of contemporary virtue ethical theories. For instance, the attempt to 
incorporate endurance into the four theories treated in this chapter could be seen as less than 
successful. A defender of McDowell, for instance, might retract and claim that, "No, the concern 
for the employees should be silenced." Or, outside the problem case, it might claim that, "No, the 
stoic at the gate is not subject to hardness. He is virtuous."131 There is not much the supporter of 
endurance can do here. We could argue that the benefits outweigh the costs. But in each of the 
examples treated, the incorporation of endurance was not a perfect integration, and required 
revisions on the part of the theories taken up. There are two ways this difficulty might be 
overcome. We could search for specific theories where endurance is a better fit, or we could 
build a theory from the ground up. Both tasks are a project for another time.   
 A fourth obstacle for the virtue of endurance comes from two directions: it could rely on 
Aristotle too much, or be too Aristotelian; or it fails to adequately represent, or overstretches the 
Aristotelian position. Regarding the first hurdle, endurance does seem to be strongly dependent 
on the Aristotelian model. It takes concepts like continence, the doctrine of the mean, and 
choiceworthiness, as basic. So in this way it could be said to be specifically geared toward neo-
Aristotelian virtue ethics rather than virtue ethics more generally understood. While this is not 
necessarily a bad thing, there is no reason why endurance, taken by itself, needs to be neo-
Aristotelian or bound to a neo-Aristotelian framework. For example, we can sufficiently make 
sense of failing to be moved by something important without bringing in the doctrine of the 
                                                
131 See Section 3 for a reminder.  
 
 133 
mean, or choiceworthiness, or even holding it under the description of being pained. I take the 
concepts to be helpful, but they are not necessary for endurance to do its work. So, an 
independent non-Aristotelian framework, or at least an adaptable framework, will have to be 
built if endurance is to be utilized outside of the neo-Aristotelian mold. I think this restructuring 
is both possible and desirable.  
 The second hurdle is equally problematic, in regard to philosophers who do want to 
remain and identify themselves as neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists. Much of what I say about the 
virtue of endurance is speculative. For example, while Aristotle does list endurance as a virtue 
and mean on his chart in the Eudemian Ethics, there is no clear indication that he intended it to 
be used in the way that I put forward. Much of what I go on to claim is put together indirectly by 
examining Aristotle's scattered comments concerning endurance's relation to other concepts like 
continence, softness, mixed action, and so on. But while making this type of move was necessary 
(considering Aristotle's scarce treatment of endurance in the extant works), I take it, there is still 
something there that is worth maintaining; whether it is consistent with what Aristotle would 
want to hold or not. As Hursthouse keenly puts it: "But, one might say, what reasons have we for 
believing this, beyond the fact that Aristotle says so?"132 In the dissertation, I have given many 
reasons to accept endurance beyond the fact that it comes from Aristotle. Thus, while one can 
attack my scholarship, the end result stands on its own. And even if the implications are my own, 
I believe there is enough of an Aristotelian flavor to keep most virtue ethicists in the neo-
Aristotelian camp satisfied.  
 
8. Conclusion  
                                                
132 See Hursthouse (1999: pp. 54–55).  
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This chapter made the case for adopting the virtue of endurance in contemporary virtue ethics, 
beyond its ability to solve the problem of continence. I believe the case for incorporation is a 
good one. But why stop here? Endurance has great promise above its ability to solve a particular 
problem and incorporate into a particular theory. For instance, with a little work, I see no reason 
that would prevent endurance from working within a deontological or utilitarian framework. 
There are many avenues for further investigation that this very old, but exciting concept could 
take. Thus, in a big way, it is my hope that this dissertation will bring attention to or renew 
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